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ABSTRACT
The work presented here represents a practical investigation into the role
of truth in the development of scientific knowledge. Truth is commonly
understood in the natural sciences to exist as a single, objective reality,
independent of human perception. The role of science, then, is to elucidate that
truth through observations and experiments in the endeavor to uncover scientific
knowledge. However, one's access to scientific truth is only possible through the
lens of the "perceptual apparatus"- the combination of available data,
observational tools, theory, prior experience, and cultural bias which influence
the interpretation of any scientific result. The perceptual apparatus, however,
inherently constrains one's interpretation of the truth to a single perspective,
leaving open the possibility of other perspectives which potentially hold different
interpretations of the same truth. The realization of this would suggest that there
lies some value in understanding what interpretations are held by an alternate
perspective. The point of the study presented is to explore, on a practical level,
how perspective and interpretation shift under different perceptual apparatuses
and what consequences that might hold for scientific knowledge developed within
the field of environmental science.
Chapter II examines how the concept of the paradigm applies to truth and
the development of scientific knowledge, in particular examining how shifts in
paradigms influence a scientific community's interpretation of truth. The chapter
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utilizes four case studies of proposed paradigm shifts in the field of ecology to
look at how the scientific understanding of four ecological phenomena has
changed over time.
Chapter Ill utilizes an artificial dataset to examine how the spatial and
statistical interpretation of a hypothetical phenomenon differed between nine
different resolutions of "sensor'' used to observe the phenomenon. The artificial
dataset had an advantage over real observational data in that the "truth" of the
phenomenon was known and could be used as a benchmark against which other
interpretations were evaluated.
Chapter IV utilizes a real-world seagrass distribution and abundance
dataset to examine how the interpretation of seagrass distribution was influenced
by sampling strategy. The study utilized two different sampling methods (i.e.
spatial arrangement of sampling points) and seven different levels of sampling
effort (i.e. number of sample points) to predict the distribution of seagrass across
a shallow shoal and examined differences in those predictions.
Together, the three components of this thesis reveal two important
realizations: that a connection exists between information, uncertainty, truth, and
knowledge that must be considered when evaluating a scientific endeavor and;
two, that by accepting one interpretation to be more truthful than another, the
perception of truth, and the knowledge derived from it, becomes not a
deterministic concept, as philosophically proposed, but falls along a continuum of
truthfulness.
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In terms of practical implications, this study reveals that science should be
cautious when assuming that a particular method, test, or objective function
deemed acceptable by the current paradigm is sufficient for justifying truth and
the knowledge derived from it. Such caution is especially prudent when the
derived knowledge is used to drive a practical decision. In such cases ,
consideration should be given to evaluating other perspectives derived from
other theories, methods, and standards, and deciding whether or not those other
perspectives offer valuable insight into the described truth.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.1 Introduction

If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can
be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same
sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. If, on the
other hand, they are to be called science, then science has
included bodies of belief quite incompatible with the ones we hold
today.

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 3

Science is, by its very nature, a search for knowledge of the unknown. As
an activity, science encompasses the methodical search for knowledge of the
world yet undiscovered. As a field of study, it defines the ways in which that
search is carried out; the questions which can be asked and the methods
employed to answer those questions. Underlying the notion of scientific
knowledge are the concepts of truth and objectivity, that the scientific process
carries with it an unquestioned dedication to revealing the facts of the world "as
they exist," independent of any personal values which may alter an outcome. It is
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because of that perception that science and the products of scientific inquiry
carry with them an authority not necessarily attributed to other sources of
knowledge; "The admiration of science among the general public and the
authority science enjoys in public life stems to a large extent from the view that
science is objective or at least more objective than other modes of inquiry" (Reiss

& Sprenger 2016, p. 2). Thomas Nagel called this objectivity the "view from
nowhere," identifying it as the ability to see fact without perspective, transcending
one's own experiences and beliefs to see the "true nature" of the fact unmediated
by the human mind (Nagel 1989, Reiss & Sprenger 2016).
Truth, however, is an elusive concept, and the idea that objectivity is a
path to truth is a misleading one. Further examination of the subject reveals that
objectivity is just one tool for justifying the "truths" illuminated by the scientific
process, a process which is laden with opportunities for the encroachment of
perception and values into the scientific endeavor. Reiss and Sprenger (2016)
state that perception is influenced by "his or her personal situation, details of his
or her perceptual apparatus, language and culture, [and] the physical conditions
in which the perspective is made." (p. 3). Furthermore, Bourke (2014) recognizes
that "beliefs, political stance, and cultural background, (gender , race, class,
socioeconomic status, educational background) are important variables that may
affect the research process" and refers to those influences as "positionality" (p.

2).
The acceptance of positionality and perceptual biases is
acknowledgement that the truth obtained through the scientific endeavor is not
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an objective "view from nowhere" as proposed by Nagel, but that it is associated
with some degree of subjectivity. While researchers in other fields, such as
anthropology (Chavez 2008, Jacobs-Huey 2002, Merriam et al. 2001 ), human
geography (Rose 1997, England 1994), psychology (Cousin 2010, deMarrais &
Lapan 2004, Sweet & Moulthrop 1999, Haig & Borsboom 2012), social work
(Webb 2001, Kanuah 2000, Latting 1990, Weiss & Bucuvalas 1980), healthcare
(Jafar 2018, Borbasi et al. 2005), statistics (Huff 1954), and cartography
(Monmonier 2014), have grappled with the role of positionality, the environmental
sciences appear to have somewhat lagged behind and, to date, no such attempts
to explore the implications of such limitations within environmental science and
ecology are recognized. The environmental sciences do recognize that a
potential for bias exists in the scientific endeavor, but the assumption is generally
made that such subjectivity is mitigated through the standardization of the
"perceptual apparatus," i.e. the tools, standards, and methods chosen to execute
an investigation (see discussion in Gower 1997). From the rigors of the scientific
method to the suite of statistical tools available to analyze the data, scientists
conform to the prescriptive norms of their field in order to preserve the objectivity
which is so essential to their success. The assumption made is that by fulfilling
the requirements of the perceptual apparatus, the resulting scientific product is
inherently objective. The underlying notion is that objective science is truthful and
truthful science is objective. The reliance on a standardization of the perceptual
apparatus as a means of objectivity fails, however, to result in science which is
free from perceptual bias and, therefore, does not guarantee arrival at the truth.
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Rather, the "objective" reality which emerges is simply a single, controlled
perspective which intentionally rejects all other perspectives. The single
perspective is convenient, in that it provides a consistent view of one reality,
comparable and compatible between investigations and one which allows for a
single universal understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. However,
if one's perspective is limited such that a single reality is chosen, then inherently
the choice is made to conceal all other realities. Thus, the reliance on a
standardized perceptual apparatus results not in Nagel's "view from nowhere" but
rather in a "view from the same somewhere every time." It is the realization that
the selected perspective is still subject to personal and perceptual biases which
impact the way one interprets the truth of their scientific work that has been
embraced by the social sciences but has been left largely unacknowledged within
the environmental sciences.
The failure to acknowledge bias is further complicated by the fact that
often times environmental scientists are unable to make complete observations
of a phenomenon of interest. Instead, they rely on limited sets of observations
and attempt to draw from them general conclusions concerning the reality of the
phenomenon. This inductive process has inherent uncertainties and results in a
perspective all its own. How then, if this is the case, does a scientist know that
the reality selected is the one which best presents the facts "as they exist"?
History would tell us that they do not. The world according to Ptolemy or Newton
was very different than that of Galileo or Einstein. Perspectives change with new
information and that which is fact today may become myth tomorrow .

4

The underlying notion here is that the "truth" as realized by the scientific
endeavor is subject to the perspective of the scientist. If such is the case, then
the scientific knowledge which is derived from the realized truth, is also very
much dependent on those factors shaping the scientist's perspective - the
personal history of the scientist conducting the investigation, the physical,
intellectual, and cultural conditions in which the investigation is carried out, and
the "perceptual apparatus."
The argument is made in this thesis that by understanding the perspective
inherent in their perceptual apparatus environmental scientists can better
understand the limitations of their knowledge, develop alternative methods for
deriving a more holistic conception of the truth they seek, and ultimately drive
more informed decision making.
It should be noted that references will be made in this thesis to the influence
of positionality on the understanding of truth and the development of scientific
knowledge. However, it should be clear that the study described here does not
seek to evaluate positionality, as defined by Bourke (2014), as an influence on
the development of scientific knowledge. The study here is strictly concerned
with selected components of the perceptual apparatus (specifically, sensor
resolution, statistical analysis methods, spatial interpolation, sampling methods,
and sampling effort) related to the observations of a given phenomenon and
quantitative/spatial analyses of the data derived from those observations .
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1.2 Overall Goal
Scientific knowledge is based on our ability to discern the truth from
observations and the collection of data. However, different sensors,
instrumentations and sampling strategies provide different perspectives on the
same reality. Hence, the question remains - does the scientific community really
know what they claim to know, or it is just the best interpretation of an observed
phenomenon in a given space and time, observed through the perceptual
limitations of the chosen methods and interpreted under a reigning paradigm?
The research described here utilized two scenarios common in the environmental
sciences: The evaluation of a natural phenomenon through the "lens" of a sensor
constrained by the limitations of its resolution, and the interpretation of a natural
phenomenon through the "lens" of a sampling strategy constrained by the
number and spatial orientation of the points used to collect the observations. In
both cases, the observational methods utilized were reflective of the tools made
available and deemed acceptable by the existing paradigm, and in both cases
the multiple variations of the method tested represented multiple possible
choices made by a scientist applying those methods under that paradigm and
influenced by the scientist's own perspective. As such, the methods tested were
reflective of the perspective inherent in the perceptual apparatus applied to
interpret the "truth" of an observed phenomenon. By understanding the
perspective inherent in the perceptual apparatus, including instrumentation and
sampling strategies, the scientific community can better understand the
uncertainty in their conception of truth and the influence of that uncertainty on the
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knowledge derived from it. Such an understanding can provide a foundation on
which we are able to develop alternative methods for deriving a more holistic
conception of the truth we seek, and ultimately drive more informed decisionmaking through an understanding of the limitations of our truth.

1.2.1 Objectives. The aim of this research was to understand how the
perceptual apparatus used to make observations about a phenomenon of
interest affects the conclusions drawn from those observations. In this case, the
perceptual apparatus was the resolution at which observations are made
(referred to as "sensor resolution") and the combined effect of the number and
spatial orientation of observations (referred to as "sampling design"). The
concepts tested were somewhat general, though they were applied to specific
examples within environmental science using the datasets below (synthetic
dataset and seagrass distribution data). The principal aim was achieved through
the following primary objectives:
1.

A meta-analysis of published reports in which new evidence has led to
fundamental changes to that which was considered truth within the field
of ecology. Ecology was chosen for three reasons: First, ecology as a
field of study has undergone a number of transitions in what is
considered ecological knowledge. Examining these transitions provides
context to how knowledge is developed within the field. Second, ecology
is a specific field within the environmental sciences which relies heavily
on sampling regimes to make observations about a phenomenon of
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interest. As such, the methods examined in the case studies below are
especially applicable to the field of ecology. Third, there are no studies
found to date within the field of ecology which specifically examined the
role of perspective and the influence of the perceptual apparatus in the
interpretation of truth and the development of knowledge. As such, this
study represents the first known attempt to link those broad philosophical
concepts within a rigorous ecological exercise. Specific ecological topics
examined in the meta-analysis included evolution, community ecology,
life history evolution, and ecosystem-based fisheries management
2.

The evaluation of the effect of the perceptual apparatus as sensor
resolution and interpolation on the depiction of a hypothetical natural
phenomenon for which "true" values were known for every measurable
location (Synthetic dataset). The phenomenon simulated in this study
contained measured values which changed continuously across
geographic space, analogous to real phenomena such as sea surface
temperature or the distribution of airborne particulate matter across a
landscape. The "sensor'' in this case was analogous to that which would
be used for the remote sensing of those types of phenomena.

3.

The evaluation of the role of the perceptual apparatus as sampling
design (number and spatial orientation of sampling points) in the
depiction of a biological-oceanographic event which varied discretely
over a local spatial extent and for which true values were unknown
(Seagrass dataset).
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The primary objectives were accomplished through the following
secondary objectives:
1a. Review of the existing scientific literature to highlight works which have
contributed to the argument above.
2a. Development of a model raster-based dataset representing a
hypothetical natural phenomenon of measurable values distributed
continuously across geographic space;
2b. Subsampling of the raster dataset at ten different ground resolutions
representing ten different sensor resolutions;
2c. Comparison of spatially interpolated depictions of the event between
sensor resolutions and between the subsampled and unsampled
datasets;
3a. Comparison of the effect of two sampling methods (transect and
systematic random sampling) on the statistical descriptions of seagrass
species occurrence; and,
3b. Comparison of the effect that changing the number and spatial
distribution of sampling points has on the derived conclusions about
seagrass occurrence

1.3 Background

1.3.1 Scientific knowledge, truth, and the perceptual apparatus.
Generally speaking, most people can easily identify those activities which are
broadly referred to as "science," recognizing the various fields of science from
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molecular biology to behavioral ecology and from quantum physics to astronomy
to the social sciences, among numerous others. The various recognized fields of
science have their own distinct features and differ greatly in their degree of and
tolerance for uncertainty but, as an activity, science is generally seen as a
rigorous quest for knowledge of the universe yet to be explained, a search for
answers to questions which describe why the universe is the way it is. As a
discipline, science is recognized as a set of rules and theories which govern the
way knowledge is acquired, the questions which may be asked and the methods
to be utilized. Inherent in both is the understanding that at the core of science is
knowledge. Intimately intertwined with the understanding of science and
knowledge is the concept of truth, the truth that exists in the assumption that
those facts uncovered by science are descriptions of the world "as it actually
exists." Truth, however, is not given, and the "facts" collected through science are
often confounded by the subjective influences of the physical and cultural
environment, the scientist, or even the scientific process itself. What, then, is the
role of truth in science and, most importantly, how does one know that the
knowledge gained through scientific inquiry is in fact based in truth?
To get at the question of truth in science, one must first look deeply at the
scientific process in general, starting with questions such as "What is science?",
"What is knowledge?" and "How does the former lead to the latter?" Broad
philosophical questions, such as these, are typically reserved for the discipline of
the Philosophy of Science, however, careful consideration of those questions is
helpful for putting into context seemingly less philosophical questions about the
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way science is conducted or how it is applied, such as questions about the
method of scientific inquiry and the development of theory. Answering, or at the
very least pondering, those broad questions lends insight into understanding the
limitations of our knowledge, which ultimately helps us to better define the role
science plays in society, in progress, and in human interaction with the physical
world.
Starting then, at the beginning: What is science? The Oxford dictionary
defines science as 'The intellectual and practical activity encompassing the
systematic study of structure and behavior of the physical and natural world
through observation and experiment" (Oxford online, 2016). What science is,
however, is more complicated than what is suggested by the Oxford dictionary.
Science is not just an "intellectual and practical activity" but is also a standard by
which the scientific community judges activities, ascribing the title of "scientific" to
those activities, investigations, and results which satisfy some set of criteria and
values. The issue of separating those activities deserving of the title of "science"
from those not deserving, is so complicated that it has given rise to an entire
philosophical debate which has resulted in a wealth of philosophical literature
dating back as far as the Renaissance period (see Okasha 2002). And while
there is much to be gleaned from an in-depth discussion of theories surrounding
the demarcation of science, the full breadth of that debate is not pertinent here.
What is pertinent, however, is a handful of key takeaways which have come to
influence the way science is conducted, evaluated, and applied today.
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lmre Lakatos, in his famous "Lectures on Scientific Method," as recorded
by Lakatos & Motterlini (1999), broadly recognized three schools of thought
related to how one determines an activity, or theory, to be scientific. First, is the
school of Epistemological Anarchism which argues that all theories are equal and
there exists no difference between truly scientific and pseudo-scientific theories.
Lakatos dismisses Epistemological Anarchism, stating that the demarcation of
science is necessary for confirming or denying the existence of a theory,
particularly in the competitive world of research where scientists compete for
grant funding, exposure, publication privilege , and intellectual property rights.
Essentially, Lakatos argues that without demarcation there is no way to
differentiate the "good" theories from the "bad," but argues that, clearly, the
scientific community does that. Whether for the dissemination of research funds,
the selection of work for publication, or even just the decision to endorse a
particular line of inquiry, the scientific community does differentiate between
scientific theories and those which do not meet the scientific standard (Lakatos &
Motterlini 1999). The key point, here, is that as a culture, the scientific community
has decided that there are activities, theories, or otherwise, which should be
considered scientific, and those which should not.
Embracing the point made above, the next two schools of thought focus
on how science is demarcated from pseudo-science . The first of these two,
Elitism, or Authoritarianism, argues that a true demarcation does exist between
science and other science-like activities, but there are no demarcation criteria only well-trained experts in a given scientific community are capable of
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demarcating the true scientific theories from all others. Here, Lakatos likens the
process to the way in which young scientists learn to do science, not just by
learning the teachable points of science, but by observing the elders of their
scientific community in action. Leaming to simply do science is not enough.
Science must be determined by those who have learned to judge good science,
and to do so one must "sit at the feet of great scientists for decades" {Lakatos &
Motterlini 1999, p. 29). Lakatos argues that the process of demarcation by the
elite is not so much the differentiation between science and pseudoscience, but
of scientific communities and their pseudo-scientific counterparts. Thomas Kuhn,
in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions {Kuhn 1962(20121), emphasizes
Lakatos's point arguing that at any given time the current line of scientific thought
is governed by the reigning "paradigm," as determined by the dominant thought
leaders of the scientific community. Though he uses the term in slightly different
ways throughout, Kuhn generally defines a paradigm as the set of accepted
foundational theories, rules, instruments, and methods by which scientists judge
their {and their colleagues') activities. The paradigm itself is a product of the
scientific community, encompassing those norms which have been accepted and
adopted by it. Kuhn states "Effective research scarcely begins before a scientific
community thinks it has acquired firm answers to questions like the following:
What are the fundamental entities of which the universe is composed? How do
these interact with each other and with the senses? What questions may
legitimately be asked about such entities and what techniques employed in
seeking solutions?" (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 5). The community determines not just
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what endeavors are worthy of being pursued, but which of their results are
worthy of scientific recognition. In this way, the scientific elite are demarcating the
scientific from the pseudo-scientific through personal judgement and without
formal demarcation criteria. According to Lakatos, with authoritarianism "you can
have a jury but you cannot have a law ... there can be no laws, there is only the
jury of wise men" (Lakatos & Motterlini 1999, p. 28).
The key points of authoritarianism are two-fold: first, is that the scientific
community judges itself. Whether that judgement is through a set of laws (as
described below) or simply through a "jury of wise men" is a subject which is still
debated, but the point is that in creating a system in which the scientific
community judges science, it also creates a system which determines how
science is carried out, how it is taught, how it progresses, and what, generally,
fits within the confines of the "science" designation. This, then, leads to the
second key point of authoritarianism: the concept of the paradigm. While the
existence of paradigms, as proposed by Kuhn, is not universally accepted in the
philosophical literature (Okasha 2002), the concept is a useful one for
contextualizing the way one thinks about science, how it progresses, and what
limitations may be imposed while carrying out scientific activity. A discussion
regarding paradigms follows in a later section.
The third, and final, school of thought presented here is Demarcationism,
or Militant Positivism, which claims a true, definable separation between science
and pseudo-science. If demarcationism is accepted, then one is left with the
question: "What are those criteria which separate scientific theories or activities
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from non-scientific ones?" This question, alone, has filled volumes of literature
with debate (see Okasha 2002 for an overview), however, no single defining
characteristic has risen to the surface as the universally accepted criteria for
demarcating science. What has developed from the debate is the recognition
that there exists a set of key characteristics which are associated with science, or
may even be conditions of science, but that on their own cannot differentiate
between science and pseudo-science. Characteristics such as experimentation,
observation, explanation, and various forms of logical progression have all been
proposed and refuted in the literature (Okasha 2002, Popper 1963, Lakatos &
Motterlini 1999). Okasha (2002) makes the argument that articulating a clear and
consistent definition of science proves difficult, if not impossible. Instead, Okasha
suggests that science might be comparable to philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's
characterization of what it is to be a "game." Rather than having a clear, rigid set
of rules that define science, scientific theories and activities, like games, can be
characterized by a loose set of traits which are possessed by most, but not all,
members, and the interpretation of whether the combination of those
characteristics results in science remains at the discretion of the leaders in the
field (Okasha 2002). If such is the case, then characteristics such as
observations, experimentation, falsifiability, and logical progression may all be
more or less present in any given scientific activity, however, the presence or
absence of any of them do not individually determine the scientific status of that
activity. It is interesting to note, here, that once again there exists a concept of an
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elite membership of scientific leaders who are key to determining whether a
particular set of traits qualifies as science.
Ben-David (1971, p. xiii) offers a slightly different take when he states that
"All fields of science (at least natural science) share procedures of presentation
and evaluation of arguments and theories ultimately based on mathematics and
verifiable empirical observation and have the common function and goal of
discovering valid knowledge mainly about natural phenomena". Ben-David
brings up a critical point here: All science does share something, namely "the
common function and goal of discovering valid knowledge" (Ben-David 1971).
The point Ben-David makes is not altogether unexpected, but it is a point
that has not yet been explored here; no matter how science is defined, all
science shares the common goal of discovering knowledge. Furthermore, BenDavid doesn't just make the point that all science shares the goal of discovering
knowledge, but adds the qualifier of "valid" knowledge, suggesting some level of
justification required for knowledge to be accepted. What, then, is knowledge,
how is it obtained, and how does one differentiate valid knowledge from invalid
knowledge?
The attempt to define knowledge, once again, leads one to a philosophical
debate much too large to be covered in detail here. The analysis of knowledge is
epistemology, and the understanding of knowledge derived from epistemology is
therefore epistemic knowledge. A highlight of the major points of the discussion
around epistemic knowledge, however, should be sufficient to shed light on the
discussion at hand. First of all, knowledge, in this case, refers to the knowledge
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of a fact (or proposition), called propositional knowledge, as opposed to the other
forms of knowledge such as the knowledge of acquaintance, the knowledge of
how to do some activity, or the knowledge of where something is (although
spatial sciences may be concerned with knowledge associated with location, one
can still think of this as propositional knowledge) (Ichikawa 2017).
In the analysis of propositional knowledge, an analytic statement can be
constructed in the form of "S knows that p, if and only if j," where "S" refers to the
subject which knows the proposition "p", given a set of conditions "j" which are
both necessary and sufficient for S to know p (Ichikawa 2017). Given this
statement, it seems reasonable to conclude that j is the key component on which
knowledge (the knowledge that p by S) depends. What then is j, and how does it
get us to knowledge?
The traditional analysis of knowledge, called "tripartite" analysis, contends
that j is composed of three conditions which, together, are necessary and
sufficient for knowledge to exist. Those conditions are truth, belief, and
justification, otherwise known as the justified, true belief (JTB) theory of
knowledge (Ichikawa 2017). Written in the form introduced above, JTB states
(Gettier 1966, Ichikawa 2017):
S knows that p if and only if:
pis true
S believes that p
S is justified in believing p
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The JTB analysis of knowledge is far from universally accepted and
numerous alternative theories have been proposed (Ichikawa 2017, Nagel 2014,
Sosa 1999, Feldman and Conee 1985, Goldman 1976, among others). However,
an understanding of the JTB analysis of knowledge provides a foundational
starting point for the discussion here. Other proposed analyses will be
recognized where applicable.
Starting, then, with the first of the conditions, truth. Knowledge, by
convention, does not apply to what is wrong; knowledge implies awareness of a
fact and facts depict truths. Nagel (2014) calls this trait "factivity," and associates
it with other factive verbs, such as to realize, to prove, and to see, all of which
cannot exist without the existence of the fact. Knowledge is a relationship to the
truth given by some kind of access to the fact, the implication being that what is
not true, cannot be known. Truth, however, is not dependent on knowledge; truth
exists whether there is an awareness of it or not. In this context, truth is how
things are, not how they are perceived, and so exists independent of knowledge
(Ichikawa 2017, Nagel 2014). The example given by Nagel (2014) is that of a
two-sided coin inside a closed box. Should someone shake the box, the coin
would be tossed inside the box and eventually settle with one of the two surfaces
facing up. Should no one ever open the box, there would be no knowledge of
which surface is facing up, however, the lack of knowledge does not preclude the
truth that one of the two surfaces was the facing surface.
The second condition is belief, the consequences of which imply that what
is not believed cannot be known. According to Ichikawa (2017, p. 3) "Failing to
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believe something, precludes knowing it." Belief, according to JTB, however, is
not a suggestion about how confident one is in the proposition; S does not
believe that pis likely or possible. The condition here is a stronger belief, it
requires absolute certainty about p (Ichikawa 2017).
The final condition is justification. Justification, it is argued, is necessary to
preclude a lucky guess. In the coin-in-a-box example above, the scenario is
possible where someone walks into the room with the box and states with
certainty that the coin inside the box is tails up. Should the box be opened and
the coin be found tails up, the first two conditions alone would allow that the
person "knew" that the coin was tails up. The justification condition requires that
the subject have a relevant justification for believing the proposition. In this
example, the person must have a relevant reason for believing that the coin is
tails up. Herein lies the issue which makes the justification clause perhaps the
most debated aspect of the JTB analysis: What constitutes relevant justification?
Two views are held relative to what aspects of the subject-proposition
relationship justify a belief. lnternalism argues that justification is dependent on
some state internal to the subject, that is, some cognitive access to a reason
which justifies their belief. Feldman and Conee (2001) give the example of an
expert and a novice bird watcher, both observing the same bird from the same
perspective. The expert has relevant internalist justification for knowing that the
bird he observed was a woodpecker. That is, he can call on his prior experience
to recognize the defining traits in the observed bird and know that it is a
woodpecker. The novice, on the other hand, who has never seen such a bird
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would have no relevant justification for believing the bird was a woodpecker. Audi
1998 (as reported in Feldman and Conee 2001, p. 1), states" ... justification is
grounded entirely in what is internal to the mind, in a sense implying that it is
accessible to introspection or reflection by the subject." Feldman and Conee
(1985) go so far as to argue that even apparently external factors, such as
evidence, are internalist, because the evidence must be cognitively processed
and reflected upon to result in justification. The authors refer to this internalist
view as Evidentialism, which will be returned to shortly.
The opposing view to internalism is externalism, which argues that factors
external to the subject are suitable for relevant justification. Armstrong (1973)
uses the example of a reliable thermometer. Should a thermometer be known to
give reliable temperature readings, then one would be justified in knowing the
temperature if they read the thermometer. This, according to the author, requires
none of the conditions espoused by internalists, yet still justifies knowledge. Such
reliance on a "reliable process," that is, a process known to reliably produce true
beliefs when used previously, is a center point of the externalist argument and is
known as Reliabilism (Ichikawa 2017). While the internalist-externalist debate
remains unresolved, it should be noted that modern scientific process uses both
to justify its claims. Evidence, in the form of observation, experimentation, and
data, is a primary tenet of modern science, as is the use of reliable processes
such as statistics and the scientific method in general.
In addition to the two views on justification, it is also accepted that there
exist two kinds of justification: Propositional, or ex ante, and doxastic, or ex post.
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Both are recognized as distinct entities and are not considered mutually
exclusive; any given proposition can be supported by both propositional and
doxastic justification (Ichikawa 2017, Nagel 2014). Propositional justification is
concerned with whether a subject holds sufficient reason to believe a proposition,
while doxastic justification in concerned with whether that belief is held
appropriately. In the previously given example of a coin in a box, the subject may
be justified in his statement because he believes all two-sided coins always land
tails-up when tossed inside a box. Given the situation, his justification would be
sufficient, but is not likely to be considered appropriate. In general, it is
recognized that knowledge is most concerned with doxastic justification
(Ichikawa 2017) and therefore the subject's accurate, yet inappropriately justified,
statement would fail to be considered knowledge.
Returning, then, to the previous discussion of Ben-David's "valid"
knowledge, it would appear that valid knowledge is belief in a fact which is
justified, either internally or externally, with a justification that is both relevant and
appropriately held (i.e. doxastic). However, taking into consideration the three
conditions of knowledge proposed by the JTB analysis, it could be left to question
whether the scientific knowledge referred to by Ben-David and epistemic
knowledge are one in the same. It would appear that, if knowledge is to be held
to the philosophical definition proposed by the JTB and related analyses, then
epistemic knowledge and scientific knowledge are not philosophically compatible.
The justification for such a statement will be made below, but, if such is the case,
then what follows is that scientific knowledge is somehow inherently different
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than the philosophical understanding of knowledge. The basis for this statement
is three-fold:
1) Belief is rarely, if ever, certain in science.
2) Justification is subjective and susceptible to the paradigm of the
present.
3) The truth is rarely obtainable in science.
Let us begin first with belief and justification, as they are the most difficult
to discuss in isolation. Evidentialism, as introduced above, is "the view that the
epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's
evidence for the belief' (Feldman and Conee 1985 p. 15). That is, a belief is
justified so long as it fits the available evidence. The scientific parallel to
evidentialism is that of classical inductivism which came into popularity early in
the 20 th century. Classical inductivism claims that valid scientific theory must be
derived from facts. According to lmre Lakatos, "the code of intellectual honesty of
classical inductivism is: 'Reject any proposition that has not been proven from
facts"' (Lakatos & Motterlini 1999, p. 41 ). Inductive logic, the logical mechanism
of inductivism, requires that two assumptions be made to arrive at a general
theory from a specific fact; the first assumption lies between the fact and its
corresponding factual proposition, the second assumption lies between the
factual proposition and the resulting inductive generalization (Lakatos & Motterlini
1999). A classic example would be the development of the theory that all copper
conducts electricity based on observations of copper wire conducting electricity
between an electrical source and a light bulb. The first set of assumptions is
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made when one observes a light bulb illuminating when connected properly to a
battery via copper wire. The assumption is made that the metal wire is in fact
copper, based on known characteristics of that metal, and that the electricity is
traveling through the copper wire and into the bulb as opposed to through the air,
through the ground, or that the electricity is contained within the bulb. None of the
assumptions are directly observable, but all are inferred based upon prior
knowledge and experience; thus one must arrive at a factual proposition from the
observed fact - the observed copper wire is conducting electricity from the battery
to the light bulb. This proposition is never directly observed- the electrons cannot
be seen moving from the battery to the bulb- but it is inferred based upon a prior
understanding of electrons, conductivity, and circuits. The second assumption is
made in assuming that all copper conducts electricity because all copper
previously observed has conducted electricity, an assumption referred to as an
inductive generalization. Simply stated, the inductive generalization is the
assumption that all A's are B's because all observed A's have been B's.
Inherent, but not evident, in this argument is an assumption about the underlying
reason why all observed A's have been B's: "The inductive conclusion that all A's
are B's is a suggestion about the underlying inaccessible cause of all A's being
B's; all observed A's are B's because of the underlying fact that one hundred
percent of A's are B's" (Gower 1997). David Hume looked at the logic of such
conclusions and argued that, psychologically, there was good reason for people
to embrace the conclusions of inductive arguments: "evidence creates
expectations which make it natural, and perhaps even inevitable, for us to believe
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the conclusions it leads to" (Gower 1997, p. 190). Logically, however, no matter
how obvious the evidence, because of their reliance on assumptions, inductive
conclusions are irrational, an argument which came to be known as "Hume's
Problem of Induction" (Gower 1997). Hume's problem of induction introduces the
point that a belief justified by induction is not scientifically valid and would appear
to be epistemically invalid for knowledge as well.
Lakatos agreed with Hume and argued that because of Hume's problem,
inductivism had no place in science: "no scientific proposition can ever be proven
from facts, and therefore classical inductivism can be crossed out on merely
logical grounds" (Lakatos & Motterlini 1999, p. 40). The philosophical justification
of induction and the practical utilization of induction, however, are two separate
issues and despite the fact that Hume and Lakatos may have had a
philosophically justifiable argument against the use of induction, in practice
"inductivism is still very influential, even though it is logically impossible" (Lakatos

& Motterlini 1999, p. 43).
One school of inductivism which has found great utility in modern science
is that of probabilism, which argues "not that theories can be deduced from facts,
but that they can be at least probabilified by facts" (Lakatos & Motterlini 1999, p.
50), the idea being that scientific statements can be accepted so long as the
factual evidence demonstrates them to be highly probable. "Highly probable" is
subjective but implies the utilization of probability, i.e. the quantifiable measure of
the likelihood that a predicted event will occur within a range of specified times,
locations, or values. This concept is so powerful simply because knowing
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anything with complete certainty in science is rare, particularly in cases where it
is impossible to observe a phenomenon of interest in its entirety (i.e. the
phenomenon must be sampled); " ... absolute certainty is an ideal they can rarely
achieve. But practical certainty, implying degrees of probability, is regularly
achieved and is an appropriate aim for scientific method" (Gower 1997, p. 84).
Here, again, the practical application of science is in conflict with the
philosophical ideals of knowledge. If "absolute certainty is an ideal they can
rarely achieve," then belief with certainty, and therefore knowledge, is also an
ideal rarely achieved. Thus, point number two above.
In practical use, probability is an ideal tool for interpreting evidence from
events which are deterministic (i.e. they either do fit the prediction or they do not)
and either recurring or repeatable. Such events can be assigned an outcome
frequency between zero and 100 percent, calculated by taking the ratio of
positively predicted outcomes to the total number of events, which can then be
used to determine the degree of probability of the event. The subjectivity lies in
determining what degree of probability can be regarded as "highly" probable, a
question which is typically addressed by the reigning paradigm of the moment
and, in many cases, is restricted to a threshold of 95% or 90%. This frequency
interpretation is the most simplistic measure of probability, and while there are
other definitions of, and methods for calculating, probability, an in-depth
discussion of those details is not pertinent here. What is important is that
probability is claimed to philosophically justify inductivism by moving the
argument from "If A, then B" to "If A, then probably B" and solving Hume's
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problem of induction as a logical fallacy. According to Gower (1997, p. 189), "So
long as such reasoning does yield probably true conclusions from true premises,
and therefore does meet its aim, inductive skepticism is unjustified." Solving the
logical problem of induction does not, however, suggest that that which is highly
probable is certain. Those conclusions drawn from probabilism, no matter how
conclusive they are, are still associated with some degree of uncertainty:
" ... though we may be quite sure the conclusion is correct, our certainty is
practical rather than absolute. This is shown by noticing that, unlike the
conclusion, the evidence we have does not make it impossible for the next A we
examine not to be a B" (Gower 1997, p. 89-90). Therefore, probabilism still does
not solve the epistemic issue of certainty of belief. Scientifically, it would appear
that probability justifies belief by lowering the threshold of certainty from the
absolute certainty required of the JBT analysis to some scientifically acceptable
level. Essentially, probabilism implies that so long as one is at least x% certain
(typically 95%), then they are certain enough. The implication here is that
scientific knowledge is somehow different than philosophical knowledge, that
while certainty is a requirement for scientific knowledge, absolute certainty is not.
Additionally, for probabilism to be useful, it requires the quantification of the
certainty, and therefore the uncertainty of an event. The identification and
quantification of uncertainty will be discussed at length in the next section.
Another form of justification derived from inductivism was that of
verificationism, which was popularized by proponents of logical empiricism,
largely led by the Vienna Circle of late 1920's Vienna, Austria. Verificationism
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argued that a theory must not just be derived from facts but it must be verifiable,
that is, it must be capable of being substantiated by observations (Okasha 2002,
Popper 1963). Popper (1963), himself greatly influenced by logical empiricism,
questioned the logic of verificationism, and inductivism in general, noting that it is
impossible to make every possible observation, therefore, the existence of a
verifiable observation is always possible. Popper turned verificationism around
arguing that while it is logically impossible to use induction to prove a proposition
true, one could use deduction to prove it false by finding just a single observation
which is counter to the proposition.
Deduction is the logic by which a supposition is true, so long as its
premises are true. In deduction, there is no uncertainty in the supposition, so
long as there is no uncertainty in the premises. Using this logic, Popper proposed
that for a theory to be justified it should make predictions which are capable of
being falsified. That is, predictions which are able to be determined to be only
true or only false. Such predictions either support (but never verify) or refute a
theory. Consider the example in which a subject is holding what she theorizes to
be a glass of red wine. If the premises given are that all red wine is red and all
red wine contains alcohol, then the falsifiable supposition is that the red wine she
is holding must be red and must contain alcohol. Should subsequent testing hold
true that the wine in her hand is both red and contains alcohol, then her theory is
supported (but not verified). Should she be able to demonstrate that either one of
the premises does not apply, then she has falsified her theory and is unjust in
believing that what is in her hand is red wine. Popper came to this conclusion
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after examining closely the explanatory theories proposed by Alfred Adler and
Sigmund Freud in the field of psychology. Both Adler and Freud proposed
theories which, despite giving conflicting explanations for exactly the same
behaviors, appeared to be equally verifiable. Furthermore, both theories could be
applied to any behavior and appear verified (Popper 1963). To Popper, it was
clear that theories such as those which rely on verifiability without falsifiability
were unjustified. In the accepted scientific method of today, researchers express
their falsifiable theories about cause and effect in the form of an experimental
hypothesis (H1). Popper's falsificationist approach lies in scrutinizing and testing
a null hypothesis (Ho), the statement of which falsifies H1 and which always
argues that the proposed cause has no effect. Should exception be found to Ho,
that is, should the test of the cause demonstrate a measurable effect in the
population, then Ho is rejected and H1 is accepted. On the other hand, should no
effect be observed, then exception to Ho is not found and Ho is accepted while H1
is rejected (Wilkinson 2013). Wilkinson (2013, p. 920) states that according to
both Hume and Popper "any claim to the existence of an effect cannot be made
unless it is first shown that a situation of no effect is untenable."
Key to the scientific method is that failure to reject a null hypothesis does
not verify a theory, and rarely justifies it. Justification, rather, lies in the
falsification of every reasonable alternative hypothesis. A similar condition has
been proposed in the analysis of knowledge which contends that for knowledge
to be justified it must eliminate all "relevant alternatives" (Ichikawa 2017,
Goldman 1976). Goldman (1976 p. 772) states "a person is said to know that p
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just in case he distinguishes or discriminates the truth of p from relevant
alternatives." Key here is the term "relevant" as it suggests that one must not
eliminate (or, in Popper's terms, falsify) all alternatives but, rather, only those
which produce a "perceptual equivalent," defined as an alternative "possible state
of affairs that would produce the same, or sufficiently similar, perceptual
experience" (Goldman 1976 p. 779-80). Knowledge, in essence, must be able to
distinguish between the truth and anything appearing to be the truth but is not the
truth. The relevant alternatives approach of Goldman lies in applying Popper's
falsificationist approach to every relevant alternative; should every relevant
alternative be falsified, then one is justified in claiming knowledge of the
proposition. Distinguishing the relevant alternatives from the non-relevant ones,
however, is subjective: "in these cases ... there is an intuitive sense in which the
relevant-alternatives tend to be more similar to actuality than irrelevant ones"
(Ichikawa 2017 p. 11). The same can be said in the case of science; the decision
that all reasonable alternative hypotheses have been tested is a subjective one,
which brings us to point number two made above: Justification is subjective.
Another form of scientific justification has its roots in the epistemic concept
of reliabilism. Reliabilism claims that a belief is justified if it stems from a
cognitive process which is likely to lead to a true belief, "the view that
epistemically justified beliefs are ones that result from belief-forming processes
that reliably lead to true beliefs" (Feldman and Conee 1985, p. 25). The
equivalent justification in science is objectivity, objectivity acquired through
"procedures of presentation and evaluation of arguments and theories ultimately
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based on mathematics and verifiable empirical observation" (Ben-David 1971 p.
xiii), that is, objectivity acquired through rigorous and reliable scientific process.
Reiss and Sprenger (2016, p. 1) refer to scientific objectivity as science free from
"particular perspectives, value commitments, community bias or personal
interest." Ben-David (1971 [1984], p. xx) describes it as "insistence on the value
neutrality." Scientific objectivity implies that scientific activities and their outcomes
are insulated from the will of people, governments, society, etc. In practice,
objectivity is accomplished through the rigors of the methods employed in the
scientific endeavor, methods determined by the reigning paradigm of the present.
Reiss and Sprenger (2016 p.1) claim that objectivity has given science a
status and authority not realized by other endeavors: "The admiration of science
among the general public and the authority science enjoys in public life stems to
a large extent from the view that science is objective or at least more objective
than other modes of inquiry". Gaukroger (2012) goes a step further and claims
that the authority of objectivity has expanded beyond just science and has:
Assumed an unassailable status. Values that have come to be
associated with objectivity, such as impartiality and freedom from
prejudice, now not only guide scientific enquiry, but have also been
imported into the moral and political realms. They are now regarded
as underpinning notions of fairness and equality. In other words,
objectivity is not only distinctive of human reasoning and behavior,
it has been built into distinctively human goals and aspirations. (pg.

1)
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The success of objectivity is largely built on the somewhat cyclical
underlying notion that objective science is that which successfully presents the
facts of the world abstracted from personal perspective, and science successfully
presents the facts of the world as if it is objective (Reiss and Sprenger 2016). In
other words, the notion that objective science is truthful, and truthful science is
objective. Gaukroger (2012) warns, though, that objectivity is a means of
justification, and truth and justification are not to be confused. It is possible to,
both, arrive at a truth in a non-objective way, and to arrive at an objective theory
that is not true. Furthermore, the author contends that truth is an inappropriate
guide for justification, namely, because truth cannot be realized independent of
the justification (point number three above). While the truth may exist
independent of justification (more on that discussion to follow), scientists have
only justification to illuminate the truth: "We can do no more in establishing its
truth than establish what its justification is, where this justification is judged
against what are taken to be the standards of justification for a theory of that kind
making that kind of claim ... what we aim for is the theory that has the greatest
degree of justification" (Gaukroger 2012 p. 58). The point here is that the testing
of a scientific theory does not end in truth, but rather, begins with justification and
ends at a point at which it is determined to be "justified enough." The questions
then become what is justified enough?, and what are the standards of
justification against which someone may evaluate a scientific theory?
Herein lies the problem: objectivity is a value and, as such, is itself
subjectively assigned based on the perception of a relevant authority. That is,
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there is no quantitative measure of, or definitive test for, objectivity. Objectivity is
based on appraisal by the scientific community, a condition, once again, strikingly
reminiscent of Kuhn's authoritarianism. This is problematic because both
scientific activity and objectivity are complicated, and arguments can be made
that subjectivity in the scientific process can be allowed without necessarily
compromising the legitimacy of the scientific product. Weber (1917 [1989), as
referenced in Reiss and Sprenger 2016) identifies four stages at which scientific
objectivity can be compromised: (i) the choice of a scientific research problem;
(ii) the gathering of evidence in relation to the problem; (iii) the acceptance of a
scientific hypothesis or theory as an adequate answer to the problem on the
basis of evidence; and, (iv) the proliferation and application of scientific research
results. According to Reis and Sprenger (2016), the infiltration of values and
ideals at stages (i) and (iv) is generally accepted, recognizing that the choice of
research problem is influenced by personal and institutional interests, funding
sources, and society in general, and that the application of that research is
equally dependent on societal values and the values of the authorities in any
given field (see discussion above on Elitism, also Kuhn 1962 [2012)). Speaking
to this, Ben-David ( 1971) emphasizes the historical role society has played in
influencing the choice and application of scientific research:
The differences between scientific activity at various times and
places were explained by two types of conditions: one was the
changing constellation of social values and interests among
populations as a whole which channeled the motivation of people

32

to support, believe, or engage in science to different degrees. The
second set of conditions was the organization of scientific work
which was more or less effective in marketing the products of
research and encouraging initiative and efficiency in it. (p. 169)
It is at the core of the scientific process - stages (ii) and (iii), fact gathering
and the assessment and acceptance of scientific theory, respectively- where
debate exists about whether and how a value-free ideal can be achieved and
whether those stages can be carried out while maintaining the "view from
nowhere." This is a complicated debate because, as discussed above, objectivity
is a subjective value, assigned in varying degrees to scientific claims, methods,
or results according to an accepted standard (Reiss and Sprenger 2016).
Furthermore, fact gathering is a human experience in which facts are observed
and evaluated in the context of personal experience and prior knowledge. In an
attempt to objectify the fact gathering experience, researchers often devise
methods for normalizing and standardizing it through some "perceptual
apparatus" which aims to separate the fact from the fact gatherer. Here,
"perceptual apparatus" refers to both the tools employed (microscopes, calipers,
scales, etc.) as well as the standards deemed acceptable for their use (precision,
resolution, choice of units, etc.). The standardization of judgement via the
perceptual apparatus creates, in effect, a system in which so long as science
satisfies the requirements of the apparatus, it gains the benefit of being
considered objective. Gaukroger (2012) warns that such "mechanization" of
decision making represents a dangerous misunderstanding of objectivity:
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Namely, that it consists of removing, in as far as possible, all
elements of judgement from the interpretation of data. This
supposedly eliminates individual prejudices and biases from
interpretation and decision making ... Standardized decision-making
procedures stand in for reflection on the nature of the problem for
which the decision is sought in the first place ... they employ
pseudo-scientific means of bypassing understanding and
evaluation in favour of something that is deemed to transcend bias
and prejudgement. (p. 3)
Such devices, however, don't remove perception, they simply standardize it such
that one may reliably predict how they are going to experience the fact; they do
not create Thomas Nagel's "view from nowhere," but rather, a view from the
same somewhere every time. This is critical because it leaves open the
possibility of other perceptions - if the perception is dependent on the perceptual
apparatus, then should the apparatus change, so might the perception.
The idea of shifting perceptions in science calls into question the very idea
of truth itself. The epistemic concept of truth is absolute, that a proposition is
either true or it is not, which appears to be based squarely in the belief that one
single truth exists, and it requires only to be observed to be realized. In the
analysis of knowledge, this is referred to as realism (Glanzberg 2016). When
applied to science, it is known as scientific realism, and claims that the world is
composed of one "truth" which exists independent of human perception and it is
the role of scientists to realize this truth (Reiss and Sprenger 2016). According to
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Hacking in his Introductory Essay prefacing Kuhn (2012, p. xxxiv), "the thought
that there is one and only one complete true account of everything is deep in the
Western tradition. It descends from what Comte, the founder of positivism, called
the theological state of human inquiry. In popular versions of Jewish, Christian,
and Muslim cosmology, there is one true and complete account of everything,
namely what God knows." Glanzberg (2016) claims that there are two key
features of realism:
1) The world exists objectively and is independent of the way it is
thought about or described.
2) Any thoughts or claims made are about that world.
Scientifically, the objective truth philosophy is a convenient convention
which Reiss and Sprenger (2016) claim is popular for four primary reasons: One,
the objective view provides a means for settling disagreements about the true
nature of a fact by providing empirical answers to questions. To expand on that,
should two people disagree on the color of the sky, the objective view postulates
that such a disagreement can be settled by measuring the wavelength of light
emitted (or scattered) from the sky such that both parties can agree that it has a
wavelength of 474 nanometers which, by convention, falls within the blue color
spectrum. Second, objectivity provides a simple, more unified view of the world if there is only one true state, independent of perspective, then the world appears
less complicated and there exists no reason to debate about the existence of
alternative states. Third, the objective view suggests that the world is composed
of a structure of consistent, identifiable facts and, thus, provides a basis and
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justification for making predictions based on that structure. Similarly, and fourth,
the consistent structure also provides a foundation for manipulating and
controlling the world.
On the other hand, there is the counter argument, popularized by Thomas
Kuhn and Paul Feyerband, that while there may exist a single reality,
observations of that reality can never be made independent of perception (similar
to the argument made above concerning objectivity and truth); positionality, prior
experience, knowledge, and existing theory always influence the way one
perceives an observation (Kuhn 1962 [2012], Lakatos & Motterlini 1999). Thus ,
whether or not there is one single reality, "truth" is what is perceived by an
observer and observations are always subjective. To start, Kuhn argued that a
scientific language independent of theory does not exist; the language used to
describe and record any observation is dependent upon the theoretical
assumptions and concepts of the paradigm in which the scientist is working. If so,
then no observation can properly be recorded as data without being subjected to
the influences of the theory under which the observer was working. Kuhn argued
that even the sensual perceptions of scientists are influenced by the theories of
their governing paradigm, going so far as to argue that two different scientists
working in two different paradigms perceive two different facts when they "look
from the same point in the same direction" (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 149). Kuhn
calls this the "theory ladenness of data" and argued that because of theoryladenness all data are collected under the preconceptions of an existing
paradigm and, as such, there can exist no truly objective data set by which two
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paradigms can be compared. If such is the case, then science is not necessarily
moving toward a greater understanding of reality, but simply moving away from
the misunderstandings of the past toward a greater understanding of reality in the
context of existing theory. Kuhn describes this as "a process of evolution from
primitive beginnings - a process whose successive stages are characterized by
an increasingly detailed and refined understanding of nature ... [however], nothing
that has been said or will be said makes it a process of evolution toward
anything" (Kuhn, 1962 [2012], p. 170). Kuhn argues that an increasingly detailed
understanding of nature naturally leads to the discovery and collection of facts for
which an existing paradigm has no explanation. Such inexplicable facts
eventually lead to gaping holes in existing paradigms which give way to drastic
paradigm shifts in which the language, theories, laws, etc. of the former paradigm
have no relevance in the new paradigm. One such example is that of the fairly
recent shift in the dominant theory of fluid flow in soils within the field of soil
science. Prior to the early 1970s, the dominant belief among soil physicists was
that fluids exhibited a matrix flow behavior within most soils - a theory based on
the work of Darcy (1856). While working on his Ph.D. at the University of
Kentucky, Dr. Virgil Quisenberry was one of the first soil scientists to recognize
that, in most cases, naturally occurring soils previously assumed to have matrix
flow, actually demonstrated preferential flow. When presented to a conference of
experts in 1973, the work was initially regarded as an anomaly and the leading
scientists of the time held that "most" soils would corroborate the matrix theory.
Dr. Quisenberry's finding, however, was an inexplicable exception to the
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accepted theory of the time. On its own, his work could have remained an
exception, but when examined in conjunction with similar findings of other
scientists, the cumulative effect of many exceptions led to a gaping hole in the
dominant theory. Such works justified further scientific exploration of fluid flow
through soils and eventually led to the understanding that naturally occurring
soils actually demonstrate preferential flow behavior in most cases. Within ten
years, the dominant theory had shifted to preferential flow and examples of
matrix flow were considered the anomalies (Dr. Quisenberry, personal
communication, March 10, 2017, 9:30 a.m.). That understanding changed the
way soil scientists understood their science and produced a new truth not just in
soil flow dynamics, but in all the aspects of soil science related to it. Through
paradigm shifts such as these, the perception of the world shifts from one "truth"
to another and leaves myth where truth once existed.
This idea that "truth" in science is not a fixed concept, but rather,
something more fluid, shifting along with our justifications, is not dissimilar from,
and cannot be disentangled from, the earlier suggestion that scientific knowledge
and epistemic knowledge are not the same. Epistemic knowledge is based on an
objective and observable truth, whereas Carey and Smith (1993, p. 236) claim
that" ... knowledge of regularity in nature is a consequence of successful
conjecture, rather than its precursor." That is, knowledge is based on theory, not
the other way around, and theory, by definition, is not truth: "Every theory aims at
truth, in the trivial sense that someone who proposes a theory proposes it as a
true theory" (Gaukroger 2012, p. 56) but theories are themselves "large-scale
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intellectual constructions that constitute the scientists' understanding and guide
the day-to-day activities of scientists" (Carey and Smith 1993, p. 236). This
concept aligns with Kuhn's philosophy that science is not a process of
accumulating facts while moving ever closer to the truth, but rather, a continuous
process of gaining ever improved information about the questions one is asking.
Gaukroger (2012, p. 66) summarizes this notion when he states "What we are
being guided towards are the best answers to the questions that we pose. The
quality of the answers will depend on the quality of the questions, what they
assume as given, what they take to be appropriate evidence, and what they take
to be the relevant form of explanation." On occasion, the questions answered
may not lead to more questions, in which case it may be suggested that one has
arrived at the truth (and, perhaps, knowledge), but more often, the answers
obtained only lead to more questions which accumulate until a point is reached
where it is realized that entirely the wrong questions were being asked in the first
place. These so-called paradigm changes would suggest that scientific
knowledge is as fleeting as the truth it seeks, dependent on the subjective
acceptance of the best justified theory, until it is replaced with yet another
justification. As such, it may be suggested that the realization of truth is not
guaranteed within the confines of the scientific endeavor. This, however, is not
meant to suggest that science does not have important and useful practical
applications. Ben-David (1971, p. xiii) recognizes that science is "applicable for
the solution of technical problems" and that "nonscientists are aware today of
these successes of scientific research and believe that science has tremendous
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potential for problem-solving." It is for this reason that the attempt to understand
the limitations of scientific knowledge has not been reserved only for
philosophers of science. Scientists of all kinds recognize many more practical
aspects of everyday science that greatly influence the way in which one
interprets their truth. In particular, most scientists recognize the inexact nature of
data and incorporate numerous methods for understanding how uncertainty in
their data affects their conclusions. An understanding of the relationship between
data, uncertainty, and truth, is especially important in those cases where data
drive real world decisions, as oftentimes different interpretations of the data may
lead to different decisions. It is the relationship between data, uncertainty, and
truth which is discussed below.
1.3.2 Data, decisions, and uncertainty. Recent advancements in

science and technology have greatly improved society's ability to collect,
analyze, and derive information from environmental data, and to do so faster and
more efficiently than ever. Such advancements have allowed environmental
scientists to ask more in-depth questions of more complex systems, and to
disseminate the results of such inquiries faster and further than ever. Enormous
amounts of information are now available to those individuals, including
scientists, policy makers, regulatory authorities, and the general public, wishing
to make more informed decisions on just about any aspect of the natural or
human world. Data, the basic unit of observation from which information is
derived, are nearly ubiquitous, available from what seems to be an infinite
number of sources and covering nearly every phenomenon. Data are scrutinized,
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analyzed, and used to extract conclusions about the phenomenon from which
they were derived. "Big data," in addition to being a household term, is a fairly
recent phenomenon generally used to describe the collection and utilization of
enormous datasets, realized out of technological advancements in computer
hardware, software, and computing power (see review in Chen et al. 2014). Chen
et al. (2014, p. 171) highlights the value of this mass availability of data, stating
"big data also brings about new opportunities for discovering new values, helps
us to gain an in-depth understanding of hidden values, and also incurs new
challenges." IBM states:
Big data is being generated by everything around us at all times. Every
digital process and social media exchange produces it. Systems, sensors
and mobile devices transmit it. Big data is arriving from multiple sources at
an alarming velocity, volume and variety. To extract meaningful value from
big data, you need optimal processing power, analytics capabilities and

skills.(IBM n.d.)
Extracting meaningful value from big data has proven invaluable for
numerous scientific and non-scientific fields, including medicine (Collen and Ball
2015), genomics (Stephens et al. 2015), materials science (Ghiringhelli et al.
2015), infectious disease (Hay et al. 2013), astronomy (Stephens et al. 2015),
ecology (Hampton et al. 2013), and business intelligence and analytics {Chen et
al. 2012, Chen et al. 2014), among others . The availability of data has become
so evident that in March of 2012 the White House Office of Technology and
Information Policy announced its Big Data Research and Development Initiative

41

emphasizing the role of digital data to "help solve some [of] the Nation's most
pressing challenges" (White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Initiatives,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/initiatives#Openness,
October 11, 2016). Similarly, McAfee et al. (2012, p. 62) recognize that
" ... because of big data, managers can measure, and hence know, radically
more ... and directly translate that knowledge into improved decision making and
performance." What is evident above is that, if properly incorporated into
informed decision-making, the increase in data availability has the potential to
affect real change.
"Big data," or more accurately "big data analytics," however, is a process,
and is just one example of the inductive processes commonly utilized in science
in which a series of observations of some phenomenon of interest are used to
draw general conclusions about some characteristic of that same phenomenon.
The process is essentially two-fold, the collection of observations followed by the
derivation of conclusions from those observations. Typically, each observation is
recorded as a measured value of some attribute of the phenomenon collected
from a single point in space and time; this single record is referred to as a datum.
Multiple observations collected together are referred to as data and represent a
record of measurements of the desired attribute over a defined temporal and
spatial range. The data values themselves represent the range of observed
variation of the attribute of interest over that spatio-temporal extent. Once
collected, the second step is to subject the data to the rigors of scrutiny and
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analysis required by the accepted paradigm of the discipline at hand. From that
scrutiny is derived a body of information, a set of general conclusions, about the
phenomenon from which the initial observations were made.
The derivation of information, however, is rarely the ultimate goal. Often
times a third step exists in which the derived information is used to drive actions
or decisions related to the observed phenomenon. For example, the
determination through sampling that the level of some contaminant within the
groundwater beneath an industrial park exceeds some predetermined threshold
for safe human consumption may lead to a number of different actions: 1} the
human consumption of water from within the contaminated area may be
prohibited; 2} a process of groundwater remediation may be initiated to reduce
the contaminant levels to below the predetermined safety threshold; 3) an
investigation may be launched to determine what actions led to the elevated
contamination levels and who is responsible for them; and, 4) regulations may be
imposed on the activity which resulted in the elevated contamination levels to
prevent future contamination events in other locations. Whatever the purpose,
the collection of data is usually more than a scientific process focused purely on
a greater understanding of the human-environmental system. The collection of
environmental data often leads to real social-political actions, with real socioeconomic consequences, all of which are highly dependent upon the way in
which those environmental data were collected, analyzed, and transformed into
information.
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In a world of readily available data, the ability to move from observation to
information-based decision has been greatly supported by the development of
sophisticated technology tools. The emergence of such technology-based
support tools has streamlined the processes of obtaining, analyzing, and
interpreting large data sets, and empowered those individuals who need to make
data-based decisions to be able to utilize those data without relying on
technically-trained specialists to carry out the transformation from data to
information. The use of systems which combine science and technology,
particularly computer-based technology, to provide information which support
decisions are often referred to as Decision Support Systems (DSS; see
discussion in Power 1997). DSS are powerful tools because they are designed
with the end-user in mind. They often target decision makers with little or no
technical experience and provide easy access to data and powerful analytical
tools with little requirement for understanding the complexities of the underlying
processes. Essentially, DSS simplify complex environmental assessments
through user-friendly interfaces which emphasize simplicity, consistency,
forgiveness, feedback, and robustness (Corbett et al. 2002). Often, this is
accomplished through deemphasizing data entry, simplifying powerful analytical
tools, and restricting outputs (Corbett et al. 2002). While the advantages of this
system are innumerable, there are major disadvantages which must be seriously
considered when the data-user has limited knowledge or understanding of the
limitations of the data or analyses used to drive decisions. Oftentimes, there is
sufficient error or uncertainty associated with a data set as to allow for a
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multitude of interpretations, and the failure to understand the limitations of those
interpretations can have detrimental results (Corbett et al. 2002). Burrough et al.
(1996, p. 31) state that " ... unskilled users may uncritically accept the results and
assume that complex models perform adequately. Even experts may accept
simulated results without adequate validation ... ," the result of which is a
" ... potential danger to rational decision making." Loague & Corwin (1996, p. 132)
note that "Uncertainties are pervasive in risk-based environmental assessment
problems and thereby impact the decisions made to address those problems.
Even so, risk-assessment and risk-management decisions generally rely on
nominal predictions from models with little or no knowledge of the reliability of
those predictions." The realization here is that the propagation of uncertainty
from data, through analysis, and into results has critical implications not just on
DSS results but on the consequences of decisions made based on those results.
As Corwin (1996, p. 81) states: "Uncertainty has a significant practical
implication. Uncertainty poses doubt about or affirms the use of predicted outputs
as a basis for policy guidance and action." Similarly, Fisher (1999, p. 203) states
that "appropriate conceptualization of uncertainty and the application of related
analytical methods creates a rich analytical environment where decision making
based on spatial information is facilitated not only by objective orderings of
alternatives but also by giving confidence in those alternatives."
The realization that the uncertainty that exists within the translation of data
into information can have critical implications in the decision-making process has
led to a wealth of literature seeking to characterize the uncertainty that is
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associated with the process (see review in MacDonald & Strachan 2001 ). What,
though, is uncertainty and how does it become associated with data and the
analytic process? The Oxford Online Dictionary defines "uncertain" as "not known
or definite," by which uncertainty is the "state of being uncertain" (Oxford Online
Dictionary: https://en .oxforddictionaries. com/definition/uncertain,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/uncertainty,

January 27, 2017). In

terms of data, uncertainty can be thought of as the limitations of confidence in a
given, estimated, or determined value and can occur in any combination of three
dimensions-in

attribute value, time, or for those data sets with a spatial

identifier, in the determination of location (Fisher 1999). For any measurement,
estimation, or prediction, one can only ever state that they have a value that is
near the real value, where the actual real value is unknown. Robinson & Frank
( 1985) recognize eight reasons why this is true: 1) measured objects or events
are often only vaguely defined; 2) measurements are inherently imprecise
(though situations do exist where measurements can be made with negligible
levels of imprecision); 3) gross errors of statistical nature may corrupt data; 4)
schemes for classification are imprecise and subjective; 5) ordinal scale
attributes are approximate qualifications of subjective classes; 6) the recording
and use of "facts" is subject to interpretation and influenced by context (clearly a
reference to Kuhn's "Theory Ladenness of Data"); 7) differences between the
intended use and actual use of data leads to semantic error; and, 8) data are
often representative of a past state of reality (temporal uncertainty). For these
reasons, the argument can be made that for any measured, estimated, or
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predicted value, one cannot state definitively that they know the true value, but
that the truth lies within a range of uncertainty. Understanding the source and
extent of that uncertainty is key to shaping how one interprets the truth in their
experimental investigation.
On the source of uncertainty, uncertainty arises from three primary
aspects of experimental or modeled systems: 1) the oversimplification of complex
processes; 2) from the inability of a model to capture the natural variability of a
given parameter; or, 3) from the inexactness of the techniques used to estimate a
value (Corwin 1996). The first two derive from natural variation and complexities
within the system and are generally referred to as aleatory or stochastic
uncertainty. The latter is typically due to the limitations of the measurement
apparatus or technique used to assign an exact value to an input, parameter, or
attribute value that is assumed to have a real, fixed value with respect to the
investigation being conducted. The latter form is referred to as epistemic or
subjective uncertainty. (Helton et al 2006, lonescu-Bujor & Cacuci 2004).
Within modeled systems, uncertainty of the stochastic kind is typically
addressed by choosing a model which best "fits" the nature of the complexity or
variability involved. While there are numerous model types in use, environmental
models generally fit into one of three categories: 1) empirical; 2) conceptual; and,
3) process-based (Letcher and Jakeman 2009). Empirical models are the most
simple and typically describe a complex process in aggregate, without defining
the individual parameters. Process-based models are the opposite, often defining
in great detail the parameters relevant to a particular system. Conceptual models
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lie somewhere in between empirical and process-based models (Letcher and
Jakeman 2009). All three models, however, rely on clear, linear relationships
between inputs and outputs. Other modelling techniques, such as fuzzy set
theory (discussed below) and artificial neural networking (ANN) allow for less
specific, and even dynamic, relationships to be modeled in order to capture the
inherent complexity or variability within a system. For example, ANN uses layers
of processing elements containing weighted inputs, a transfer function, and a
single output, that are connected by weighted coefficients, to create networks of
artificial "neurons" reflective of how biological neurons are structured in the
human brain. The structure of ANN allows for powerful modeling systems which
can detect patterns and relationships in data through an inherent "learning"
process which requires little to no upfront knowledge of the modeled system, so
long as there is sufficient data to train the model (Agantonovic-Kustrin &
Beresford 2000). Regardless of the model chosen, some stochastic uncertainty
will remain unaccounted for. Furthermore, each model type introduces its own
level and type of uncertainty and all models are only as reliable as the data which
informs them. In that case, all models are limited by the epistemic uncertainty
inherent in the data collected.
The evaluation of uncertainty in a model or experimental system is
generally categorized as either uncertainty analysis or sensitivity analysis, both of
which apply to either retrospective or forecasting models (Helton et al. 2006,
League & Corwin 1996, MacDonald & Strachan 2001 ). Uncertainty analysis is
primarily concerned with quantifying the total amount of uncertainty in analysis
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results that stems from uncertainty in the analytic inputs, parameters, or model
structure (League & Corwin 1996}. Sensitivity analysis is the identification of the
degree to which individual input uncertainty contributes to uncertainty in the
results (Helton et al. 2006). Uncertainty analysis establishes the general reliability
of the results - greater uncertainty in the results implies less confidence in the
truth described by those results - while sensitivity analysis establishes which
uncertain model variables most significantly contribute to the uncertainty and
allow the scientist to identify which aspects of her truth are subject to the
uncertainty (Loague & Corwin 1996). Loague & Corwin (1996) argue that
uncertainty analysis is useful for determining the level of resources that should
be expended on reducing uncertainty, while sensitivity analysis provides direction
on where those resources would best be spent to obtain the most cost-effective
reduction in uncertainty. Hamby (1994} expands on the role of sensitivity
analyses, arguing that they are useful for determining: 1} which parameters
require additional research in order to reduce overall output uncertainty; 2) what
input parameters should be utilized and which can be eliminated; 3) which
parameters contribute most to output variability; 4) what parameters have the
greatest correlation to output results; and, 5) assessing the effect of changing
one aspect of the model design.
Numerous methods have been developed for analyzing the uncertainty
and sensitivities in model systems and, while a thorough review of those
methods is not pertinent here, some commonly encountered methods include
one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis (Graff et al. 2005), first-order analysis (Loague
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& Corwin 1996), Monte Carlo analysis (MacDonald & Strachan 2001 ), Differential

Sensitivity Analysis (MacDonald & Strachan 2001 ), Generalized Sensitivity
Analysis (Spear and Hornberger 1980), factorial analysis (Paruelo & Sala 1995),
and regression techniques (Welsch 1980), among others (see reviews in Hamby
1994, Helton et al. 2006, lonescu-Bujor & Cacuci 2004, and Cacuci & lonescuBujor 2004). Generally, the methods for analyzing uncertainty are categorized
according to whether the method utilized is deterministic (i.e. uses a series of
experiments to determine the outcomes of an established model) or stochastic
(i.e. methods based on probability distributions). MacDonald & Strachan (2001)
refer to the former as structured and the latter as unstructured, while lonescuBujor & Cacuci (2004) refer to the former as deterministic and the latter as
statistical. lonescu-Bujor & Cacuci (2004) note that deterministic methods are the
only ones for which an exact determination of local sensitivities can be made. In
some cases, the same method can be applied to both uncertainty and sensitivity
analyses (MacDonald & Strachan 2001, lonescu-Bujor & Cacuci 2004); however,
it is important to note that different methods applied to the same model can result
in different determinations of uncertainty (Hamby 1994).
Like non-spatial data, spatial data can have uncertainty derived from both
epistemic and stochastic sources. Spatial data is unique, however, in that
uncertainty may arise, not just in measurements of attribute value (including
time), but also in location. Fisher (1999) recognizes a system of hierarchal
classifications of spatial entities in which individual entities are grouped into
classes with other entities sharing similar values (attribute and locational), which
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in turn belong to a higher set of classes, and so on and so forth. To be
successful, the classes must be clearly separable from other possible classes,
and the entity must be clearly separable from other entities within the same
class. For class and entity to be clearly separable there must be a clear definition
of both. When successful, the system is Boolean in that every object is either a
member of a particular class or it is not. In a geographic context, the class is a
clearly defined geographic extent which is contiguous and homogenous for a
specific value of an attribute. A simple example might be the classification of land
parcels (the entity) by zoning type (the attribute value) within a county. Individual
parcels of land can clearly be assigned zoning type values, and have a clearly
defined spatial extent, which can then be aggregated into a hierarchy of
geographic categories such as census blocks, census tracts, counties, etc.
Uncertainty arises when either class or entity cannot be clearly defined due to
limitations in the measurement apparatus (epistemic uncertainty), or when
natural variation within the system (stochastic uncertainty) prevents a clear and
concise definition of the entity or class. For spatial entities, the spatial and nonspatial attributes interact such that for any given entity or class there exists four
states: 1) those for which both the attribute definition and spatial extent are
clearly defined; 2) those with a clear attribute definition but with locational
uncertainty; 3) those with an uncertain attribute definition but a well-defined
spatial extent; or, 4) those with an uncertain attribute definition and spatial extent
(Robinson & Frank 1985). Fisher (1999) notes that for any entity belonging to the
first category (well defined attribute definition and spatial extent), any uncertainty
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associated with that entity must be epistemic and can be addressed through
deterministic or stochastic means. The author refers to the epistemic state of
uncertainty as error. The remaining three states, however, each potentially
contain some level of both epistemic and stochastic uncertainty and must be
addressed using other means. Fisher (1999) further classifies these states
according to how their uncertainty affects the ability to fit entity to class.

Vagueness results from the situation in which either the object or the class is not
well defined, and therefore unable to classify. Ambiguity arises when the entity is
clearly defined but it cannot be clearly assigned to a class. Ambiguity can be a
function of an entity belonging to two or more classes, referred to as discord, or a
function of differing interpretations of the classification process, termed

nonspecificity.
Examples of the above states may be observed in the exercise of
classifying land use/land cover categories for a given spatial extent. A class
defined as "Lakes greater than one acre and less than five acres" is clearly
defined and any lake entity fulfilling that criteria would clearly fit the class. Should
the scientist be unable to fit a lake to that criteria it would not be because of an
unclear definition, but rather, because of some challenge in determining (i.e.
measuring) whether the lake was actually greater than one acre and less than
five acres (which would, therefore, be due to epistemic uncertainty). Fisher
(1999, p. 193) notes "If it is possible to separate unequivocally the phenomenon
to be mapped into mappable and spatially distinct objects using the spatial
distribution of some individual attribute or collection of attributes, at a given time,
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then there is no problem of definition." In contrast, a class of forest landcover
defined as "hardwood forest composed of primarily mature pop ash and red
maple, with a lesser component of shrub species and sparse softwoods" may be
a description by which it would be more difficult to assign an observed entity. The
use of unclear qualifiers, such as primarily, lesser, and sparse, results in a
situation that would be classified as vagueness and, according to Fisher (1999),
could be addressed using fuzzy set theory. Fuzzy set theory "provides a
framework for dealing with fuzzy qualifiers, e.g. most, many, few, not very many,
almost all, infrequently, about 0.8, etc. In this way, fuzzy logic subsumes both
predicate logic and probability theory, and makes it possible to deal with different
types of uncertainty within a single conceptual framework" (Zadeh 1983, p. 199).
Such fuzzy set theory assigns membership values to a class on a continuous
scale between O and 1, as opposed to the binary system discussed above in
which an entity either is member of a class or it is not (O'Sullivan & Unwin 2010).
Ambiguity may be envisioned by a situation in which two land use/land cover
classes are differentiated by the areal extent of palmetto, one class defined by
10-25% palmetto and the other defined by 25-50% palmetto. Should the entity
observed contain exactly 25% palmetto, and lack any other differentiating
characteristics, then an ambiguity based in discord would exist about which class
the entity belonged to. Similarly, should there be question as to whether a
definition of 25-50% long-leaf pine referred to 25-50% areal canopy coverage or
25-50% of the total number of trees, then the ambiguity would stem from the nonspecificity of the classification process. According to Fisher (1999), rigorous
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methods for dealing with discord and non-specificity in model systems have not
yet been well researched.
In addition to epistemic and stochastic uncertainty, the uncertainty in
spatial data is also recognized as either global or local. Global uncertainty is the
uncertainty inherent within a complete dataset at all locations, while local
uncertainty is the uncertainty associated with a single location (Goovaerts 2001 ).
The most commonly encountered approaches for dealing with either global or
local uncertainty in spatial datasets include the kriging-based methods, such as
linear, lognormal, disjunctive, and indicator kriging, and stochastic simulation
models such as sequential Gaussian simulation, sequential indicator simulation,
p-field simulation and simulated annealing (Goovaerts 1999, Goovaerts 2001,
Papritz and Dubois 1999).
Simply stated, regardless of the type of data collected, uncertainty arises
from the inability of the "perceptual apparatus" to define a measured or predicted
value with infinite precision, or to clearly define the range or boundary of the
phenomenon to which the measured value belongs. Whether the perceptual
apparatus is the measuring tool, the model, or the theory under which the study
is carried out, there exists inherent uncertainties which are then propagated
through analyses as quantitative observations are subjected to mathematical
calculations or as qualitative observations are used to influence subsequent
interpretations. Ultimately, uncertainty is realized in a scientist's interpretation of
truth and, in this way, has both practical and philosophical implications.
Identifying the quantity and source of uncertainty in a scientific study either casts
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doubt on, or affirms, the degree to which a scientist believes their study's
outcome represents the truth, but in doing so shapes their idea of what that truth
is or should be.

1.3.3 Sampling network design, spatial data, and truth. Nowhere within
the field of environmental science is the connection between the perceptual
apparatus, knowledge, and truth more obvious than in those investigations which
rely on the power of sampling to derive their realities. Sampling, by its very
nature, relies on inductive generalization to create a reality from a limited
collection of observations made across time and space and through the filter of
the perceptual apparatus. As such, the conclusions drawn from sampling events
are subject to all the biases of perception, observation, theory, etc., as discussed
above, plus those associated with inductive generalization and the nuances of
predicting or explaining a phenomenon across a physical space.
Seeing is believing, and humans incorporate a great deal of observational
evidence to understand, analyze, and predict the effects of their actions on the
environment. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from those observations are
often used to drive key decisions regarding human activity and the environment.
As such, the ability of key decision-makers to act on critical information is
dependent on the ability of scientists to obtain accurate, reliable, affordable, and
timely information. The limitations of time and resource restraints
notwithstanding, the most reliable information concerning a specific phenomenon
of interest would be derived from observations of that phenomenon at all possible
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locations and at all possible times. However, since making such observations is
typically neither economically nor operationally possible, environmental scientists
must rely on a network of observations distributed throughout space and time
from which they can derive the desired information to relay into the decisionmaking process. Such a network of observations is generally collected through a
larger information system composed of: a network of sampling stations where
observations are made; data storage systems to hold details of the observations;
and data analysis methods from which information can be derived from
observations. Collectively, those components are referred to as an environmental
monitoring program (EMP) (Vos et al. 2000). The networks of observations, often
referred to as monitoring networks, are used to characterize a measureable
parameter associated with the phenomenon-of-interest across a defined space
and time, or to predict the unknown value of that parameter at a known location
and moment based on the known values at other locations. The use of
monitoring networks is widely discussed in the academic literature of a number of
different fields of study, including groundwater (Locaiga et al. 1992, Spruill and
Candela 1990), surface water (Casper et al. 2012, Strobl & Robillard 2008), air
quality (Baldauf et al. 2009, Nychka and Saltzman 1998), terrestrial biology (Vos
et al. 2000) and marine biology (Lophaven 2004, Kirkman 1996).
The design of the monitoring networks, defined by Loaiciga (1992) as "the
selection of sampling points and [temporal] sampling frequency to determine,
physical, chemical, and biological characteristics ... " (p. 11), is described by Vos
et al. (2000) as "the methodological core of the program" (p. 318) because it
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determines the confidence in which observed changes can be related to
specified causes. Such design can be carried out in a number of different ways,
using a number of different methods, depending on the objectives of the
monitoring activity. According to Loaiciga et al. (1992), monitoring activities are
typically designed to carry out one of the following four objectives: 1) ambient
monitoring which characterizes "background" levels of a characteristic of a
population in space and time; 2) detection monitoring which seeks to identify
times and locations where a parameter exceeds background levels; 3)
compliance monitoring which identifies when a contaminant has exceeded a
predefined threshold; or, 4) research monitoring in which the monitoring
networked is designed to meet particular research goals. Spruill and Candela
(1990) further combine those objectives into two broader objectives: 1) to
describe, statistically, the areal characteristics (mean, median, percent above
threshold, etc.) of the chosen parameter (the "what" question), or 2) to detect the
location(s) of particular values of that parameter within the spatial extent of
interest (the "where" question). Once the monitoring objective is identified, the
spatial scale can be determined. Once the spatial scale is determined, specific
objective functions (i.e. performance criterion) are selected which drive the
selection of the sampling network design method (Loaiciga et al. 1992). Objective
functions are classified by Loaiciga et al. (1992) as either ultimate or surrogate.
Ultimate objective functions are those which directly influence the design of the
monitoring networks, such as minimizing environmental impact, minimizing costs,
or avoiding exposure risk. Alternatively, surrogate objectives functions substitute
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for ultimate objective functions and rely on secondary characteristics of the data
such as the minimization of statistical parameters or prediction error. Oftentimes,
multiple competing objective functions exist and trade-offs between competing
objective functions must be considered (ex: monitoring cost vs. variance
minimization). Furthermore, the nature of the phenomenon being examined and
the type of data available also influence monitoring networks design and must be
considered in concert with monitoring network objectives, scale, and objective
functions (Loaiciga et al. 1992).
Ultimately, a monitoring network must be designed to answer the posed
question (i.e. the objective) as efficiently and effectively as possible. Spruill and
Candela (1990) refer to such a monitoring network as "optimized" and define it as
one which provides statistically acceptable results with as few sampling points as
possible. Within the academic literature, there are numerous methods described
for optimizing monitoring networks using surrogate objective functions, including
but not limited to: Bayesian/probability-based; statistical power-based; variancebased; model-based; geostatistical; and any combination of those or others (see
Baldauf et al. 2009, Loaiciga et al. 1992, Lophaven 2004, Mahar & Datta, 1997,
Nychka and Saltzman 1998). Spruill and Candela (1990) directly compared two
such methods, statistical power-based and geostatistical (i.e. kriging), for the
redesign of a ground-water-quality monitoring network intended to measure
ground-water chloride levels in a deep, confined aquifer in the Llobregat delta
near Barcelona, Spain. Using an existing dataset consisting of 120 samples from
a population of 1000 sampling wells, the authors applied a set of objective criteria
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for each design method and determined how many samples were necessary to
optimize the monitoring network. The statistical power-based method was used
to determine the fewest number of wells necessary to estimate with 95%
confidence the median chloride level within 40% of the true median. The kriging
methods were used to identify the minimum number of wells which provided the
same maximum and average standard errors when compared to the original
sample set. The statistical power-based results suggested that log-normal
regression methods could produce a median chloride estimation within 40% of
the true median value with 95% confidence with only 13 wells. A unique
regression method combining both parametric and non-parametric methods,
without assuming a particular distribution, found equivalent levels of error with 25
samples but provided a means for estimating the number of samples necessary
to establish a selected quantile with known error. The kriging methods
determined that 99 sample stations distributed throughout a regular grid of 500m
x 500m rectangular cells provided the same maximum and average standard
error as the original 120-station network. Based on those results, the authors
made the argument that while the statistical power-based method more efficiently
answered "what" questions concerning general descriptive characteristics of the
chosen parameter for the given population (mean, median, standard deviation,
i.e. the areal characteristics), it resulted in greater prediction error at individual
points. On the other hand, the geostatistical method required more sample points
but resulted in less local prediction error, thereby more efficiently answering the
"where" question. The authors successfully argue that monitoring networks must
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be designed with their purpose in mind, and that different designs are suitable for
different questions. Implicit in that conclusion is that different network designs
give different results, i.e. conceptions of the truth. As such, the network design
(number and spatial orientation of sampling points) is yet another aspect of the
'perceptual apparatus' through which the truth is observed. It is this aspect of the
perceptual apparatus that is discussed -in Chapter IV.

1.4 Overall Structure of Thesis
This manuscript is divided into five major chapters. The first chapter
introduces the concepts of scientific knowledge and truth and explores the
philosophical foundations of these concepts, followed by a discussion on specific
cases in science to which a philosophical understanding of knowledge and truth
may be especially prudent. The next three chapters present three scientific
investigations which examine the practical role of truth in the development of
scientific knowledge. Chapter II explores more deeply Thomas Kuhn's concept of
paradigm shifts and presents a meta-analysis of three case studies of potential
paradigm shifts which have occurred in the field of ecology.
Chapter Ill utilizes an artificial dataset to examine how changing the
resolution of a sensor impacts the interpretation of the truth when applied to
observations of a given phenomenon for which a true state is known.
Chapter IV utilizes a real dataset derived from observations of seagrass
distribution and abundance to explore how different sampling strategies and
effort levels impact the interpretation of seagrass distribution. The three studybased chapters are followed by Chapter V, which examines my own conclusions
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relating the results of the studies to the themes of truth, scientific knowledge,
data, uncertainty, and data-based decisions presented in the first chapter.
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CHAPTER II: PARADIGM SHIFTS IN ECOLOGY

Paradigms can be thought of as the contextual lens through which science
is carried out. They serve to both guide science, showing the path along which it
progresses, and to evaluate science, creating the filter through which it is
observed. As such, paradigms have a major influence on what is justified as truth
in science and when those paradigms shift, the potential exists for a major shift in
not only what is considered truth, but therefore, in what is considered scientific
knowledge. Below is a discussion on paradigms and revolution in science, in
general, followed by four case studies of proposed paradigm shifts within the field
of ecology, and a discussion of their influence on ecological knowledge.
The field of ecology was chosen as one example among many possible
fields representing the environmental sciences. Ecology is a good example of the
field of environmental science due to its inherently interdisciplinary and applied
nature that is based on fundamental principles of biology, chemistry, and physics.
For the discussion of paradigms, ecology is especially pertinent for a number of
reasons: First, ecology is a fairly young science, having only been formally
recognized for the last 100-130 years. During that time, ecology has undergone a
number of transitions in the understanding of foundational concepts which can be
recognized as "revolutions" in the development of scientific knowledge. Looking
back at how that knowledge developed is a powerful tool for understanding the
role that paradigms play in the process.
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Second, ecology is a science heavily dependent on observations made
through the lens of a perceptual apparatus, and the components of that
apparatus, examined in subsequent chapters, are all applicable within the field.
While sensor resolution and sampling strategy are not examined in the context of
paradigm shifts in this chapter, the examples presented do emphasize the fact
that the knowledge developed within the field is highly dependent upon a set of
observations and the way those observations are interpreted.
Lastly, there are no known existing studies that have specifically examined
the role of perspective and the influence of the perceptual apparatus in the
interpretation of truth and the development of ecological knowledge. As such, this
study represents the first known attempt to link those broadly philosophical
concepts within a rigorous ecological exercise.

2.1 Paradigms and Revolution in Science
The contemporary concept of a paradigm was proposed by Thomas Kuhn
in his famous essay, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962 [2012]),
though the term paradigm had been widely used among philosophers of science
for many years prior (Hacking 2012). The novelty of Kuhn's proposal, relative to
prior uses, was that through the use of "paradigm," Kuhn proposed a structure by
which he argued that science progresses from speculation to revolution and back
again. The impact was enormous, it led not only to a wealth of philosophical
discourse around Kuhn's proposal, but it also interjected "paradigm" into the
vernacular of scientists and general society, from then until the present (see
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review in Hacking 2012 and Kuhn 2000). Furthermore, the concept of paradigms
and the subsequent concept of paradigm shifts, have continued to influence the
way that scientific communities evaluate change in their own fields today. Part of
the reason for Kuhn's impact at the time was, according to Hacking (2012), the
way that he associated paradigms with revolution, a term that, in the cold war era
of the 1960s, was reserved for radical transitions, and therefore, carried a more
negative connotation than it does today. The other reason for the widespread
notoriety of Kuhn's proposal was that it questioned the foundational relationship
between science, progress, and truth that was so widely accepted by the
scientific community of the time. The latter, combined with a lasting, though not
always accepted, (see Okasha 2002) conceptual framework for evaluating
change in science, has carried the persistent influence of Kuhn's theory into the
present.
To get at the impact of Kuhn's proposal, one must first understand what it
is he proposed. Kuhn proposed that scientific progress occurs through a series of
steps that move from speculation to eventual revolution, all of which are
dependent on the foundational concept of the paradigm. While Masterman
(1970) points out 22 ways in which Kuhn used the term paradigm, Kuhn's initial
introduction of the term described paradigms as example scientific works on
which subsequent practitioners of the field base their activities. In this way, he
offers the term "exemplar" as a substitute and notes particular cases where the
scientist responsible for a work has had their name ascribed to the paradigm,
such as 'Copernican astronomy' or 'Newtonian physics.' Kuhn (1962 [2012])
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states that paradigms "provide models from which spring particular coherent
traditions of scientific research" (p. 11). Inherent in this description is the idea that
paradigms are not just foundational examples, but that they result in "coherent
traditions" implying that some form of ideological organization exists around
paradigms. It is that ideological organization that becomes the foundation upon
which future scientific activity is conducted, evaluated, and taught, and which
binds the members of a scientific community: "The study of paradigms ... is what
mainly prepares the student for membership in a particular scientific
community ... Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed
to the same rules and standards for scientific practice" (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 11).
The existence of a paradigm, however, is not essential. Kuhn notes that science
can happen in the absence of a paradigm, but that in such cases "all of the facts
that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to
seem equally relevant" (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 15). Thus, the paradigm gives
context to facts and provides a set of criteria by which a community can judge
their value. As such, the development of a paradigm is a sign of maturity in a
scientific field and, to get there, paradigms must contain two essential
characteristics: 1) they must be sufficiently novel to attract an enduring group of
followers away from competing schools of thought, and, 2) they must be
sufficiently open-ended to provide a variety of questions and problems for
followers to resolve. Neither point contends that a paradigm must be accurate or
truthful, but both suggest how endorsement of a particular paradigm can shift
over time. This, then, leads to Kuhn's proposal that through scientific progress, a
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scientific community can transition from endorsement of one paradigm to
another, an event he refers to as a paradigm shift and which he likens to
revolution (Kuhn 1962 [20121).
According to Kuhn, the path of scientific progress from conception to
revolution is composed of six steps: 1) normal science; 2) puzzle solving; 3)
paradigm; 4) anomaly; 5) crisis; and, 6) revolution. The first step, normal science,
is firmly established within the paradigm and is the day-to-day scientific activity
conducted by most scientists, most of the time. It is this science which is
concerned with development of scientific knowledge, though Kuhn asserts that
the knowledge derived from normal science is rarely novel: ''The most striking
feature of the normal research problems we have just encountered is how little
they aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal" (Kuhn 1962
[2012], p. 35). Kuhn argues that normal science is primarily concerned with three
activities: 1) the determination of significant facts; 2) matching of facts with
theory; and, 3) the articulation of theory, all of which are simply filling in the gaps
of the established paradigm with yet undescribed examples, an activity Kuhn
refers to as "mopping up operations" (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 24 ). These mopping
up operations are comprised of solving puzzles which feed back into the
paradigm, adding to the range and precision with which the paradigm can be
applied and further bolstering its establishment. In that way, the activity of step
one, normal science, is characterized by step two, puzzle solving, which enforces
the existence and subscription to step three, paradigms. The first three steps are
therefore cyclical; paradigms, enforced by puzzle-solving circle back around to
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influence the next steps of normal science, establishing the criteria by which
normal science chooses which new puzzles to pursue and how to go about
solving them. From there, puzzles are solved, the paradigm is enforced, and the
cycle starts anew. Inherent in this cycle is the fact that the paradigm, through the
leaders of the scientific community which follow it (see the discussion on
authoritarianism above), determines which puzzles are to be pursued and which
are to be ignored, often limiting to only those puzzles to which use of the
paradigm would tend to suggest successful solutions through normal science.
Kuhn notes that by limiting the puzzles which are to be pursued by normal
science, adherence to the paradigm may produce outcomes contrary to societal
benefit: "A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community from those
socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because
they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the
paradigm supplies" (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 37). Despite this critique, Hacking
(2012) points out that it is unlikely that Kuhn viewed normal science or paradigms
as not valuable. Hacking argues that Kuhn described normal science as
providing little novelty in terms of the development of theory, but in terms of
developing nuanced detail, and for the development of practical applications
such as technology or medicine, normal science has enormous value. To this
point, Kuhn himself states, "By focusing attention upon a small range of relatively
esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of
nature in a detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable" (Kuhn 1962
[2012], p. 25).
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Moving on from the establishment and reinforcement of paradigms, it is in
the fourth step, anomaly, where the roots of revolution begin. While normal
science and problem solving are not concerned with novelty, "Discovery
commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature
has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal
science" (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 53). Within normal science, the discovery of small
anomalies that do not agree with the existing paradigm are often ignored and
written off as outliers. Kuhn argues that such anomalies are dependent upon the
success of normal science, as it is normal science which establishes the
precision against which anomalies stand out: "Anomaly appears only against the
background provided by the paradigm" (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 65). However, as
anomalies accumulate, and the scope of normal science is unable to account for
their existence, the existing paradigm is called into question, eventually arriving
at the fifth step, crisis.
Crisis is the widespread recognition of anomaly which leads to a
questioning of the underlying principles of the reigning paradigm. The process,
however, does not occur at once- science must not only discover that the
anomaly exists, but it must describe what the anomaly is and how the paradigm
fails to account for it. Attempts to alter the existing paradigm to account for the
anomalies are not unusual and "proliferation of versions of a theory is a very
usual symptom of crisis" (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 71 ). The rejection of the
paradigm, though, is not as simple as recognizing that it has failed to account for
the observed; the rejection of one paradigm always coincides with the
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acceptance of another and "the judgement leading to that decision involves the
comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other'' (Kuhn 1962
[2012], p. 78). Key to the process is a loosening of the rules of normal research
such that questions, not previously deemed worthy of the paradigm, are made
available for pursuit. Crisis often leads to a proliferation of new discoveries at a
time when scientific communities are open to accept anomalies for what they are.
In this way, crisis often leads to a period of extraordinary research. Eventually,
this leads to one of three outcomes: 1) the existing paradigm is able to account
for the crisis-inducing anomalies and the existing paradigm survives; 2) even
radical new approaches cannot account for the anomalies and the problem is set
aside for future generations; or, 3) the crisis gives way to a new candidate for a
replacement paradigm. The third is the paradigm shift, and should be viewed as
more than simply the accumulation of new facts; it is:
A reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that
changes some of the field's most elementary theoretical generalizations
as well as many of its paradigm methods and applications ... When the
transition is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the
field, its methods, and its goals. (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 85)
Hence, a revolution. From revolution emerges a new paradigm, which eventually
gives way to a new tradition of normal science with new puzzles and new
applications to enforce the authority of the paradigm. And, the cycle continues.
However, the impact of Kuhn's proposal, and the basis for its introduction
here, was not purely for his description of the structure by which that cycle
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proceeds, but for the way Kuhn related paradigms to truth and the development
of scientific knowledge. Kuhn argued that paradigm shifts resulted in radical
changes of world view for scientists working within the paradigm:
During revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking
with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. It is rather as
if the professional community had been suddenly transported to another
planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light and are joined by
unfamiliar ones as well. (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p.111)
This change of view leaves the scientific community with a new perception of the
same information they had been working with previously, leading to new
decisions about what is important, what questions should be asked, and what
methods or instrumentation should be employed. More than this, however, Kuhn
argues that the new paradigm is "incommensurable" with its predecessor, that
the two paradigms are so different that one cannot be understood through the
perspective of the other (Kuhn 1962 [2012], p. 112). This argument was
articulated by Hacking (2012) by supposing that humans can extract the meaning
of the names of objects by looking at the object with which the name is
associated. For example, one knows the meaning of "computer" because they
have seen a computer and learned to associate it with its name. For theoretical
objects such as electrons, however, the meaning of an object's name is couched
in the theory by which one arrives at the object. Should the theory of electrons
change, then the meaning of "electron" would be different and incommensurable
with previous meanings, despite the name remaining the same. The example
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elaborates on Kuhn's argument that paradigm shifts not only change the theory
under which a community is working, but the very language with which that
community is using to describe their world. As such, even the observations and
data collected under a new paradigm are different, as scientists are seeing the
same phenomenon in a new way and using a new language to describe it.
The incommensurability point made above has serious philosophical
implications for the relationship between science and truth. Kuhn argues that the
popular conception of science, as the cumulative progress toward truth, is an
inaccurate one. Instead, he proposes that science is moving away from primitive
understandings but not necessarily toward truth: "a process of evolution from
primitive beginnings - a process whose successive stages are characterized by
an increasingly detailed and refined understanding of nature. But nothing has
been or will be said that makes it a process of evolution toward anything" (Kuhn
1962 [2012], p. 171). At first look, this statement could suggest that Kuhn was
arguing against the existence of truth at all. Hacking (2012) contends that Kuhn
was not questioning the existence of truth itself, but that he questioned the
scientific utility of thinking about science as the accumulation of facts along a
path to realizing one objective truth. Hacking argued that Kuhn believed that
science was cumulative within the confines of normal science, but that
revolutions disrupt continuity by changing the goals established by the existing
paradigm. The ultimate result, according to Kuhn, is not a blatant disregard for
the views of a previous paradigm, but reinvigoration of the field by new
perspectives, new theories, and new opportunities for exploration. In this way,
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paradigm shifts are key to scientific progress, for without them science would
grow stale and degenerate. This is an interesting point because it opens the
possibility that, on occasion, a paradigm is not confronted by anomaly and crisis;
on occasion, the paradigm is able to explain all puzzles which it allows to be
explored. In these cases, according to Kuhn, the paradigm leaves the realm of
scientific exploration and becomes a standard for scientific application, usable in
practical fields such as engineering.
Kuhn's proposal was remarkable at the time it was published, for both
philosophers and practitioners of science. Since the publication of Kuhn's The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the concepts of paradigms and paradigm

shifts in science have given way to wealth of academic discourse refuting,
supporting, or otherwise discussing Kuhn's proposal. That discourse has
continued through to contemporary times and both Kuhn's structure and
philosophy continue to be referenced in works today. What follows is a detailed
discussion of modem scientific works within the field of ecology that have been
evaluated in the context of Kuhn's proposal. These works highlight some key
strengths and weaknesses of Kuhn's ideas and are presented to provide context
to the studies and conclusions published in this thesis.

2.2 Ecology and Revolution

The term "ecology" was first coined by German zoologist, Ernst Haeckel,
in 1866 (originally as "oecology"; Pimm & Smith 2018), who later elaborated on
the term, defining it as "the study of all those complex interactions referred to by
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Darwin as the conditions of the struggle for existence" (as quoted in McIntosh
1986). As a discipline, ecology has its foundations in the field of natural history,
as seen in the early works of Carolus Linnaeus in the eighteenth century and
Alexander von Humboldt in the early nineteenth century. By the 1890s ecology
was a recognized science concerned with various aspects of oceanography,
limnology, plant science, and animal ecology, flourishing in juxtaposition to the
laboratory-dominated sciences of the time. By 1915, both America and Britain
had established ecological societies, and in 1920, the journal Ecology published
its first volume (McIntosh 1986). The point is that ecology is relatively young
compared to more traditional sciences, such as physics and astronomy, having
really only matured within the last 100 years. Despite its relatively short history,
the field of ecology has grown enormously, not only in terms of the breadth of
topics that have come to be recognized as sub-specializations within the field,
but also in terms of the ontological development of ecological knowledge, from
primitive understandings to the nuanced details with which we describe the
interactions between organisms and their environment today. As expected, within
this rapid and extensive development a number of shifts have occurred in the
foundational principles and theories that have supported specific areas of interest
within the field. Using the standards laid out by Kuhn, it is possible to view some
of these shifts as revolutionary, though the designation of paradigm shift is itself
a matter of perspective and, as detailed below, arguments have been made that
ecology is too complex a science to suffer the type of radical shifts in world view
that Kuhn referred to as revolutions. Despite the debate, it is clear that the field of
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ecology has grown in leaps and bounds since its early days as a nascent
science, and during that time has undergone drastic changes often associated
with the type of crisis and debate described by Kuhn.
Below are selected overviews of proposed paradigm shifts within the field
of ecology. They are not intended to comprise a comprehensive review of the
historical development of ecology as a whole, but rather, a representative
discussion of specific paradigms and their evolution presented as examples of
Kuhn's proposal in the contemporary. Such examples provide historical context
to the development of key ideas in the field of ecology and provide evidence for
how paradigm shifts contribute to the development and advancement in a
particular field. Furthermore, backward examination of such developments
carries the advantage that the observer knows now what they didn't know then,
providing key insights into the way the current state of knowledge has developed
as a result of shifting perceptions and interpretations of truth. These works
highlight how paradigms contribute to the perceptual bias which influences the
way knowledge develops within the field of ecology. They serve as specific
examples of shifting perceptions within the natural sciences and emphasize the
need for those sciences to embrace the reality of perceptual bias in their
interpretation of reality. Within the context of this study, the proposed examples
provide historical justification for the subsequent case studies that examine the
role of sensor resolution and sampling strategy in the interpretation of natural
phenomena.
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Figure 1: Selected examples of proposed paradigm shifts in ecology

2.2.1 Ecology and the philosophical foundations of evolution. The
concept of evolution is not necessarily an ecological concept, having established
roots long before the formal indoctrination of ecology as a science distinct from
natural history. The embracing of Darwinian evolution 1 by the scientific
community, however, has been suggested as a key conceptual shift which paved
the way for the development of ecology as it is known today (Simberloff 1980,
Stauffer 1957). Evidence of Darwin's influence on ecology is apparent in the very

1

The phrase "embracing of Darwinian evolution" is not intended to imply that Darwin's theory
was, or is, a universally accepted theory. Much academic literature has been dedicated to debate
over particular aspects of Darwin's theory, and many changes have been proposed to "fit" the
theory to subsequent cases. In regard to Darwin's theory, Pigliucci (2007) states "evolutionary
biologists have responded to various crises by augmenting the preexisting framework, building on
what was already there, without overthrowing any of the previous foundations" (p. 2743)
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definition of the term as first offered by Haeckel and quoted above. Simberloff
(1980) argued that the Darwinian revolution was more than a scientific paradigm
shift, that it led to a series of revolutionary changes in the philosophical
interpretation of the world which enabled subsequent scientific developments
which have led to the field of ecology as it is known today. This proposal is
interesting in that it provides a global philosophical framework for a series of local
shifts in scientific theory that have, themselves, been considered paradigm shifts
within the field of ecology.
Early scientific philosophy held that everything natural, including
organisms, fit neatly into a system of classification characterized by distinct,
separate, and unchanging types (Simberloff 1980). When applied to types of
organisms, i.e. species, this idea aligned with both the religious ideas of the time,
which claimed a fixity of species determined by intelligent design (Piggliucci
2007), as well as the early Greek metaphysical philosophies of essentialism and
idealism, which perceived types (species) as perfect and unchanging essences
or ideals, while individuals within a species were imperfect embodiments of those
ideals (Simberloff 1980). This placed heavy emphasis on the differences
between types, seen as fundamental differences in their essences, while the
differences among individuals were inconsequential, viewed as the "noise" which
detracted from the perfectness of their embodiment. The problem with this
philosophy was that it failed to address how one type could change into another.
(Simberloff 1980). Darwin's theory, first elaborated in his 1865 publication, On
the Origins of Species (herein referred to as Origins), argued that it was the
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individual differences that drove speciation by allowing some individuals to be
better 'fit' and therefore produce more, and more fit, offspring. As such, Darwin
eliminated the distinction between individual and species differences, arguing
that the variation between individuals and the variation between species was one
in the same. Furthermore, Darwin suggested that the variation was due to some
material difference within individuals that could be passed from parent to
offspring and suggested a physical entity called 'gemmules' as the carrier of
those differences (Simberloff 1980). Darwin's theory was not well received
initially, particularly as he had no scientific evidence of 'gemmules' (McIntosh
1986). However, around the same time as the publication of Origins, Johann
Gregor Mendel was conducting his foundational experiments on the heritable
traits of plants, from which developed a basic understanding of genes as the
material basis for the physical characteristics of organisms (Simberloff 1980).
The revolutionary idea proposed by Mendel was, yet again, not fully recognized
in its time and not until the early 1900s did scientists discover both Mendel's and
Darwin's works and realize that the former provided the missing pieces of the
latter (Pigliucci 2007, Simberloff 1980).
As a result of rediscovering Mendel's and Darwin's work, a revolutionary
change in how the scientific community perceived the evolution of species was
initiated. To some, such as Stauffer (1957), the Darwinian revolution (as it came
to be known) was the single biggest event leading to the formation of modern
ecology, while others credit Darwin and a number of his predecessors (Acot
1997). Either way, it is evident that the ideas of Darwin were highly influential on
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the scientific development of modern ecology - providing a new perspective on
how the variability inherent within individuals interacted with the environment to
drive both the diversity of organisms seen on earth, as well as the apparent
matching of organisms to their environment, i.e. adaptation (Acct 1997).
Simberloff (1980), however, proposed a larger effect of the Darwinian revolution
beyond scientific influence - the philosophical paradigm shift from essentialism to
materialism. Materialism recognized a material basis for evolution, namely the
physical components of genes and the selective forces of food, sex, competition,
predation, etc. which act to create inequalities in the usefulness of different
expressions of genes. Essentialism attributed the differences between species to
different metaphysical essences, establishing that different species were
fundamentally different and could not be transformed from one into another. The
realization of the former, according to Simberloff (1980), was the realization that
evolutionary processes are stochastic, as opposed to deterministic, and thus,
marked the beginning of a shift from a cause-and-effect type philosophy in the
biological sciences to a probabilistic philosophy (this was especially important for
the development of modern genetics and the rise of statistics as a tool of
biological analysis (see Simberloff 1980). It should be noted, however, that the
maturation of ecology and the shift from essentialism to materialism were not
necessarily congruous; Darwin's theory provided a scientific basis which enabled
the development of key concepts within the field of ecology, it also provided the
scientific evidence needed to enable a new philosophical understanding of the
world, but specific lines of theoretical development within ecology have continued
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to struggle with the tension between essentialism and materialism as both have
experienced their own paradigmatic evolutions. Despite a movement toward the
non-deterministic and non-metaphysical in ecology, certain aspects of
essentialism continue to be attractive in modern theory. One example has been
the "superorganism" metaphor and the concepts of "balance of nature."

2.2.2 Community ecology: Superorganism to hierarchical patch
dynamics. According to Simberloff{1980), the first paradigm in ecology was the
perception of plant communities as superorganisms, with their own ontogeny of
successional communities, each striving to realize some climax state which
together was greater than the sum of its parts, an analogy first proposed by
Frederic E. Clements in 1905 (McIntosh 1986). The superorganism theory was
indicative of the long-held notion that nature worked in balance to preserve order,
that all things were connected and that populations would remain stable so long
as their environment remained so (Clements 1936, McIntosh 1986). Even Darwin
is quoted as saying, "In the long-run the forces are so nicely balanced that the
face of nature remains uniform for long periods of time" (Stauffer 1957, p. 139).
According to McIntosh (1986), this notion was also rooted in western religious
beliefs that all things were divinely ordained. Wu and Loucks (1995) called this
idea the "balance of nature" paradigm and argued that it was actually the first
paradigm in ecology, but that Clements' superorganism proposal was
responsible for driving the paradigm from a purely theoretical concept to a
quantitative one. The quantification of the balance of nature paradigm is
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recognized as the "equilibrium" paradigm. The equilibrium paradigm focused
attention on the community and proposed that, given a stable environment
("stable" generally referring to the climate and a lack of anthropogenic
influences), all communities would tend toward a single, measurable and
predictable state, i.e. the climax state (Clements 1936). The key to the
equilibrium paradigm was that "equilibrium theories and models can be defined
independently of the balance of nature idea and thus, in principle, can be tested"
(Wu and Loucks 1995, p. 441 ). At the time of Clements, the superorganism
metaphor and the equilibrium theory were synonymous, equilibrium was
achieved in the whole by the balancing of the many parts, and the testable nature
of the theory quickly gained support. By the 1930's, equilibrium theory and the
superorganism concept had been adopted by other fields beyond plant ecology
including limnology, zoology, and paleoecology, leading to paradigm status
(Simberloff 1980, McIntosh 1986). The very idea of an equilibrium or climax state
implies an ideal, a deterministic target at which communities are aspiring to, and
as such Simberloff (1980) argued that equilibrium theory suffered from the same
essentialist roots as early evolutionary theory. The problem with the equilibrium
paradigm was that it treated communities as deterministic at a higher level but
recognized an inherent stochasticity at lower levels. Therefore, it "did not lead to
a mechanistic understanding of the operation and structure of nature" (Simberloff
1980, p. 16). Thus, the superorganism paradigm had its critics, and early on,
Gleason (1926) advocated for a more species-based view of associations.
Gleason argued that any given community existed at the mercy of environmental
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factors and species recruitment, and contended that that any argument
suggesting that the community was predetermined was inappropriate: "every
species of plant is a law unto itself, the distribution of which in space depends
upon its individual peculiarities of migration and environmental
requirements ... The behavior of the plant offers in itself no reason at all for the
segregation of definite communities" (Gleason 1926, p. 26). Initially however,
Gleason's argument was not universally accepted, and it wasn't until the idea
was picked up by others in the late 1940s that the tide turned on Clements'
superorganism paradigm. Critiques of Clements' theory in 1947 (Egler 1947,
Cain 1947, Mason 1947), followed by subsequent empirical work published in the
1950s and 1960s, unhinged equilibrium theory from the superorganism
paradigm, shifting scientific perspective of communities from superorganism to a
collection of individual species populations, focusing subsequent research on
few-species interactions (Simberloff 1980). Equilibrium theory, however,
persisted as its own paradigm and subsequent work in community and
population ecology continued to focus on equilibrium-based concepts such as
steady states, stability, resistance, resilience, and persistence (Wu and Loucks
1995).
Despite the broad acceptance of the equilibrium paradigm, empirical work
uncovered a number of examples which demonstrated that ecological
populations are not truly stable. Thus, starting in the 1970s, a number of
alternative theories were proposed in an attempt to explain the anomalies which
equilibrium theory failed to encompass (Wu and Loucks 1995). Theories ranged
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from the homeorhesis, theory which argued that perturbed systems return to a
conserved trajectory and rate of change as opposed to a conserved path towards
an inevitable climax state (i.e. perturbations can lead to changes in climax
states), to total non-equilibrium in which communities are in a constant state of
unpredictable change. Multiple-equilibrium perspectives have argued that
equilibrium can act at a local level for different populations, resulting in a mosaic
of locally stable communities, each influenced in some way by the others
surrounding it - the result is a patchwork of populations and communities each
existing at different levels along a gradient of community transition. Through
theories such as multiple-equilibrium theory, ecology came to embrace the
concept of heterogeneity or "patchiness"' (Wu and Loucks 1995, Weins 1976).
Furthermore, ecologists have come to recognize the importance of scale in
spatial dynamics and that observations of patterns and processes at one scale
are not always translatable to another scale (Weins 1989). There has also been
recognition that the processes which drive ecological patterns, such as
patchiness at one scale, are linked to the processes and patterns at other scales,
and that ecological systems self-organize into hierarchies of process-pattern
relationships such that the patterns derived from one process can reinforce or
stabilize patterns at the same or other scales (Wu and Loucks 1995). The
recognition of the importance of patchiness and hierarchical dynamics in
community ecology has been suggested as the new paradigm of the field, a
paradigm called hierarchical patch dynamics (Wu and Loucks 1995, Kotlier and
Wiens 1990).
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Hierarchical patch dynamics proposes that within a patchy system,
numerous mechanisms exist which provide for both stability and instability at
various spatial, temporal, and organizational scales. Those mechanisms interact
in a cumulative or deductive manner to produce varying levels of equilibrium and
disequilibrium at higher or lower scales. In this way, hierarchical patch dynamics
incorporates both instability and nonequilibrium, while theorizing a mechanism for
stability at large (ex: landscape) scales, a stability Wu and Loucks (1995, p. 459)
refer to as "metastability." Such a view abandons the single-scale perspective of
ecological systems existing in equilibrium in the absence of some major driver of
perturbation in exchange for a perspective that accepts instability and
nonequilibrium at one scale, while allowing for stability, equilibrium, and the
potential "balance of nature" at another. The new paradigm, however, rejects a
deterministic view of such a balance while embracing a concept of stochastic
change and hierarchical properties of ecological systems. Thus, systems can
achieve metastability without the composition of that system being some
predetermined, inevitable state. If hierarchical patch dynamics is, in fact, a new
paradigm, then the perspective of population behavior within an ecological
system has shifted from a perspective reflective of an essentialist view of the
world in which equilibrium is consonant with an ideal state or "the way things
should ,be," to a materialist view in which the current state is reflective of the
material condition in which the world exists. The determination as to whether
hierarchical patch dynamics has replaced the equilibrium paradigm in population
ecology is not definitive, but the hierarchical nature and complexity of ecological
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systems is widely accepted with a wealth of literature elaborating on the subject
(Angeler et al. 2013, Kotliar and Wiens 1990, Lovett et al. 2006, Wu and David
2002, Fauchald and Tveraa 2006, Gillson 2004 ).

2.2.3 Paradigms in life history evolution. Another area of ecology which
has undergone a somewhat revolutionary change in perception is in the
understanding of life history strategies as they relate to population regulation. As
an area of research within the field of population ecology the study of life history
strategies is closely related to the discussion above and in many ways parallels
the development from a deterministic, single-scale paradigm to a stochastic,
multi-scale one. The exploration of this paradigm shift, however, is yet another
example of change in the fundamental understanding of foundational concepts
which support a scientific field and further demonstrates how knowledge relates
to the perception of truth.
The terms "r-Selection" and "K- Selection" were coined by MacArthur and
Wilson (1967) to describe the natural selection processes which act on
populations existing under differing conditions of density dependence and
resource limitation. MacArthur and Wilson were not the first to describe this
selective process (Dobzhansky 1950), but they offered a conceptual description
for the process which found popular support (Reznick et al. 2002). Their analogy
was that of an island that, when first colonized, would have few density effects,
abundant resources, and little competition, but as the population expanded,
resources would become limited, density effects would come into play, and
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intraspecific competition would increase. According to the theory, populations
selected for in the absence of density effects and competition are r-selected and
are characterized by high fecundity and low parental investment in offspring.
Such populations maximize energy input into creating offspring while minimizing
input into caring for them, leading to high levels of productivity. K-selected
populations are the opposite of r-selected and exist under extreme levels of
density-dependence and competition. Thus, maximum energy is allocated to
producing a few highly competitive and highly fit offspring. The r- and K-Selection
theory did not propose the two selective states as binary, independent
possibilities, but rather, as two extremes existing on opposite ends of a spectrum
(Pianka 1970). Pianka (1970) expanded MacArthur and Wilson's theory,
proposing that r- and K-selection could be used to predict specific life-history
traits which would evolve as a consequence of different r- and K-environments.
Ricklefs (2000) points out that Pianka's proposal, like MacArthur and Wilson's,
was not original and earlier authors such as Lack (1954, 1966, 1968), Skutch
(1949), Moreau (1944), Andrewartha and Birch (1954), and Ashmole (1963) had
already described and debated both

r- and K-selection-type

theories as well as

the influence of such selection on life-history traits. The works of MacArthur and
Wilson and Pianka, however, are those credited with establishing densitydependent life-history evolution as a paradigm (Reznick et al. 2002). According
to Reznick et al. (2002), the paradigm developed for three primary reasons: First,
it drew a connection between density-dependent population regulation and
evolution. This connection built on previously observed criticisms of Darwin's
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theory of natural selection, that the fitness of a trait could be mitigated by
population density, even in a stable environment. Second, it was intuitive. The
predictions made by Pianka, partially based on the work of MacArthur and
Wilson, made sense in terms of what was scientifically accepted as truth by the
ecological community of the time. Lastly, it allowed scientists to make testable
predictions about specific life-history traits that ought to be observed given
certain information about density and competition. Together, these reasons
resulted in an unprecedented draw of new scientists into the field of life-history
evolution and provided a foundation of work sufficiently open-ended to provide a
wealth of unanswered questions for new entrants into the field to pursue, two
qualities characteristic of Kuhn's description of a paradigm (Reznick et al. 2002).
However, it was the third of the reasons listed above that ultimately led to
the downfall of the paradigm. According to Reznick et al. (2002), the works which
followed Pianka (1970) were keen to apply his theory to empirical studies but, in
practice, the application tended to produce results such that:
Correlation between a rough description of an environment and life-history
traits was often seen as sufficient to classify organisms without an
evaluation of population regulation or any test of causation ... Moreover,
the focus on density-dependent vs. density-independent selection
neglected other important agents of selection . (p. 1512)
The criticism was that Pianka's theory was too simple to fully explain the
development of life-history strategies. Additional empirical and observational
work in the 1980s and 90s demonstrated that MacArthur and Wilson (1967) were
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accurate in their assertion that density-dependence can act as a selective
pressure, but demonstrated that Pianka's (1970) extension of the theory into the
evolution of life-history traits made certain unsubstantiated assumptions about
the predicted characteristics of K-selected organisms and failed to account for
other influential factors such as environmental variability and predation (Reznick
et al. 2002).
As a consequence of the experimental and observational work
contradicting density-dependent life history evolution, a new paradigm of lifehistory evolution arose, the demographic theory paradigm (Ruznick et al 2002).
Demographic theory contends that life-history evolution depends strongly on
whether selective pressures, including density and environmental factors, affect
different age classes differently (Stearns 1992). Early work in demographic
theory lacked density-dependent selection criteria but these models failed to
account for biological observations and subsequent work introduced either
density-dependence or resource limitation as a means of accounting for
population density. The realization that came from incorporating density
dependence into demographic models was that the predicted optimal life-history
was a function of both how density-dependence was incorporated (reduced
fecundity, increased mortality, delayed maturation, etc.) and how environmental
factors affected vital rates (Reznick et al. 2002). The outcome has been a host of
new models which no longer evaluate life-history evolution along a single
continuum of density but incorporate multiple influencing criteria that are more
"dependent on describing the functional form of density regulation or the
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magnitude of an environmental effect - factors that are hard to measure in
natural populations" (Reznick et al. 2002). The emergence of this new paradigm
led to two outcomes in terms of the scientific understanding of life-history
evolution: One, it has changed the way the scientific community views life
histories; they are no longer just the outcome of population density and resource
availability but are now the result of a complex of interactions between density,
resource availability, environmental factors, and extrinsic factors such as
predation. Second, a degree of stochasticity has been introduced which was not
present before. While this led to the perceptions of greater descriptions of
mechanistic causality of specific life-histories, it also introduced a level of
uncertainty which may have not been present in Pianka's initial model.
Furthermore, the transition from density-dependent theory to demographic
theory closely paralleled the philosophical shift from essentialism to materialism
described in the previous sections. r- and K-Selection theory specifically called
on the logistic model to describe the continuum between the two extremes. This
methodology was reflective of a broader movement in the field of ecology, in
which theoretical mathematics were being applied to ecology as a means of
elevating the "scientific" status of the field, to that of more rigorous sciences such
as physics and chemistry. Theoretic mathematical works that use logistic
equations were based on physical systems, treating organisms as gas
molecules, or based on mathematical models developed for economics,
thermodynamics, or hydrodynamics (McIntosh 1986). Beginning in the 1920s,
mathematical descriptions of populations championed the logistic equation to
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model population growth; first, as single species, (Pearl and Reed 1920, though
first proposed by Velhurst in 1838 (as reported in McIntosh 1986)), then, as twospecies models (Lotka 1925, Volterra 1926), then later as multi-species models
(Nicholson 1933, 1947, Levins 1968}. Criticism of the logistic approach noted that
logistic models failed to capture variation among individuals within a population,
lacked a sufficient number of parameters to truly represent biological populations,
and only represented the mean interactions between populations (Nicholson
1954). According to Simberloff (1985, p. 19), "the logistic [is] the most aseptic of
ideals, cleansed of many of the most interesting (and 'noisiest') biological
properties." This simplified view of populations represented a desire to conform
ecological behavior to an ideal, making it measureable and predictable much like
the physical sciences from which the logistic model was borrowed. Such an
essentialist ideal ignored the stochastic nature and complexity of natural
systems: "the individuality of populations and communities is their most striking,
intrinsic, and inspiring characteristic, and the apparent indeterminacy of
ecological systems does not make their study a less valid pursuit" (Simberloff
1980, p. 25). The attempt by the demographic model to capture such
"indeterminacy" through the accounting of multiple parameters and the realization
of those parameters as stochastic in nature, represented a shift from the
essentialist viewpoint to the materialist.
Despite this transition, Simberloff (1980) argues that the essentialist
viewpoint in ecology has not gone away but has simply taken on a new form; "the
first ecological ideal, Clements' superorganism, is not dead, but rather
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transmogrified into a belief that holistic study of ecosystems is the proper course
of ecology" (pg. 27). A cursory review of the wealth of academic literature
dedicated to ecosystem studies supports Simberloff's assertion that ecosystem
studies have taken on a paradigm-like status in the study of ecology. However,
whether or not the new focus on ecosystems is, as asserted by the author, a
reversion back to the "balance-of-nature," is open for debate and selected
arguments suggest that ecosystem studies are yet another movement away from
the deterministic, essentialist paradigms of early ecology and toward a
stochastic, materialistic view more resonant with demographic theory and
hierarchical patch dynamics. One example is in the application of community
ecology principles to the management of marine wild-harvest fisheries, an area
known as Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (EBFM}.

2.2.4 Ecosystem-based fisheries management: A paradigm shift in applied
ecology. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations defines a
"fishery" as "a unit determined by an authority or other entity that is engaged in
raising and/or harvesting fish. Typically, the unit is defined in terms of some or all
of the following: people involved, species or type of fish, area of water or seabed,
method of fishing, class of boats and purpose of the activities" (FAQ Term Portal
website, http://www.fao.org/faoterm/en/?defaultCollld=21,

accessed February 7,

2018). In terms of wild-harvest, marine fisheries, there are three major
subsystems which encompass the parts listed above: 1) the resource (fish}; 2)
resources users (fishermen); and, 3) resource management (Defeo et al. 2007).
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Each of these subsystems are then composed of their own component entities.
Example component entities within the "resource" subsystem include life cycle,
environmental factors affecting abundance and distribution, and ecological
interdependencies. Those within the "resource users" include fishing fleets and
their characteristics (vessel sizes, gear types, spatial distribution, etc.),
composition of their catch, and the economic functions of the fleet. The third
subsystem, "resource management," is composed of the interaction of resource
and resource user components, plus external forces like markets, politics, and
societal interests (Defeo et al. 2007). Underlying fisheries management is
fisheries science, which is intended to provide information about aspects of the
resource, the resource user, and the interactions between them, in order to drive
more informed decision-making.
Traditional fisheries science has generally been concerned with the
dynamics of one species, or one stock, independent of all others (Mangel and
Levin 2005, Defeo et al. 2007, Brodziak and Link 2002). This science is rooted in
the early foundations of population ecology derived from "a general view by
fisheries scientists and managers, and by many ecologists, that communities
were stable, closed, internally regulated and behaved in a more or less
deterministic manner" (Mangel and Levin 2005, p. 95). The science used to
support fisheries management has largely operated on the idea that if fish
populations are reduced below their unfished biomass levels, they can then be
sustainably harvested at a rate equal to their population growth rate (Mangel and
Levin 2005). Methods for estimating the rate of population growth are generally
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based on some kind of surplus production model which estimates population
productivity as a function of the target species population and any number of
environmental parameters which influence that population. As such, the models
recognize interactions among species but assume that all interactions are oneway, with the broader ecosystem components affecting the target stock but
without the target stock having an influence on the broader ecosystem (Mangel
and Levin 2005). The focus, then, is on the interactions between individuals of
the same species. Consequently, they assume that intraspecific interactions are
more important than interspecific interactions and fail to account for situations in
which non-target competitor species are able to fill the void created by a
reduction of target species, such that the target species population becomes less
productive than estimated by a single-species model (Mangel and Levin 2005).
According to Mangel and Levin (2005), these models fail to account for the
influence of the target population on the dynamics of the ecosystem by ignoring
the potential for nonlinear relationships to induce ecosystem phase shifts and
disregarding the potential for the removal of large quantities of fish biomass to
induce potential ecosystem-level problems.

Furthermore, according to Defeo et al. (2007), "The classical view of
sustainability, prevalent during the first eight decades of the last century, was
developed from deterministic and static production models in which equilibrium
abundance or biomass is derived as a function of fishing mortality and leads to
the notion of optimum fishing mortality and concept of maximum sustainable
yield" (Defeo et al. 2007, pp. 4-5). The concepts of "optimum mortality" and
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"maximum sustainable yield" are reflective of a host of biological reference points
(BRPs) established to assess the status of a given species or stock. It should be
noted that surplus production models are not the only quantitative tools used in
fisheries management {see Mcclanahan and Castilla 2007), though the goal of
most quantitative tools is to establish BRPs for use in largely single-species
focused Target Resource Oriented Management (TROM) (Tudela and Short
2005). These concepts are deeply engrained in the idea of a static, climax state
ecological system and fail to account for the network of two-way interactions
which influence a fishery resource (Mangel and Levin 2005), including predator,
prey, interspecific competition, and habitat interactions {Pikitch et al. 2004).
Recent shifts in fisheries science and management, however, have begun
to acknowledge "that fisheries decisions take place in an ecosystem context and
ecosystem knowledge can assist in managing fisheries production and identifying
fishing effects on ecosystems" (Fluharty 2005, p. 248). The new shift emphasizes
ecosystem and habitat functions, upholding values such as ecological integrity,
ecological boundaries, hierarchical context, data collection and monitoring, and
adaptive management (Pikitch et al. 2004, Brodziak and Link 2002) and has
been described as a "holistic" approach to fisheries management {Castilla and
Defeo 2005, Brodziak and Link 2002). Pikitch et al. {2004) suggest that the new
approach reverses the order of priorities in fisheries management, starting first
with considerations of the ecosystem rather than those of the individual target
species. This approach is encompassed by a number of terms, each differing
slightly in the nuanced detail of its application, including Ecosystem Approach to

93

Management (EAM; Fluharty 2005); Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF;
Garcia and Cochrane 2005); and, Ecosystem-Based Management (EBM, Levin
et al. 2009), though Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management (EBFM; Brodziak
and Link 2002, Pikitch et al. 2004, Tudela and Short 2005) will be used herein.
The primary drivers behind a shifting focus to EBFM in U.S. fisheries
management have been, according to Fluharty (2005): 1) an improved scientific
understanding of fish ecosystem dynamics; 2) failure of the existing management
approach; 3) increase in public involvement in fisheries management and
increased legal action; 4) success in applying conservative fishery management
approaches; 5) increased consideration of rare or endangered species, and; 6)
strengthened requirements for fisheries management. Furthermore, the
recognition that external forces such as fluctuations in energy prices, new
technologies, and drastic changes in seafood markets that can exacerbate the
potential impacts of environmental change on the human dimensions of fisheries,
has been a primary driver in the adoption of EBFM (Fluharty 2005). The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which governs fisheries
management in the U.S., has stated that it "strongly supports the implementation
of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) to better inform and enable
better decisions regarding trade-offs among and between fisheries (commercial,
recreational, and subsistence), aquaculture, protected species, biodiversity, and
habitats" and has recognized that incorporating an EBFM approach will
"maintain resilient and productive ecosystems (including the human communities
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on which they depend) even as they respond to climate, habitat, ecological, and
other environmental changes " (NMFS 2016, p. 1).
In addition to the drivers above, Mangel and Levin (2005, p. 95) contend
that the new emphasis on EBFM has derived from a shift in ecological point-ofview and that "most fishery scientists and managers currently recognize that
communities are dynamic, open, often regulated by processes external to the
community, may exist in multiple alternative steady states and behave in a more
or less stochastic manner." The authors also contend that the development of
new computational tools has enabled the shift, moving beyond
species/population approaches, and even beyond pair-wise interaction
approaches, to "deal with dynamically complicated worlds and a network of
interaction" (Mangel and Levin 2005, p. 96). In essence, the new point-of-view is
a shift to community-level thinking, as opposed to the population-level point-ofview taken by single-species management, in order to better predict the impacts
of fishing. Tudela and Short (2005) argue that this shift is reflective of a Kuhnian
revolution, evidenced by the fact that EBFM is challenging single-species TROM
as the status quo management system. The challenge has led to a feeling of
crisis within the field, evidenced by extreme resistance to EBFM by the current
establishment of single-species science and management and the efforts of the
current establishment to integrate EBFM into current methods. The crisis is
further exacerbated by the fact that fisheries science is an 'applied science'
concerned with managing society's global food resources (Tudela and Short
2005). The crisis, however, is evidence, too, that the paradigm shift is not
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complete. EBFM is proposed as the next way forward for fisheries management,
yet it is far from ubiquitous and a number of key challenges have been
recognized in the wide-scale implementation of the paradigm. Such challenges
include a lack of capacity in fisheries management institutions (Garcia and
Cochrane 2005), the cost of implementing management measures (Garcia and
Cochrane 2005), the potential short-term negative impacts to fishermen (Pikitch
et al. 2004 ), the enormous amount of scientific knowledge required to manage
with nuanced detail (Tudela and Short 2005), tensions between advocates of topdown standardized implementation of EBFM and regional, experimental, and
adaptive approaches (Fluharty 2005), and social and political challenges, such
as a lack of confidence in applying EBFM to realistic and effective management
measures, resistance to change, rivalries between scientific schools, and political
agendas (Tudela and Short 2005).
The shift from population ecology-based, single-species fisheries
management to ecosystem-based fisheries management based in the principles
of community ecology can clearly be argued as the type of change in world view
that Kuhn proposed as a paradigm shift. The world observed through the lens of
individual species is very different than the world as viewed through the lens of a
community of species connected by a network of linkages, each member
dependent on the others. Furthermore, the development of EBFM has led to new
tools, new methods, and new goals for fisheries science and management.
Philosophically, however, it could be argued, based on the argument presented
earlier in this chapter, that the shift from population ecology-based to community
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ecology/ecosystem-based scientific philosophies represents a return to the
philosophical paradigm of essentialism from materialism, based on the balanceof-nature and superorganism ideals Simberloff (1980) associated with the latter.
Simberloff (1980) directly relates the ecosystem concept to the superorganism
concept, arguing that both envision ecological systems as systems which "evolve
toward linear good behavior" (p. 27) and provides a list of reasons why the
ecosystem paradigm is so attractive, including the availability of research
funding, the attractiveness of applying systems analysis to ecosystems studies
("the glamour of turning ecology into a space-age science" p. 29), and the
general attraction of scientists to the notions of holism and balance-of-nature. I
would argue, however, that the EBFM approach is not rooted in the same
deterministic, balance-of-nature concept that Simberloff is referring to, but rather,
that it has developed as a means of better capturing the dynamic, stochastic
nature of fisheries. Simberloff's idea of ecosystem holism is described best by
the statement "the notion that 'everything affects everything else' ... includes not
only its tidiness but its determinism, for if all components are included in the
system and linked to all others by deterministic equations, then no exogenous,
random input is possible" (Simberloff 1980, pp. 29-30). I argue that the notion of
''

EBFM is, in fact, not tidy, and that its argument for implementation is to better
acknowledge and account for inherent stochasticities within ecological systems
that single-species methods fail to capture. The ultimate realization underlying
EBFM is that "communities are probabilistic and multi-casual, rather than
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deterministic and homeostatic" (Mangel and Levin 2005). In this way, EBFM
represents a further concession to a materialistic view in ecology.

2.2.5 On paradigm shifts in ecology. The above sections detail
proposed examples of Kuhn's paradigm shifts within the field of ecology. These
examples outline both local paradigm shifts in scientific theory (superorganism to
hierarchical patch dynamics, r- and K-Selection to demographic theory, singlesspecies fisheries management to EBFM) as well a paradigm shift generally in
scientific philosophy (essentialism to materialism). Paradigms, such as the ones
included, are useful for understanding how knowledge of a particular subject
evolves over time. According to Graham and Dayton (2002), the study of
paradigms "provides a tangible system for examining how scientific theories are
rejected or accepted" (p. 1482) and "understanding the lines of paradigm ascent
or descent clarifies hierarchical nodes linking concepts that served as the origins
of various ecological subdisciplines" (p. 1487).
At the same time, Paine (2002) questions whether the concept of the
paradigm, as described by Kuhn, can actually be applied to biology (including
ecology). Paine contends that the sciences to which Kuhn applied his concept,
namely the physical sciences, are linear or binary in nature, such that they are
"predisposed to contradiction by single well-conceived observations or
experiments" (Paine 2002, p. 1553), thus, revolutions in those fields are easy to
recognize. In contrast, the biological sciences, and ecology in particular, are
characterized by phenomena resulting from a plurality of causes. The multiple
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causation nature of ecology tends to lead to numerous alternative hypotheses
and multiple lines of logical explanation for any given subject of research. As
such, ecology is not a linear discipline and a challenge to any one of those logical
threads is unlikely to result in revolutionary changes in understanding. It is in this
way that "paradigm shifts are apt to be less obvious in our field, if they truly exist
at all" (Paine 2002, p. 1553). As an alternative, Paine suggests that ecology is
plagued with a plentitude of 'bandwagons,' defined as "a temporarily popular
focus or research agenda, sort of an ecological supernova which bursts into
prominence and then fades with time" (Paine 2002, p. 1554). According to Paine
(2002), bandwagons typically fall out of favor because technological limits are
reached, the development of theory has outpaced empirical testing, or fatal
anomalies have undermined a theoretical foundation. One can't help but notice
the similarities between Kuhn's paradigm and Paine's bandwagon. Kuhn's
concept, however, implies a greater impact of paradigms; that paradigms
represent more than just a waning scientific interest, that they are constructs for
scientific thought and perspective. Paine's criticism of Kuhn's proposal, however,
appears to be less focused on the definition of paradigm itself, and more on the
way in which Kuhn described the paradigm shift. Paine questions the potential for
revolutionary transition in ecology and, in giving an example taken from
ecological ideas of succession, states "I cannot conceive of a revolution that
could or will replace our increasingly sophisticated and mechanically detailed
understanding of how ecosystems respond to disruption" (Paine 2002, p. 1554 ).
Paine's argument appears to be in line with more traditional views of knowledge
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as the accumulation of facts. This is emphasized in Paine's statement that "New
and interesting biological detail will ... fine-tune this bandwagon (reducing squeaks
in the wheels?); they will not overturn the cart which seems robust in its diversity
and central to so much of ecology" (Paine 2002, p. 1557).
On the other hand, Paine acknowledges three potential areas in the
history of ecology which may have qualified as paradigm shifts: The first was in
the acceptance of MacArthur and Wilson's (1963, 1967) island biogeography
concept which theorized a species-area relationship by which "islands" of larger
size supported greater species richness than smaller ones (Gotelli 1998). The
second was the shift from theoretical to experimental approaches in ecology in
the 1960s and 70s, and the last was is the transition from equilibrium theory to a
recognition of the stochastic, context-dependent nature of ecological systems
(Paine 2002).
Regardless of whether the transitions between scientific foci are described
as paradigm shifts or a succession of bandwagons, much is to be gained by a
historical appreciation of the evolution of ecological knowledge (for simplicity, the
term paradigm will be used for the remainder of this paragraph, though,
bandwagon is interchangeable in this context). Graham and Dayton (2002)
demonstrate that paradigms have a paradoxical effect on ecological knowledge,
in that they both stimulate and constrain ideas. Paradigms, for all intents and
purposes, "are simply representations of the current state of scientific
understanding" (Graham & Dayton 2002, p. 1482) and are all united by the
commonality that they are the status quo by which all future scientific activity and
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progress is judged, at least until the paradigm shifts. As such, and as discussed
earlier, paradigms focus effort on uncovering the nuanced detail of a particular
area of interest. However, paradigms also represent the extent of comfort within
a given field of study, thereby constraining the efforts of the ecological
community, focusing on only those subjects the paradigm deems worthy of
pursuit. Graham and Dayton (2002) argue that paradigms have other impacts on
ecological knowledge as well. Through the intense focus of paradigms, ecology
tends to become more specialized, sacrificing general approaches in exchange
for more nuanced articulation of scientific knowledge. While this is a sure sign of
ecological progress, it also comes at the expense of the historical context for
contemporary knowledge;
Such specialization compels even the most scholarly researchers to
become myopic, as it becomes harder to track general ecological
developments in lieu of the specific, and often esoteric, advances made in
their own subdisciplines ... This focus on specialized topics inherently
forces emphasis on the contemporary research as prior studies may be
deemed too broad to be relevant." (Graham & Dayton 2002, p. 1486)
This emphasis on contemporary leads to a second consequence of ecological
progress within a paradigm: the erasure of history. Through their focus on a
specialized area, ecologists lose touch with the historical foundations of the more
generalized field under which their subdiscipline operates. This is further
exacerbated by the inevitable accumulation of ecological literature, often
representing highly specialized and detailed studies that overwhelm the role of
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more generalized, foundational works. The ultimate consequence of ecological
progress without historical context is the recycling of ideas and a loss of scientific
momentum (Graham & Dayton 2002).
The conclusions here are two-fold: First, is that paradigms, and the
revolution between them, have a role in science; paradigms give context to facts,
they provide a starting point for scientific conversation, they organize and
conceptualize complex scientific phenomena, they guide future scientific
endeavors, and they provide a standard against which to measure scientific
discovery. Furthermore, as Kuhn argued, without paradigm shifts science
becomes complacent and boring. It is in the periods between paradigms, in the
moment of crisis when two separate world views compete for dominance, that
"extraordinary" science finds a way forward and science progresses.
Second, is the conclusion that paradigms offer a means to reveal the
processes by which scientific knowledge develops. They offer a system for
examining how and why particular scientific theories are deemed successful, and
they provide a conceptual map of paradigm evolution that links the emergence
and development of various concepts which have served as the foundations of
various scientific subdisciplines. In a broader context, this suggests that
knowledge is more than justified, true belief- that knowledge has a historical
context that influences one's present interpretation of the truth.
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CHAPTER Ill: SYNTHETIC DATASET

3.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter demonstrated that paradigms play a primary role in
the way knowledge is developed within a particular line of study. One of the ways
paradigms influence that development is through determining what tools,
methods, and standards, i.e. the "perceptual apparatus," are used to observe and
evaluate a phenomenon of interest. Furthermore, by influencing the selection of
perceptual apparatus, paradigms influence the way a phenomenon is observed
and interpreted. Using the preceding ecological examples to provide context in
the way knowledge is developed, the next two chapters examine the role of the
perceptual apparatus in that development. This chapter specifically focuses on
the resolution capabilities of the sensor used in making an observation, while the
subsequent chapter focuses on the number of and spatial orientation of, the
observations .
In the examination of any phenomenon of interest, a primary component
of the perceptual apparatus is the degree to which an observed change is
capable of being detected. Oftentimes with environmental investigations, the
detectable level of change is different than the actual level at which the change is
occurring, the former being constrained by the capabilities of the "sensor"
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employed in making such observations. The "sensor," in this case, refers to all
aspects that control or affect an observation. Whether the "sensor" is a tool
(microscope, spectral sensor, particle detector, etc.), the human eye, or the
sampling strategy employed, the "truth" is a characterization of the phenomenon
as presented by the sensor and may be considered an artifact of the sensor's
ability to detect change (herein referred to as "resolution"). Different sensor
resolutions, and, therefore, different observation resolutions, create different
representations of the phenomenon of interest which are then subject to different
interpretations.
Furthermore, an investigator may recognize that the available resolution of
their observations does not match the actual resolution of the change within their
phenomenon of interest, yet the investigator desires to make some conclusion
about the change at the resolution at which it is occurring. In the case of many
environmental sampling exercises, measurements are made at given locations,
yet it is assumed that some level of unobservable variation occurs between those
locations. One such example is in the modeling of precipitation between
rainwater collection stations. While precipitation cannot be measured at every
location, certain methods are used to predict the quantity and timing of
precipitation in non-measured locations based on the measurements made at
specific sampling sites. In such an example, the data are being collected at one
resolution, while inferences are being made at another. To make such
inferences, any number of methods may be applied which allow the investigator
to make estimations of the nature of change at locations, or at a resolution, not
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measured. In spatial sciences, the estimation of values at unobserved locations
using the values recorded at, and spatial relationship to, observed locations is
referred to as interpolation.
To examine the role of sensor resolution and interpolation in the
interpretation of truth, a synthetic dataset was created with a base resolution of 1
unit, intended to represent some hypothetical natural phenomenon of interest. A
synthetic dataset was used because it provided an opportunity to examine a
phenomenon without the biases and variables associated with real data
collection. Furthermore, the synthetic dataset provided a model for which the
resolution of change is known (in this case, 1 unit) and it can be stated that there
is no change occurring at any resolution greater than 1 unit. Such a model
provided an opportunity to make direct comparisons between experimental
treatments of lower resolution observations and the "true" known resolution, a
situation rarely obtainable with real data. In this case, the phenomenon simulated
was continuous in its distribution of change in space, similar to the distribution of
sea surface temperature or seawater pH across an oceanic landscape, and as
opposed to the discrete distribution of change which may be observed in the
distribution of particular plant communities across a terrestrial landscape. Once
the synthetic dataset was simulated, the data were then subsampled at
progressively lower resolutions (see detailed methods below), while
characterizations, both spatial and statistical, of the simulated phenomenon were
made for each level of resolution and compared to the base resolution
interpretation. The subsampling of data was carried out to represent varying
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levels of sensor resolution, analogous to changing the resolution of the sensor
when collecting remotely sensed data of the surface of the earth. Additionally,
using the lower sampling resolutions, inferences were made about changes
occurring at locations other than those where the observations were made using
spatial interpolation methods. The method is intended to compare statistical and
spatial inference about a phenomenon to the real phenomenon by using the rare
scenario, in which sampling and interpolation scenarios can be compared to the
actual event for which values are known for every possible location. The outcome
demonstrates how differently constrained observations result in different
characterizations of the same phenomenon. The implication here is that different
characterizations result in different understandings of what is considered truth
and therefore have the potential to result in different statements of knowledge.
The power of this scenario is that it allows for a direct comparison between that
which is truth and that which is interpreted as truth.

3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Study area. A geographic study area does not exist for this
investigation. The data used were derived, with substantial alteration, from real
data, but were not intended to be representative of any actual natural
phenomenon. The data were created to have spatial characteristics (size,
location, direction, etc.) but are not associated with any real geographic location.
The base data were a raster dataset composed of 2546 raster cells
approximately 1 linear unit on a side. The spatial extent of the data was irregular
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in shape with a maximum length along the x axis of 61 units, and 51 units in
maximum length along they axis (Figure 2). Data values ranged from 1.61395 to
4.14846, and do not have a unit of measure.

3.2.2 Data sources. The base dataset from which the synthetic data were
derived were Colored Dissolved Organic Matter (CDOM) data extracted from
Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) data available from
the NASA Giovanni website (http://giovanni.gsfc.nasa. gov/giovanni/) in NetCDF
format. The data were downloaded as 4km 2 resolution, time-averaged local
maps for the period of July through December 2005. The NetCDF data were
converted to tif raster format and resampled to 1 km2 resolution using a cubic
resampling method within GIS. The resampled dataset was utilized as the base
data for this investigation and was considered the "truth" against which all
experimental treatments (i.e. observations) were compared. The intent of the
investigation was not to draw conclusions about any aspect of CDOM
phenomena, but rather, to draw conclusions about the nature of interpretations of
a given hypothetical phenomenon given different constraints on the observation.
Therefore, the data were not treated as CDOM data and all attribute value and
spatial units associated with the data have been removed from the discussion.
The attribute values reported are unitless while spatial resolution will be reported
in "units" for linear measurements or "square units" for aerial measurements.
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Figure 2: Synthetic dataset

3.2.3 Data processing. Unless otherwise noted, all spatial data

processing and analyses were conducted using Environmental Systems
Research Inc. ArcGIS version 10.3 and associated extensions, packages, and
tools ("ArcGIS" or "GIS"). All data were manipulated and displayed using the
North American Datum 1983 Florida State Plane West coordinate system.

3.2.3.1 Treatment levels. To simulate varying levels of sensor resolution,

the base level dataset of 1 square unit resolution (hereafter referred to as the
"census/1.0" level) was resampled at progressively lower resolutions using the
Resample tool in ArcGIS. Bilinear resampling was carried out by increasing the

108

length of the raster cell sides in intervals of 0.1 linear units from +0.1 to +9.0 units
(1.1 to 10.0 times the base cell length), in an attempt to find the resampling
resolution at which the central tendency of the resampled data differed
significantly from the central tendency of the census data. At 10.0 times the
census cell length, the median cell value was not significantly different than the
median cell value of the census level (see Results below). Additional resampling
was not carried out as other effects of resampling were apparent. For the
purposes of this thesis, the resampling treatment levels reported on are those of
census/1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 9.0, and 10.0 and are referred to as
the "RESAMPLED" treatment set (Table 1). Note that treatment level
designations refer to an increase in the length of each side of the representative
raster cell, corresponding to a decrease in the overall data spatial resolution (i.e.
greater raster cell lengths correspond to fewer raster cells per area).
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Table 1: Details of data resampling treatments

Treatment

Lenth of cell Area of cell
{units 2 )
side {units)

Number of
cells in
AOI

Census/1.0

1.0

1.0

2546

2.0

2.0

4.0

619

3.0

3.0

9.0

283

4.0

4.0

16.0

164

5.0

5.0

25.0

99

6.0

6.0

36.0

75

7.0

7.0

49.0

50

8.0

8.0

64.0

46

9.0

9.0

81.0

35

10.0

10.0

100.0

24

To support some analyses, each treatment level raster layer was
converted to a point shapefile using the Raster to Point Tool (Conversion
Tools toolset). The Raster to Point Tool creates a point shapefile in which
each raster grid cell has a corresponding point feature located at the
geographic center of the grid cell and with an attribute value equal to the grid
cell value (Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Example of points derived from raster cells.

3.2.3.2 Interpolation. To examine whether different densities of sample
points produce different representations of the underlying event when
interpolated, an Inverse Distance Weighted (IDW} interpolation method was
applied to each of the RESAMPLED point shapefiles created in the above step.
The Inverse Distance Weighted interpolation technique creates an interpolation
surface (raster format} in which cell values are determined by a set of point
features whose values are weighted according to the inverse of their distance
from the raster cell, raised to a mathematical power. For this exercise, the IDW
tool (Spatial Analyst Tools} in ArcGIS was utilized. Using this tool, the number of
points used to calculate the value at each cell, the power of the inverse weight
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calculation, and the output cell size, are all user specified; the default values of
12 points and a power of 2 were used, and the output cell size was set to 1
square unit. IDW interpolation was applied to every resampled treatment level,
resulting in 10 interpolation treatment levels, each represented as raster layers
with the same resolution (Figure 4). The ten treatment levels derived from this
operation are referred to as the "INTERPOLATED" treatment set. It should be
noted that each of the ten INTERPOLATED output raster layers shared the same
resolution and approximately the same extent as each other and as the original
base data. Shared resolutions and extents allowed for a 1:1 ratio of raster cells
between the treatment levels and census level at each location. The resulting
raster layers were again converted to point shapefiles using the Raster to Point
Tool.

L.eoend
High 4.14646
Low: 1.61395

20

::::::=
=== ====::::::;
unns
Figure 4: Example of interpolation map. Map shown is INTERPOLATED 3.0 treatment
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3.2.3.3 Error calculation. The error of each interpolated raster cell was
calculated using raster algebra methods and the ModelBuilder tool in ArcGIS. For
this purpose, error is defined as the numeric difference between the value of the
treatment level and the CENSUS value at the specified location, calculated using
Equation 1 where Pi is the treatment level value at location i (i.e. the predicted
value) and Oi is the CENSUS value at location i (i.e. the observed value):
Equation 1:

To examine the spatial distribution of error, the absolute value of error was
calculated for every cell in every interpolation treatment level using the Raster
Calculator tool (Spatial Analyst Tools). Error calculations resulted in one output
raster layer per treatment level with error values as grid cell values (Figure 5).
To examine differences in the overall amount of error between treatment levels,
the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of each layer was calculated using
Equation 2 where A is the treatment level raster cell value at location i (i.e the
predicted value) and 0; is the CENSUS raster cell value (i.e the observed value).
Equation 2:

RMSE=

If=1CPin
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Equation 2 was applied through a custom tool created using ModelBuilder in
ArcGIS (Figure 6) and resulted in a raster layer output file containing a single
RMSE value for the entire AOI for each treatment level (Figure 7).

Legend

Error (+2.2)
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Figure 5: Example of interpolation error map (+2.2 treatment shown)
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Figure 6: Diagram of details of RMSE by Layer tool from ArcMap Mode/Builder
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Figure 7: Example of interpolation RMSE map (+2.2 treatment shown)

3.2.3.4 Data preparation for statistical analysis. Spatial data were
exported to tabular format for statistical analysis. The proposed analyses

115

required the data to be formatted in two different ways: a "long " format in which
every feature from every treatment level was represented by a different case;
and a "wide" format in which a single case represented a single location within
the AOI and contained multiple fields, each representing a different value at that
location for each of the treatment levels. All data were formatted in ArcGIS and
attribute tables were exported to tabular format for statistical analysis.
The long format data table was created using the Merge tool (Data
Management) in ArcGIS. The Merge tool allowed the point shapefiles of each
treatment level to be combined into a single dataset by merging the spatial
features and appending the attribute information into a common table. The
resulting output was a point shapefile containing separate features for every point
within every treatment level for all treatments. The attribute table of the output
point shapefile was exported as a text file (.txt extension) for import into SPSS.
The wide format table was created using the Extract Values to Points tool
(Spatial Analyst Tools). The Extract Values to Points tool extracts the values of
raster grid cells based on a set of point features and records the values in the
attribute table of the point shapefile. The census/1.0 RESAMPLED point
shapefile was used to extract the values of all raster layers from every treatment
level into a single attribute table, where each treatment level was represented by
a separate variable and each location represented by a separate case. The
resulting data structure is a single set of point features, each individual feature of
which represents a different location and which contains a different attribute

116

value for every possible treatment at that location. The attribute table was then
exported as a text file (.txt extension).

3.2.4 Statistical analysis. All statistical analyses were carried out using
SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 19.0 (IBM Corp. Released 2010. IBM
SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 19.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.). The mean,
median, and 95% confidence interval of the median were calculated for every
treatment level within the RESAMPLED dataset. The central tendencies of the
ten treatment levels were compared using a one-way ANOVA with Tukey HSD
post hoc tests. The RESAMPLED dataset met the assumption of normality for all
treatment levels except the census/1.0, 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0 treatments, as
determined by the Shapiro-Wilk Test {Table 2). However, because the dataset
also met the assumption of homogeneity of variances as determined by the
Levene's Test (p = 0.905), and ANOVA is robust to deviations from normality
given equal variances, the one-way ANOVA was determined to be a suitable
analysis.
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Table 2: Test statistics for tests of normality of RESAMPLED data by treatment level

TestsorNormality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova

LEVEL

Statistic

Sig.

df

Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic

Sig.

df

VALUE 1.00

.052

2546

.000

.972

2546

.000

2.00

.072

619

.000

.971

619

.000

3.00

.051

283

.068

.969

283

.000

4.00

.069

164

.054

.971

164

.002

5.00

.058

99

.200·

.977

99

.081

6.00

.072

75

.200·

.975

75

.142

7.00

.099

50

.200·

.962

50

.104

8.00

.081

46

.200·

.961

46

.125

9.00

.115

35

.200·

.954

35

.149

10.00

.094

24

.200·

.937

24

.143

a. Ulliefors SignificanceCorrection
.. This is a lower bound of the true significance.

Comparisons of central tendency were also made within the
INTERPOLATED dataset between the census/1.0 treatment level and each of
the lower resolution treatment levels. The INTERPOLATED dataset did not meet
the assumptions of parametric analysis (Table 3, Table 4) so non-parametric
Mann-Whitney Tests were applied to compare each of the treatment level
medians to the census/1.0 median. In this case, the census/1.0 INTERPOLATED
treatment is exactly the same as the census/1.0 RESAMPLED treatment so,
essentially, the described test examined the difference between the central
tendencies of the INTERPOLATED treatment levels and the original census
dataset. A Bonferroni correction was applied to the multiple-comparison MannWhitney Tests such that the a. of 0.05 was reduced to a.In such that a.In::: 0.05/9
::: 0.0056.
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Table 3: Test statistics for normality tests of INTERPOLATED dataset by treatment level

Testsof Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova

LEVEL
VALUE 1.0

Statistic

df

Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic

Sig.

df

Sig.

.052

2546

.000

.972

2546

.000

2.0

.074

2400

.000

.971

2400

.000

3.0

.053

2424

.000

.969

2424

.000

4.0

.073

2419

.000

.970

2419

.000

5.0

.061

2183

.000

.980

2183

.000

6.0

.075

2329

.000

.977

2329

.000

7.0

.083

2023

.000

.965

2023

.000

8.0

.077

2306

.000

.971

2306

.000

9.0

.081

2159

.000

.970

2159

.000

10.0

.049

1825

.000

.968

1825

.000

a. Lilllefors Significance
Correction
Table 4: Test statistic for Levene's Test for homogeneity of variances for INTERPOLATED dataset

Test of Homogeneityof Variances

VALUE
Levene
Statistic

21.174

df1

df2
9

22604

Sig.
.000

Lastly, the central tendency of interpolation error at each treatment level
was compared between treatment levels using a Kruskal-Wallis Test. Once
again, the assumptions of parametric statistics were not met, so non-parametric
methods were employed (Table 5, Table 6).
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Table 5: Test statistics for normality tests of interpolation error by treatment level
TestsorNormalilyl
Shapiro-Wilk

Kolmogorov-Smimova
ERROR

LEVEL
2.0

statistic

Sig.

df

Statistic

df

Sig.

.137

2400

.000

.824

2400

.000

3.0

.198

2424

.000

.752

2424

.000

4.0

.136

2419

.000

.834

2419

.000

5.0

.166

2183

.000

.819

2183

.000

6.0

.146

2329

.000

.817

2329

.000

7.0

.130

2023

.000

.869

2023

.000

8.0

.139

2306

.000

.835

2306

.000

9.0

.158

2159

.000

.794

2159

.000

10.0

.136

1825

.000

.855

1825

.000

a. Lilllefors Significance Correction
b. ERROR is constant WhenLEVEL= 1 1.0. It has been omitted.

Table 6: Test statistic for Levene's Test for homogeneity of variances of interpolationerror
Test orHomogeneityorVariances
ERROR
Levene
Statistic

613.235

df1

df2
9

22604

Sig.

.000

In addition to the statistical analyses described above, visual assessment
of the mapped treatments was performed to evaluate spatial differences in
treatment levels. All levels within a treatment were mapped using consistent
scale and symbology to allow for visual inspection of the data.

3.3 Results

3.3.1 Resampled treatment. Visual inspection of the mapped
RESAMPLED treatments revealed that decreasing sensor resolution resulted in
visibly different cartographic representations of the same phenomenon (Figure
8). A mottled pattern of high and low values was apparent at the census/1.0
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treatment level and somewhat apparent at the 2.0 level, but the pattern was lost
above the 2.0 level. The loss of that pattern came as a result of the increased

Legend
Value
- High : 4.14846

Low : 1.61395

Figure 8: Census treatment levels of the RE SAMPLED dataset
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size of representative raster cells which made representing attribute variability
across a small spatial scale impossible. Overall, the general distribution of large
areas of low or high values within the AOI was somewhat conserved at lower
resolutions, but the variability of the attribute values of the underlying
phenomenon across space was lost; large raster cells suggested large areas of
homogenous attribute values, though comparison to the census/1.0 treatment
level revealed that this was not truly representative of the underlying
phenomenon. Furthermore, the reduction in sensor resolution resulted in some
areas with drastically different values than those in the same areas at the
census/1.0 level. For instance, at the 10.0 treatment level the lower left corner of
the AOI indicated an area of relatively high value, while the same area at the
other treatment levels suggested more moderate values.
Statistical assessment of the central tendency of the mapped values using
a one-way ANOVA revealed that the mean value remained statistically similar at
all treatment levels examined (p = 0.801; Table 7). Examination of the boxplot
(Figure 9) revealed that the census/1.0 resolution level contained a high number
of outlier data points (represented by open circles and defined as data points
more than 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR) above the 3rd quartile or below
the first quartile), while the 5.0 treatment level contained only three outliers, and
only one outlier exists at each of the 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 9.0, and 10.0 levels.
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Table 7: One-way ANO VA test statistics for evaluation of differences in mean value by
RESAMPLED treatment level
ANOVA
VALUE
Sum of
Squares
BetweenGroups

df

MeanSquare

1.001

9

.111

Within Groups

841.156

3931

.214

Total

842.157

3940

F

.520

Sig.

.861
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Figure 9: Boxplots of RESAMPLED dataset by treatment level

3.3.2 Interpolated treatment. Cartographic representations of the
interpolated data resulted in some apparent visual differences between maps
produced from different sensor resolutions (Figure 10). A mottled pattern of areas
of high and low values was apparent at the 1.0 through 4.0 treatment levels, was
somewhat apparent at the 5.0 and 6.0 levels, and was lost at treatment levels
above 6.0. A general pattern of low values near the upper right edge and lower
right corner of the AOI and high values in the upper left corner is generally
conserved at all treatment levels. At higher treatment levels, however, the
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transition between high and low values appears to be a smooth gradient. It is
important to note that the raster cell size is the same for all treatment levels.

Legend
IN1ERPOLA
1ED
Vlltue

•

High : .14846

Low· 1.61395

Figure 10: Maps of/NTERPOLATED treatment levels

Statistical interpretation of the INTERPOLATED dataset using a KruskalWallis Test indicated a significant difference in median values between treatment
levels (p= 0.000; Table 8, Figure 11). Paired comparisons between lower
resolutions treatment levels and the census/1.0 treatment revealed significant
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differences median values for every treatment level above 6.0 (p<0.0056 with
Bonferroni correction applied; Table 9).

Table 8: Kruskal-Wallis test statistics for evaluation of INTERPOLATED dataset

Ranks
MeanRank

N

LEVEL
VALUE 1.01.0

2546

11817.99

2.0 2.0

2400

11302.84

3.0 3.0

2424

11669.93

4.04 .0

2419

11532 .19

5.0 5.0

2183

11417.33

6.0 6.0

2329

11449.91

7.0 7.0

2023

10850.55

df

8.0 8.0

2306

11330.14

Asymp.Sig .

9.09.0

2159

10885.35

10.0 10.0

1825

10486.46

Total

22614

I

I

Test statistics•.b

VALUE
Chi-Square

9

b. Grouping

Variable:LEVEL

0
0

0

~

0
0

0

6

0

0

w

::,

-;;i3.
>
2.

2.000

1.SOO
2.D

3,Q

, .o

.000

a. Kruskal Wallis
Test

3.

1.D

75.466

5.0

6.0

7,0

e.o

9,Q

10.D

LEVEL

Figure 11: Boxplots of INTERPOLATED dataset by treatment level
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Table 9: Mann-Whitney test statistics for comparison of median value of INTERPOLATED treatment levels
vs. Census/1. 0 treatment level. Bonfen-oni correction applied (p < aln = 0. 0519 = 0. 0056).

Le\el

Median

z

p

Census/1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0

2.602
2.566
2.593
2.603
2.551
2.579
2.484
2.559
2.531
2.450

-2.822
-0.786
-1.574
-2.077
-2.012
-4.894
-2.644
-4.823
-6.664

0.005*
0.432
0.116
0.038
0.044
0.000*
0.000*
0.000*
0.000*

Cartographic representation of cell-by-cell interpolation error between the
INTERPOLATED treatment levels and the RESAMPLED census/1.0 treatment
resulted in a mixed spatial distribution of high and low error at all levels of
resolution (Figure 12). While it was difficult to interpret such results, a general
decrease in spatial variability of error was apparent at lower resolutions, though,
throughout all treatment levels a few notable areas of higher error persisted. It is
important to note that the error calculated between the INTERPOLATED
census/1.0 and RESAMPLED census/1 .0 levels resulted in zero error, indicating
that the interpolation method used did not affect the values at sample locations.
Statistical analysis of interpolation error revealed that for both cell-by-cell
evaluation of interpolation error and map-wide calculations of interpolation error it
was generally apparent that error increased with decreased sensor resolution
(Figure 13, Figure 14). For cell-by-cell calculations, a significant increase in
median error at lower resolutions was observed (p = 0.000; Table 10, Figure 13).
The calculation of Root Mean Square Error was consistent with the median error
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findings, revealing a general increase in overall interpolation mapping error with
decreased resolution (Figure 14).
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Figure 12: Mapped interpolation error by treatment level
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Table 10: Kruskal-Wallistest statistics for evaluation of interpolationerror by treatment level

Ranks
MeanRank

N

LEVEL
ERROR 22.0

2400

7159.71

2424
2419

5971.55

4 4.0
55 .0

2183

9636.80

ERROR

6 6.0

11028.69

Chi-SQuare 2926.539

77.0

2329
2023

88 .0

2306

11821.45

9 9,0

2159

12211,54

1010.0

1B25

12346.21

3 3.0

Total

,.

9377.31

11
TestStatistics
.b

11937.97

b. Grouping

Variable: LEVEL

DD
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·"°°

FF

FF
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I

*

*

t

I
w
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a. KruskalWallis
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20068
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Figure 13: Boxplot of interpolationerror by treatment level. Letters indicate significantly different groups.
Table 11: Mann-Whitneytest statistics for comparison of median value of interpolationERROR treatment
levels vs. Census/1.0treatment level. Bonferroni correction applied (p < u/n = 0.05145= 0.0001).
Level
Census/1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0

Median

z

0.033
0.023
0.052
0.054
0.069
0.087

-65.419
-59.647

8.0
9.0
10.0

0.083
0.091
0.093

-65.557
-65.646
-65.203
-62.781
-65.133
-64.278
-63.0111

0.000·
0.000·
0.000*
0.000*
0.000·
0.000*
0.000·
0.000*
0.000*
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Treatment Level
Census/1.0

2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0

RMSE
0

0.058
0.056
0.091
0.113
0.131
0.150
0.149
0.175
0.166

RMSE of Interpolation Error
0.2
0.15
....
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Figure 14: Root Mean Squared En-or of INTERPOLATED dataset by treatment level

3.4 Discussion

3.4.1 Resampled treatment. The analysis of the RESAMPLED dataset
presented here demonstrated how two different analytical methods (spatial and
statistical) were affected in different ways by the same changes in sensor
resolution. The spatial method progressively lost the ability to pick up on small
spatial variations (spatial precision) as sensor resolution decreased, while the
statistical interpretation of mean value was unaffected by changes in sensor
resolution when analyzed with the method chosen (One-way ANOVA).
Cartographically, all resolutions were symbolized using the same
technique and color scale, therefore all resolutions were capable of capturing the
same level of change in raster cell value from cell-to-cell. In other words, all
resolutions captured the same level of precision in attribute value. Spatially,
however, maps produced at higher resolutions demonstrated "texture," small
spatial-scale variations in raster cell values that were not visible at lower
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resolutions. The loss of texture represented a loss in the representation of those
small-scale spatial variations and a coinciding loss of precision in attribute value
at any given point. Essentially, the high variability observed at high resolution
was aggregated into larger and larger spatial groupings at lower resolutions
where variability with high spatial precision was exchanged for averages with low
spatial precision and a loss of information about where specific values were
occurring.
The loss of information, however, was not the only consequence of
reduced sensor resolutions. At higher treatment resolutions, the general spatial
distribution of high and low values appeared generally representative of the true
pattern. However, at resolutions from 6.0 to 10.0 a breakdown of even the
general spatial distribution of values began to appear, and by 10.0, large areas of
the map appeared entirely inaccurate with large areas of high or low values
existing where they did not in the census/1.0 treatment map (Figure 8).
Statistical assessment of the central tendency of the mapped values using
a one-way ANOVA, however, revealed that the mean value remained statistically
similar at all treatment levels examined (p = 0.801; Table 7, Figure 9). The
ANOVA analysis demonstrated no significant differences in mean attribute value
between categories, therefore, it could be suggested that reducing the sensor
resolution resulted in no significant loss of information about central tendency.
Not evident from the statistical analysis, however, was the loss of outlier data
points in the lower resolution datasets. Outlier data points relay important
information about the distribution and spread of the population examined, as well
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as about the existence of very high or very low data points captured by the
survey methodology. The loss of outliers in the resampled dataset suggests that
either the distribution of the dataset changed such that some outlier data points
no longer fall outside the defined threshold of outliers, or that the reduced sensor
resolution failed to capture those points. Given that the threshold for outliers
generally reduced in size with lower sensor resolution levels (as evidenced by
the length of the boxplot t-bars), it is most likely that the outliers were lost through
the reduction in sensor resolution. Therefore, it can be concluded that the lower
resolution sensor failed to capture specific information, leading to bias in both
spatial and statistical distribution of attribute values.
In the case of each analytic method, the sensor resolution and analytic
method combined to produce the perceptual apparatus through which the data
were examined, and the underlying phenomenon was interpreted. In the case of
the spatial analysis, however, the interpretation was dependent on the sensor
resolution chosen, while, in the case of statistical analysis, the interpretation was
independent of sensor resolution at the levels examined. These results imply that
there were interactive effects of the two perceptual apparatus components such
that the perceptual influence of one component in one situation may be different
than the influence of the same component in a different situation.

3.4.2 Interpolated treatment. The second part of the analysis presented
was concerned with the biases imposed when sampled data are spatially
interpolated. Spatial interpolation is a method for inferring information at
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geographic locations for which direct observations have not been made. As a
result, the cartographic representations of interpolated data are independent of
the resolution at which the data are collected as the spatial resolution of
interpolated data is a user-specified parameter and is not practically restricted by
the resolution of the underlying data. In this case, the high interpolation
resolution, reflected by small raster cell size, suggests a high level of spatial
precision at all sensor resolution levels (Figure 10). Spatial precision in
cartographic representation, however, is not a proxy for the amount of
information captured by the map, and further examination of differences between
the census/1.0 level interpolation and the interpolations derived from reduced
sensor resolutions demonstrated losses of visual information similar to that
observed in the RESAMPLED dataset. At the census/1.0 level an obvious texture
of patterned spatial variability was present and, like in the RESAMPLED dataset,
the pattern was progressively lost, or "smoothed," with reduced sensor
resolution. Unlike the RESAMPLED dataset, though, there was no coinciding
change in raster cell size - all sensor resolutions are interpolated at the 1 unit2
raster cell size - therefore, the level of spatial variability possible, given the raster
cell size and the level of spatial variability represented, are not the same. The
consequence of this is that the map suggests that it is relaying more information
than it actually is. Seeing a set of adjacent raster cells with similar values implies
that there is little variability in the underlying phenomenon which those cells
represent. However, in the case of the interpolated maps derived from lower
sensor resolutions, the lack of variability between adjacent raster cells exists
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because of a lack of infonnation available to determine whether or not such
variability exists. In the case of the RESAMPLED dataset, the map user is made
aware of the lack of information by the larger raster cells, so long as they
understand that a raster cell is an aggregated representation of some smaller
spatial unit. In the case of the INTERPOLATED dataset, the map user is not
made aware of the lacking information and may inappropriately assume that the
variability observed is representative of the actual variability existing in the
underlying phenomenon.
Evaluation of interpolation error also revealed differences in treatment
levels. Calculated error increased significantly with decreasing sensor resolution,
indicating that not only was information lost with decreased resolution (i.e. the
loss of spatial variability), but it actually became more inaccurate. This claim is
further supported by the statistical analysis of median interpolated raster cell
value which revealed that the median value decreased significantly with
decreased sensor resolution (p=0.000, Table 8, Figure 11). This last point is
interesting because the same result was not observed with the uninterpolated
dataset, suggesting that the interpolation process itself is introducing a bias
which results in false interpretations of the truth.
The key outcomes of these results are that reduced sensor resolution led
to a loss of information in the interpolated spatial representation, that spatial
interpolation holds the potential for a mismatch between the amount of
information suggested and the amount of information actually presented, and that
the loss of information coincided with an increase in interpolation error. When
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evaluated in the context of scientific knowledge and truth, spatial interpolation is
yet another component of the perceptual apparatus through which one interprets
the truth. In this case, the interaction of spatial interpolation with sensor
resolution not only led to different interpretations of the same phenomenon, but in
some cases resulted in interpretations that could not be considered the same as
the underlying phenomenon.

134

CHAPTER IV: SEAGRASS DATA

4.1 Introduction

In the case of those scientific studies that depend upon a network of
sample points to elucidate a phenomenon which cannot be observed or
measured in its entirety, the "truth" is often constrained by the number and spatial
orientation of points within the sampling network (see discussion in Chapter I). To
examine the role of sampling strategy in the elucidation of truth, two different
network designs were applied to sample for seagrass occurrence and distribution
within a defined area of interest (AOI). The two strategies employed were simple
random sampling (SRS) and transect-based sampling (TBS), both considered
scientifically acceptable methods for the quantification of seagrass distribution
and abundance and are widely utilized in the scientific literature (Fourqurean et
al. 2001, Kirkman 1996, Norris et al. 1997, Short and Duarte 2001).
Interpretations, both statistical and spatial, of seagrass occurrence and
distribution, were derived from the sample observations and compared between
sampling strategies. Additionally, the number and spatial distribution of samples
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within each network were manipulated to determine how those interpretations
changed under shifting network designs.
Seagrass data were collected in October and November 2011 as part of a
Florida and Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Fish and Wildlife
Research Institute (FWRI) project directed by Dr. Paul Carlson. At the time, Chris
McHan was an employee of FWRI and participated in all aspects of experimental
design and data collection. Data were subsequently requested from, and
provided by, Dr. Carlson to Mr. McHan in July of 2016 for use in this thesis.

4.2 Methodology

4.2.1 Study area. The AOI was a shallow shoal located within central
Tampa Bay, Florida, adjacent to the Snell Isle neighborhood of St. Petersburg,
Florida (Figure 15). The shoal extended approximately 2.9 kilometers from north
to south and ranged from 0.5 to 1.0 km wide. Total area of the AOI was
approximately 2.32 km2 • Depth within the AOI ranged from -0.01 to -5.2 m
(NAVO) with portions of the shoal regularly exposed at low tides.
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Figure 15: Seagrass Study Area

4.2.2 Seagrass sample network design and data collection. Two
independent sampling networks were designed using systematic random
sampling (SRS) and transect-based sampling (TBS). The SRS network was
achieved by overlaying a network of tessellated hexagons of approximately 75m
in diameter over the AOI and assigning a single sample point at a random
location within each hexagon. The method produced a total of 176 hexagons
(Figure 16); however, because the hexagon grid did not fit perfectly within the
boundary of the AOI and some hexagons overlapped non-marine habitat (i.e.
land), some random sample points were assigned to areas which could not be
sampled and were eliminated from the sample population. The resulting sampling
network contained 147 sample points (Figure 17).

137

Figure 16: study area with 75m hexagons

Figure 17: SRS-based and transect-based sample points

138

The transect-based sample design was composed of four transects
ranging in length from 814 to 889 meters, placed at approximately equal intervals
and oriented perpendicular to the long axis of the AOI in a more-or-less
northwest to southeast direction (Figure 17). Sample points were assigned at
equal 25m intervals starting at Om. The length of the four transects varied with
the width of the AOI, such that the number of sample points along a single
transect ranged from 34 to 38, with a total of 137 points for all four transects.
Seagrass presence at each sample point was initially recorded as percent
cover data, which were collected using a modified Braun-Blanquet method
(Braun-Blanquet 1932, Fourqurean et al. 2001 ), in which a 0.5m x 0.5m quadrat
was used to estimate the areal cover of seagrass and algal species. Specieslevel cover of all seagrass species was estimated in 1% intervals from 0% to
10%, then 5% intervals from 10% to 100%.

4.2.3 Data analysis. The data analysis was composed of two types:
statistical and spatial. Statistical analyses focused on the probability of
encountering a selected species given a specified sampling method and level of
effort. Spatial analyses focused on the probability of encountering a selected
species at a particular location given a specified sampling method and level of
effort.

4.2.3.1 Data subsampling. The complete set of sample points for each
sample method (147 and 137 for SRS and TBS, respectively) were considered
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the base observation against which all other treatment level observations were
compared (referred to as the "census" level). Treatment levels were designed to
simulate varying levels of sample effort (i.e. the number of sample points) within
each of the sample methods (SRS and TBS). To create the sample effort
treatment levels, the census dataset for each sample method was subsampled
by randomly selecting a subset of sample points corresponding to the level of
effort desired. Effort levels were 40, 55, 70, 85, 100, 115, and 130 sample points,
in addition to the census level. For statistical analyses, each level of effort within
each sample method type was resampled 100 times, resulting in 100 replicate
data sets for each sample effort treatment level within each sample method type.
For spatial analyses, each effort level within each sample method was resampled
ten times . In both cases, once selected, an individual sample point was not
returned to the population until the next subsample, such that each sample point
could appear only once within each subsample set. The census effort level
treatments were not replicated.
The resulting experimental design was as follows (Table 12):
1) Sample Method ("method"): Corresponded to the method used to design
the sampling network. Sample method included two levels: random
(RAND) and transect (XSEC). A total of 147 sites and 137 sites were
sampled using the RAND and XSEC sample methods, respectively.
2) Sample Effort ("effort"): Corresponded to the number of sample sites
subsampled for a given analysis. For each sample effort treatment level
(RAND and XSEC), a subset of the sample population was randomly
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selected. Sample effort treatments were 40, 55, 70, 85, 100, 115, and 130
sites, plus the total "census" treatment level which contains all possible
sample sites. For RAND the census level is 147 sites, while the XSEC
census treatment contains 137 sites. For every sample effort treatment
level except the census level, the subsampling was repeated 100 times for
the statistical analyses and 10 times for the spatial analyses.
Fully factored, the experimental design contained 16 possible treatment
combinations (Table 12).

Table 12: Number of replicates by sampling method and treatment level

Sameling Method
RAND

Sample Points

147

130
115
100
85

70
S5
40
XSEC

137

130
115
100
85
70
55
40

StatisticalAnal~sis
Reeticates
1

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
1
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Seatial Anal'.l:'.
sis
Replicates
1
10

10
10
10
10
10
10

1
10
10
10

10
10

10
10

4.2.3.2 Statistical analysis. All statistical analyses and data manipulation
were carried out using SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 19.0 (IBM Corp.
Released 2010. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 19.0. Armonk, NY:

141

IBM Corp.). Due to the disproportionately high number of zeros (in some cases,
more than half of the observations), calculating the central tendency of percent
cover resulted in extremely skewed outcomes for both mean and median. As
such, the percent cover values were converted to presence/absence values and
a probability of occurrence for each replicate within each treatment combination
was computed. Probability of occurrence (PO) is defined as the ratio of the
number of sample sites where a species was encountered to the total number of
sites sampled (Equation 3). Normalizing the number of positive observations
made by the total number of observations allows comparisons to be made
between treatments with differing numbers of total observations. Essentially, the
positive observation is weighted according to the total amount of effort expended
to make the observation.
Equation 3:

# of sites with species present
PO= -----------

n

For example, for the RAND 55 treatment combination, if a species was present at
three of the 55 sites sampled, the resulting PO would be (3/55) = 0.055.
PO was calculated for three seagrass species/groups ("species"): Syringodium
filiforme (SFIL), Halodule wrightii (HWRI), and all seagrass species combined
(TTSG).
The calculation of PO resulted in one PO value per replicate and 100 PO
values per treatment (Table 13).
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Table 13: Number of data points by treatment

PO Data
SamQlin g Method

Effort Level

ReQlicates

Points

RAND

147
130
115
100

1
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

1
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

85

70
55
40
XSEC

137
130
115
100
85
70
55
40

1

1

100
100
100
100
100
100
100

100
100
100
100
100
100
100

The central tendency (mean and median) of PO was calculated for each
seagrass species for every possible treatment level combination. For all species
and sample effort levels, the sample populations could not be determined to be
derived from a normally distributed population using either a Shapiro Wilk or
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Therefore, non-parametric statistical methods were
utilized.
To determine significant differences in median PO between all possible
treatment combinations, a Kruskal-Wallis Test was applied to the data, treating
each unique combination of sample method and sample effort within each
species as a separate treatment. Specific post-hoc analyses, examining
differences in median PO between effort levels within sample methods and
between sample methods within effort levels, are described below .
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4.2.3.2.1 Analysis of central tendency within sample method. Within each
sample method (RAND and XSEC), the central tendency of PO for each sample
effort treatment level was compared to the PO of the census treatment level
using a Sign Test. The Sign Test was utilized as an alternative to the parametric
One-Sample T-Test to compare central tendency of lower treatment levels to the
central tendency of the census level within sample methods. Since the Sign Test
is inherently a paired test, the input parameters utilized were the PO value for
each replicate within each treatment, paired with the calculated census level PO
for the selected species. In these cases, the hypothesis tested was: The central
tendency of PO for species x within sample effort level Y is significantly different
than the observed PO of species x within the census sample effort treatment
level.

4.2.3.2.2 Analysis of central tendency across sample method. Across the
two sample method treatments, the central tendency was compared within each
sample effort treatment level. Once again, because the sample populations were
not determined to be derived from normally distributed populations, a nonparametric approach was utilized; a Kruskal Wallis Test was used to compare the
median PO between the two sample methods followed by a Mann-Whitney Test
to make pairwise comparisons of the central tendency of PO across sample
methods within sample effort.
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4.2.3.3 Spatial analysis. Using the same treatments as above, the
probability of occurrence for each seagrass species and treatment combination
was mapped using probability kriging methods available in ArcGIS. Probability
kriging uses a specified threshold to assign binomial probability values (either 1
or 0) to sampled locations based on the attribute value at that location (in this
case, the percent cover of seagrass species). For example, for an assigned
threshold of 0.5, the attribute values of 0.4 and 0.7 would receive probability
values of O and 1, respectively. To interpolate the values at non-sampled
locations, the subsequent kriging exercise then weights the interpolated value
based on both the spatial distance between the non-sampled and sampled
locations as well as the numerical distance between the sampled location value
and the specified threshold. The result is a raster layer containing probability
values on a continuous scale between O and 1 for all cells within the specified
area.
In this case, probability kriging methods were applied to the seagrass
abundance data to map derived probabilities of occurrence (PO). A threshold
value of 0.1 was specified, resulting in any location with a seagrass abundance
value of 0.1 or greater receiving a probability assignment of 1, while any
seagrass abundance values less than 0.1 received a probability assignment of 0.
For each treatment combination, ten replicate datasets were created and
used for probability kriging interpolation. The resulting ten probability distribution
maps were then combined into a single layer by calculating the mean probability
value at each cell using the Raster Calculator tool.
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4.2.3.3.1 Root mean square error. To examine the differences between

the Sample Effort treatment levels and the "census" Sample Effort within each
Sample Method treatment, the root mean squared error was calculated in two
ways. First, for a cell-by-cell calculation, a custom tool was created using the
ModelBuilder function within ArcMap which calculated the RMSE at every cell
based on the error of each of the ten replicate interpolation layers for each effort
level. The custom tool utilized the Raster Calculator tool to calculate the RMSE
using Equation 4: where 0; is the census raster cell value at cell i and Pq is the
treatment level raster cell value at cell i for layer j (where 1 s j s 1O; Figure 18).
The custom tool simultaneously calculated RMSE while extracting only those
cells within the AOI to a new raster layer. While the probability kriging exercise
made probability predictions outside of the AOI, only the predictions within the
AOI were examined here. The resulting maps represented the spatial
distributions of the root mean squared error between each of the Effort treatment
levels and the census population within the same Sample Method treatment.
Equation 4:

RMSE

=

2
"f.Z/~
1 (Pti - oa

n
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Figure 18: Diagram of details of RMSE by Cell tool created in ArcMap Mode/Builder

Second, RMSE was calculated at the layer level using the RMSE tool
outlined in section 4.1.1.4.3 (Figure 6). A total RMSE for each of the ten replicate
layers was calculated for every treatment. The resulting values were then
exported into SPSS for statistical analysis of RMSE. Because the RMSE by
Layer dataset did not meet both the assumption of normality (Table 14) and the
assumption of homogeneity of variances (Table 15}, non-parametric statistical
approaches were utilized. The Kruskall-Wallis Test was used to test differences
in median RMSE between effort levels within method types and species, and the
Mann-Whitney Test was used to test differences in median RMSE value between
sample method types within effort levels and species. For all multiple-comparison
tests a Bonferroni correction was applied such that the a. was reduced to a.In=

0.05/7 = 0.007.
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Table 14: Test statistics for tests for normality for RMSE by Layer dataset

RAND
Kolmogorov-Smimov'
RMSE

SPECIES
HWRI

S1atisHc

di

Sig.

Shapiro-Wilk
statistic

di

Sig.

.207

10

.200

.891

10

.175

SFIL

.142

10

.200·

.955

10

.731

TTSO

.164

10

.200·

.948

10

.645

a. Ulliefors SignificanceCorrection
...This is a lowerboundof the true significance
b. EFFORT= 130

XSEC
Kolmogorov-Smimov-'
RMSE

SPECIES
HWRI

statistic

df

Sig.

Shapiro-Wilk
statistic

Sig.

di

.251

10

.074

.715

10

.007

SFIL

169

10

.200'

.956

10

TTSO

.156

10

.200'

.910

10

.737
.282

a. Ullietors SignificanceCorreetion
•. This Is a lower boundoflhe true slgniftcance.
b. EFFORT= 130

Table 15: Test statistics for Levene's Test for homogeneity of variancesfor RMSE by Layer dataset by
sample method and species

XSEC

RAND

Test of Homogeneity
of Variances"

Test orHomogeneity
of Variances"

RMSE

RMSE

Levene
Statistic

df1

d12

5

4.606

54

Sig.

Levene
S1alistic

.001

a. SPECIES= SFIL

df1

d12
5

7.229

54

Sig.
.000

a. SPECIES=SFIL

Testof Homogeneity
of Variances"

Testor Homogeneity
of Variances•

RMSE

RMSE

Levene

Statistic

df1

d12

5

2.182

54

Sig.

Levene

Statistic

.070

df1

6.809

d12
5

54

Sig.
.000

a. SPECIES=HWRI

a. SPECIES=HWRI
Testof Homogeneity
of Variances"

Testof Homogeneity of Variances"
RMSE

RMSE

Levene

Statistic

df1

4.397

a. SPECIES= TISO

d12
5

54

Sig.
.002

Levene

Statistic

df1

2.509

a. SPECIES=TTSG
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d12
5

54

Sig.
.041

4.3 Results

4.3.1 Statistical analysis results.

4.3.1.1 Central tendency, normality, and error. The mean and median
were calculated for all species and all treatment level combinations (Table 16) .
and boxplots were created to evaluate the central tendency and distribution of
sample populations (Figure 19). The Shapiro-Wilk Test was used to test for
normality in the distribution of PO for all species and all treatment level
combinations. A Kolmorgorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was also utilized as a test for
normality, however, since the K-S test is not a true test of normality and tends to
be less reliable than the Shapiro-Wilk, only the results for the Shapiro-Wilk are
presented here. Shapiro Wilk Test results were inconsistent for all species
between treatment levels (Table 17); therefore, it could not be determined that
the sample population for any species was derived from a normally distributed
population and non-parametric statistical tests were utilized.
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Table 16: Central tendency by sample method and species
Sample
Method

Treatment
Level

RAND

40
55
70
85
100
115
130
147

XSEC

40
55
70
85
100
115
130
147

SFIL
Mean

Median

0.448
0.465
0.452
0.453
0.456
0.458
0.457
0.456
0.460
0.445
0.483
0.478
0.476
0.479
0.481
0.482

0.450
0.473
0.457
0.453
0.460
0.452
0.454
0.456
0.450
0.455
0.486
0.471
0.480
0.478
0.48S
0.482

HWRI
Mean
Median

TTSG
Mean
Median

0.174
0.162
0.173
0.165
0.169
0.168
0.170
0.170
0.157
0.166
0.275
0.271
0.270
0.273
0.271
0.270

0.587
0.597
0.594
0.587
0.590
0.593
0.593
0.592
0.592
0.580
0.687
0.668
0.667
0.672
0.671
0.672

0.175
0.164
0.171
0.165
0.170
0.170
0.169
0.170
0.150
0.164
0.279
0.271
0.270
0.270
0.269
0.270

Table 17: p-value results of Shapiro-Wilk by treatment and species('=
Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value
Sample Method

RAND

Effort Leve I

SFIL

130
115
100
85
70
55

0.0341
0.029
0.163 1
0.039
0.1531
0.052 1
0.0501
0.000
0.031
0.013
0.023
0.2811
0.029
0.018

40
XSEC

130
115
100
85
70
55
40

HWRI
0.001

0.004
0.001
0.1241
0.0511
0.007
0.001
0.000
0.023
0.0621
0.023
0.0551
0.049
0.Q25

TTSG

0.025
0.0921
0.1001
0.2001
0.1501
0.1021
0.015
0.000
0.012
0.1101
0.2931
0.001
0.043
0.011
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0.575
0.600
0.600
0.588
0.590
0.591
0.592
0.592
0.600
0.582
0.686
0.671
0.670
0.670
0.669
0.672

p-value > 0.05)
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Figure 19: Boxplot of PO by treatment combination and species

Kruskal-Wallis analysis revealed significant differences in median PO
when applied to all possible treatment level combinations of sampling method
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and samplingeffortfor all three species(Figure20). Post hocanalysesto lookat
specificpairwisecomparisonsof treatmentlevelsare describedbelow.
SAMPSET16
HWRI_PO 1 RAN0100

100

476.17

2 RAND115

100

458.01

3RAND130

100

468.53

4 RAN0147

1

485.00

5 RAND40

100

493.63

6RAN055

100

408.28

7 RAN070

100

500.89

8RAN085

100

435.79

9XSEC100

100

1151.09

10XSEC115

100

1175.12

11 XSEC130

130

1142.90

12XSEC137

1

1158.00

13XSEC40

100

403.82

14XSEC55

100

460.23

15XSEC70

100

1179.59

16XSEC85

100

1146.96

Total
SF!l,_PO

1432

1 RAND100

100

589.68

2RAND115

100

599.11

3 RAND130

100

572.50

4 RAN0147

1

548.00

5 RAN040

100

570.23

6RAND55

100

739.57

7 RAND70

100

598.32

8 RAND85

100

576.68

9 XSEC100

100

864.48

10XSEC115

100

908.86

11XSEC130

130

951.98

12XSEC137

1

985.00

13XSEC40

100

679.54

14 XSEC55

100

566.06

15XSEC70

100

898.50

16XSEC85

100

843.86

Total
TTSO_PO

MeanRank

N

1432

1 RAN0100

100

446.00

2RAND115

100

471.62

3 RAN0130

100

473.30

4 RAN0147

1

465.00

5 RAND40

100

482.26

6 RAND55

100

540.11

l RAN070

100

510.18

8 RAN085

100

437.75

9XSEC100

100

1089.62

10XSEC115

100

1132.88

11 XSEC130

130

1123.78

12XSEC137

1

1160.00

13XSEC40

100

533.23

14XSEC55

100

446.99

15XSEC70

100

1147.70

100

1071.49

16XSEC85
Total

1432

TestSlatlstles",b

Ch~Square

df
Asymp.Sig.

HWRI_PO

SFIL_PO

TTSG_PO

969.536

1B2.177

78B.679

15

15

15

.000

.000

.000

a. KruskalWallis Test
b GroupingVariable: SAMPSET16

Figure 20: Kruskal-Wallis Test statistics for evaluation of differences in median PO for all groups and levels
by species (a= 0.05).
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4.3.1.2 Comparison of median PO between effort treatment levels
within method types. Sign Test comparisons of median PO between lower
sample effort treatment levels and the census level revealed significant
differences (aJn ==0.007) for both the RAND and XSEC sample methods. Within
the RAND sample method treatment, only the median PO for HWRI 55 was
significantly different than the census level PO (p==0.002,Table 18). No
significant differences were observed for TTSG or SFIL at any level of effort.
These results suggest that, with the exception at HWRI 55, calculations of
median using systematic random sampling were robust at all levels of sampling
effort for all species.
Table 18: Sign Test test statistics for comparison of median PO between lower sample effort treatment
levels and census within RAND method. Bonferroni correction applied (*=p < a/n 0.0517 0.007)

=

Effort Level

40
55
70
85
100
115
130

SFIL

0.021
0.617
0.585
0.198
0.156
0.030
0.015

p-value
HWRI

0.271
0.002*
0.822

0.194
0.561
0.401
1.000

=

TTSG

0.920
0.134
0.110
0.661
0.661
0.664

0.910

Within the XSEC sample method treatment, Sign Test comparisons of
medians between lower sample effort treatment levels and the census level
revealed significant differences: (a/n = 0.007) for HWRI (p=0.000) and TTSG
(p=0.000) at the 40 effort level, and for all species at the 55 effort level (p=0.000
for all cases). Additionally, a p-value anomaly existed for HWRI 130 treatment
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(p=0.006; Table 19). These results suggest that for transect-based sampling
methods, the prediction of median was robust to reductions in sampling effort, as
low as 70 for all species, though anomalies existed at the lowest effort level for
SFIL and the highest effort level for HWRI.
Table 19: Sign Test test statistics for comparison of median PO between lower sample effort treatment
levels and census within XSEC method. Bonfeffoni coffecfion applied (*=p < c¥1n= 0.0517 = 0.007).

Effort Level
40

55
70
85
100
115
130

SFIL

p-value
HWRI

TTSG

0.019
0.000*
0.484
0.025
0.428
0.911
0.890

0.000*
0.000*
0.161
1.000
0.914
0.540
0.006*

0.000*
0.000*
0.028*
0.287
0.505
0.230
0.052

Both results suggest that the statistical representation of seagrass
remained consistent at somewhat lower levels of sampling effort. In effect, that
the "what" question, referring to the median value of PO, can generally be
determined with fewer numbers of samples than what was used at the census
level for both the systematic random or transect-based sampling methods.
However, that conclusion appears to be only consistently true for TTSG, as
anomalies were present for HWRI for both sampling methods and for SFIL within
the XSEC sampling method. This would suggest that statistical assessment of
median is robust to reduced sample efforts when assessing high abundance
species, but when applied to lower abundance species the robustness to
reduced effort levels is uncertain.
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While the results described in the previous paragraph tell us about the
comparison between lower levels of sampling effort and the census level, they
did
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Figure 21: Median Coefficient of Variation by effort level, method, and species

not give us any insight about the levels of uncertainty around any single
prediction of PO. Visual examination of the boxplots suggested an inverse
relationship between the uncertainty in the calculation of median and the sample
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effort size, based on the length of boxplot t-bars (Figure 11). To quantify this
relationship, the non-parametric equivalent of the Coefficient of Variation was
calculated by dividing the interquartile range by the median for each sample
effort treatment level (referred to as Median Coefficient of Variation; MCV).
Results indicated that the MCV tends to decrease with increasing sample size,
though the relationship is not direct as some variability is evident (Figure 21 ).
Basically, these results suggest that lower sampling efforts are associated with
greater levels of uncertainty.

4.3.1.3 Comparison of median PO between method type within effort
levels. Within each sample effort treatment level, the median PO of each species

was compared between the RAND and XSEC sampling methods using a MannWhitney Test. Significant differences {a/n = 0.007) in median PO values between
the RAND and XSEC sample methods were observed for all species at effort
levels of 70 and above {p<0.05, Table 20). These results demonstrate that
differences in the median value of the two populations are detectable at sampling
efforts of 70 and above for all species. Important to note here is that while the
two sample methods were applied to the same natural phenomenon, the
"census" PO values derived by each are apparently different {Table 16; statistical
differences could not be determined as there was only one census level replicate
per method), suggesting that the initial sample efforts applied to the seagrass
population being studied were not sufficient to result in equal characterizations of
that population. It is expected that at some increased level of effort by both
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sample method types, their respective characterizations of PO would be
equivalent.
Table 20: Mann-Whitney p-values for comparison of median PO between sample methods within sample
effort levels . Bonferroni correction applied (*=p < a/n = 0.0517 = 0.007).

Effort Level

p-value
SFIL

HWRI

TTSG

40

0.136

0.023

0.275

55

0.009

0.407

0.055

70

0.000*

.000*

.000*

85

.000*

.000*

.000*

100

.000*

.000*

.000*

115

.000*

.000*

.ODO*

130

.000*

.000*

.000*

4.3.2 Spatial analysis results.

4.3.2.1 Cartographic analysis. Interpolation mapping of seagrass PO
resulted in distinct visual differences between both sampling method types and
sampling effort levels within species (Figure 22, Figure 23, Figure 24). In all
cases, reductions in sampling effort tended to result in less complex depictions of
seagrass spatial distribution , as evidenced by more highly convoluted contour
lines at higher sampling efforts. Higher effort levels captured more spatial
variation at a finer-scale, yet lower effort levels did not present drastically
different general patterns of seagrass PO. Similarly, the two sample methods
produced maps with obvious fine-scale differences in probabilities, yet the
general information presented about how seagrass PO was spatially distributed
was quite similar. In other words, while both method and effort affected seagrass
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PO at specific locations (i.e. at the raster cell level), the general pattern of PO
distribution as depicted by the maps did not suggest drastic differences in the
distribution of seagrass across the AOI. One notable difference, however, was
the anisotropy apparent in the XSEC maps, especially for HWRI. Anisotropy is
the influence of direction on mapped or measured values, such that values
extending in the same direction are more similar than those extending in other
directions. Lines of anisotropy are evident perpendicular to transect lines
between transect lines, and parallel to the transects alongside the transects.
Interestingly, anisotropy is most evident at the highest sampling levels within
HWRI and tends to degrade with decreasing sampling effort. It is hypothesized
that the observed anisotropy is due to the linear nature of transects, and that
variation within each transect is constrained to a single direction, while variation
between transects is limited to a narrow range of direction. Anisotropy was not
observed for the RAND method.
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1
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0-0.10

Figure 22: Mean interpolated probability of occu"ence maps for SFIL by sample method and effort level
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Figure 23: Mean interpolated probability of occurrence maps for HWRI by sample method and effort level
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Figure 24: Mean interpolatedprobability of occurrence maps for TTSG by sample method and effort level

4.3.2.2 RMSE calculation. Visual examination of the cell-by-cell RMSE
maps demonstrated that within the RAND sample method error appeared to
increase in measure as well as spatial distribution with a decrease in sampling
effort for all species (Figure 25, Figure 26, Figure 27). The highest sampling
effort level appeared to have very low RMSE, as is indicated by few areas of
white or gray, while lower effort levels demonstrated clear increases in error, as
indicated by increased area of white and gray. For the TBT (XSEC) sampling
method the pattern was not as obvious. It was not always clear whether the
decreased effort resulted in increased RMSE overall, however, increased RMSE
was apparent in some isolated areas. RMSE for the TBS method was
complicated by the anisotropy, indicated by streaks of color values extending in a
single direction. Anisotropy was seen in RMSE calculations even when it was not
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apparent in the underlying census level probability maps, indicating that direction
was a strong driver in differences calculated between effort levels for the TBS
method.
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Figure 25: Census level probability of SFIL occuffence (A) and calculated RMSE for tower effort treatment
levels by sample method type (8=130, C=115, D=100, E=85, F=70, G=55)
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Figure 26: Census level probab ility of HWRI occurrence (A) and calculated RMSE for lower effort treatment
levels by sample method type (8=130, C=115, D=100, E=85, F=70, G=55)
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Figure 27: Census level probability of TTSG occurrence (A) and calculated RMSE for lower effort treatment
levels by sample method type (8=130, C=115, D=100, E=85, F=70, G=55)
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Statistical analysis of RMSE by layer did not capture the spatial variability
observed in the RMSE maps but did indicate general differences in median
RMSE between effort levels and sample types. The general trend of increasing
RMSE with decreasing effort level is visible in the boxplots below (Figure 28).
Results of the Kruskall-Wallis Test indicate significant differences between effort
level medians for all species and method types except for the HWRI and RAND
combination (Table 21, Table 22). Pairwise comparisons of RMSE between
sample method types at the same effort level indicate that median RMSE for all
pairs and all species, except those at the lowest effort level, are significantly
different (a.In = 0.007; Table 23). The exceptions were the 115 and 70 effort
levels within TTSG which did not demonstrate significantly different RMSE
between sample methods. These results indicate that RMSE is significantly lower
for the TBT method than for the SRS method at all levels of effort above 55
(except for the two anomalies within TTSG), and that the median RMSE values
of both methods increase significantly between effort levels of 55 and 130, with
the exception of HWRI collected via the SRS method.
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Figure 28: RMSE by species, sample method, and sample effort level

Table 21: Kruskal-WallisTest test statistics for evaluation of RMSE by effort level for RAND sample method
by species
Ranks•
RMSE

MeanRank

N

EFFORT
55

10

55.20

70

10

38.00

85

10

100

RMSE

Ranks"
MeanRank

N

EFFORT
55

10

32.90

70

10

37.20

32.80

85

10

10

29.00

100

RMSE

MeanRank

N

EFFORT
55

10

41.80

70

10

32.50

3430

85

10

34.50

10

24.30

100

10

33.80

115

10

18.40

115

10

30.80

115

10

28.80

130

10

9.60

130

10

2350

130

10

11 60

Total

60

Total

60

Total

60

a SPECIES=HWRI

a. SPECIES=SFIL
Test Statlslics•.b,0

Test Statl&tlcs•.b,•

RMSE
Chi-Square

41.216

df

5

Asymp. Sig.

.000

a. SPECIES=SFIL
b. KruskalWallis
Test

~-~~Jt'MhoRT

a. SPECIES= TTSO

Test Staltlstics•.b,c

RMSE
Chi-Square

5.004
5

Of

Asymp. Sig.

.415

RMSE
Chi-Square

17.008

Of

5

Asymp.Sig.

.004

a. SPECIES=
H\IVRI
b. Kluskal Wallis
Test

a. SPECIES=
TTSO
b. KruskalWallis
Test
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~-~~
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Table 22: Kruskal-Wallis Test test statistics for evaluation of RMSE by effort level for XSEC sample method
by species
Ranks•
RMSE

Ranks"
MeanRank

N

EFFORT
55

10

53.60

70

10

41 70

70

85

10

36.30

100

10

27.80

115

10

18.10

130

10

5.50

Total

60

RMSE

53.40
43.90

70

10

50.20
43.00

85

10
10

38 70

85

10

32.40

100

10

20.70

100

10

27.20

115

10

20.60

115

10

23.50

130

10

5.70

130

10

6.70

Total

60

Total

60

Asymp.Sig.

a. SPECIES=TTSG

RMSE
Chi-Square

5
.000

51.815

df

5

Asymp.Sig.

a. SPECIES=SFIL
b. KruskalWallis
Test
, . Orouplng
Variable:EFFORT

10

TestStallS1ics•.t>
,o

Test stallst1CS 0 .b,c

48.485

MeanRank

N

EFFORT
RMSE 55

10

RMSE

di

Ranks"
MeanRank

a. SPECIES=HWRt

a. SPECIES=SFIL
Test Stallsllcsa.t>,c

Chi-Square

N

EFFORT
55

.000

a. SPECIES=
HWRI

RMSE
Chi-Square

38.501

di

5

Asymp . Sig.

.000

Test

a. SPECIES=
TTSO
b . KtuskalWallis
Test

~.~~i~~!'l!hoRr

&a~:.Ob~~!iiiFFORT

b. KtuskalWallis

Table 23: Mann-Whitney Test test statistics for RMSE between sample method types within effort level by
species(* p< a/n = 0_007)

p-value

Effort
Level

130
115
100
85
70
55

SFIL

0.000*
0.000*
0.000*
0.002*
0.002*
0.796

HWRI

mG

0.000*
0.000*
0.000*
0.003*
0.005*
0.853

0.000*
0.019
0.000*
0.000*
0.007
0.075

4.4 Discussion
A key aspect of this study that must be considered foremost when
evaluating the results, is that unlike the study presented in Chapter 111,
the
scenarios presented here could not be evaluated in the context of a known true
state. That is, the true abundance and distribution of seagrass within the AOI was
not known, so a "true state" could not be used as a basis for comparison. A
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census scenario was established for each sample method and used as the basis
for which the other derived scenarios were compared. However, the census
scenario, in this case, was the scenario with the largest number of sample points,
not the scenario with every possible sample point (an impossible scenario to
achieve). Furthermore, since each sample method has its own census scenario,
any analysis of differences between the census and derived states is already an
artifact of the sampling method used. As such, the results presented are not
reflective of differences from the truth, but rather reflective of different
interpretations of the same, but unknown, truth.
Furthermore, the phenomenon of interest examined here was a real
phenomenon - the spatial distribution of submerged aquatic vegetation across a
shallow marine shoal - the existence of which was subject to any number of
unknown variables. This study did not attempt to explain the reason for the
observed distribution of selected species, or to relate the distribution and
abundance of one species to any of the other species, but rather, to examine
how different sampling networks resulted in different interpretations of the same
phenomenon when examined both statistically and spatially. Thus, this study did
not attempt to explain the causes of the observed distributions, but rather
attempted to describe the observed state of seagrass distribution at the time the
data were collected and to evaluate the different ways that distribution could be
interpreted depending on the sampling strategy and analytic methods applied.
The evaluation of the seagrass sampling network results revealed a
number of key findings: first, like the influence of sensor resolution on the
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statistical analysis of the synthetic dataset, the central tendency of observed PO
was somewhat robust to changes in sampling effort. Unlike the synthetic dataset,
however, this result was dependent on the sampling method employed, with
RAND tending to be the most robust method (Table 18, Table 19). The effect of
sampling method on PO did not appear to be confounded by species, as all
species appeared to be equally affected by sampling method. However, a few
minor anomalies exist which may, or may not, be representative of true
differences. In the case of the RAND method, no level of effort examined
produced a significantly different interpretation for any species except HWRI at
the 55 effort level (Table 18). Similarly, for the XSEC method, all species resulted
in statistically different interpretations at and below the 55 effort level, though
significant differences were also seen at the HWRI 130 and TTSG 70 levels
(Table 19). The consequence of this is the realization that changes in effort level
do not necessarily produce consistent changes in the interpretation of PO,
whether within sampling method or between sampling method. The one result
which was consistent between sampling methods was that uncertainty in median
PO, as evidenced by the calculation of MCV, increased between the highest and
lowest sampling effort levels. Even this pattern, however, was not clearly
correlated to effort level, as an increase in MCV was observed with some
increases in effort level for both methods (Figure 21 ). Anomalous results such as
these suggest that sample method and effort level are not the only influences on
the calculation of median PO, leaving one to question what other factors
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potentially influence the interpretation of truth in this situation and whether the
sampling design employed is capable of capturing the influence of those factors.
The second key result was that the estimation of PO was statistically
different between sample methods for all effort levels at and above 70 for all
three species examined {Table 20). This result is somewhat counterintuitive, as
one would expect different interpretations of median PO at lower sample efforts
and similar interpretations of PO as sampling effort increased. Of course, the
underlying assumption here is that increasing the number of samples reduces
uncertainty and leads to a more truthful interpretation of the observed
phenomenon. If such is the case, then it could be suggested that the census
level of effort was insufficient for deriving a truthful representation of seagrass
occurrence for at least one of the sampling methods. This, then, leads to the
question of whether either interpretation is an acceptable interpretation relative to
the truth and, if deemed acceptable, how to reconcile the differences.
The third key outcome of this study relates to the relative similarities and
differences in spatial representation between the two sample methods, and the
relative role of sample effort in each of those, when spatial distributions were
inferred using probability kriging methods. Clearly, reducing sample effort
resulted in visible impacts on the cartographic representation of seagrass PO
spatial distribution for all species and sample methods, with lower effort levels
demonstrating both a loss of spatial variability and shifts in the locations of
specific PO classes (Figure 22, Figure 23, Figure 24). Shifts in the location of
specific PO classes would suggest increases in error between the predicted
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values and the census values, and subsequent examination of RMSE confirmed
that both sample methods for all three species experienced increased error with
decreased sample effort. These results are similar to the results observed with
the INTERPOLATION dataset in the synthetic data study, where decreased
sensor resolution, analogous to sample effort, led to both a loss of spatial
variability and less accurate predicted values. Distinct to the seagrass results,
however, is the recognition that the two sample methods demonstrated equal
levels of calculated error at the 55 effort level but statistically different levels of
error above the 55 level. Interpretation of this result in the context of truth is
difficult, because the truth is not the standard from which the error was
calculated, and one must be careful not to assume that less error is
commensurate with a more accurate representation of the truth. However, the
conclusion can be made that the RAND method of sample network design is
more susceptible to error than the XSEC at reduced effort levels above 55. At 55,
both methods are equally susceptible to error. The practical application of this is
the understanding that when designing sampling networks, transect-based
networks will result in more similar cartographic representations with reduced
sampling effort than systematic random based networks. However, if the
transect-based method results in a generally less accurate depiction of the
underlying phenomenon, then whether or not a reduced effort results in more
similarity is moot. Unfortunately, this study was not able to evaluate the absolute
relationship of the two sampling methods to truth.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Summary

The work presented here represents a practical investigation into the role
of the perceptual apparatus in the interpretation of truth and the development of
scientific knowledge. As detailed in section 1.3.1, truth is commonly understood
in the environmental sciences to exist as a single, objective reality, independent
of human perception. By that philosophy, the role of science is to elucidate that
truth through observations and experiments. The philosophy is convenient as it
provides an end point to the scientific endeavor, a goal that can be achieved;
truth, when realized, is knowledge. The power in this conceptualization is that
knowledge of a single truth allows that truth to be described, compared,
predicted, and controlled. Section 1.3.2 argued that, ultimately, knowledge of a
truth allows it to be applied to the needs of humanity, the consequence of which
has proven to be an enormous benefit to humankind. Knowledge, however, does
not exist without truth, for what is not true cannot be known, and one's access to
truth is only through one's perception of it. Truth must be perceived through a
lens of available data, observational tools, theory, prior experience, and cultural
bias, to name just a few of the many influences on one's interpretation of truth.
Together, these influences produce a degree of prejudice and bias which must
be sufficiently acknowledged so that one is justified in believing that what they
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have observed is the truth. Truth, in the objective sense, cannot be established,
but a justification for believing that a given piece of information is truth can be. In
this way, justification is what science uses to determine what is truth and,
therefore, what is knowledge. In the environmental sciences, justification often
comes in the form of standardized methods, tools, and thresholds . The problem,
however, is that the methods and tools used to establish a scientific justification
are subjectively chosen by the leading paradigm of the moment, leading not to an
objective perspective free of prejudice and bias, but of a single subjective
perspective in which the prejudice and bias is limited by the standards of the
paradigm. Furthermore, standardizing the methodology fails to account for one's
personal perspective, influenced by cultural norms, personal experience, or prior
knowledge, on the interpretation of the results. Other sciences, in particular the
social sciences, have recognized the role such perspective plays in the
interpretation of truth, and a wealth of dialogue is available. Scientists in these
fields routinely account for perspective in the planning and evaluation of their
research. The environmental sciences, however, have largely lagged behind and
continue to rely upon the prescriptive norms of their paradigm to justify a truth.
The result is the establishment of a consistent perceptual apparatus through
which all scientific activity is viewed, but, by limiting that view to a singular
perspective, one leaves open the possibility of all other perspectives which
potentially hold different interpretations of the same truth. Furthermore, Chapter II
pointed out that the paradigms which establish the standards for justification are
not stable, and that as scientific knowledge accumulates, it has the potential to
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not only shift the way in which the world is viewed but constrain what evidence
will be used to evaluate truth and to develop knowledge in the future. The
realization of this effect would suggest that the environmental sciences, like the
social sciences, would benefit from understanding what interpretations are held
by an alternate perspective. Therein lies the point of the study presented - to
explore, on a practical level, how perspective and interpretation shift under
different perceptual apparatuses and what consequences that might hold for the
development of knowledge within the environmental sciences.
Chapter Ill utilizes an artificial dataset to present a hypothetical scenario in
which a phenomenon of interest was able to be observed in its entirety, such that
all changes occurring within the phenomenon were captured by observations.
While unlikely to be encountered in a practical investigation, a hypothetical
situation like the one presented is ideal for understanding theoretical implications
because it allows for complete knowledge of the truth. That is, the underlying
phenomenon was observed without perceptual apparatus bias (further discussion
might be possible about the bias introduced by the theory under which the
dataset was created, but, in this case, the discussion is strictly referring to the
bias imposed by the process of observation). With the truth known, the controlled
biases of observational resolution (as a proxy for sensor resolution) and the
inference method were introduced and deviations from the truth were observed.
Chapter IV, on the other hand, presents a practical situation in which real
data were collected from a real phenomenon of interest. In this case, the
phenomenon was the distribution of seagrass across a shallow shoal and the
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data were seagrass abundance data collected using two different sampling
networks. The data were selectively resampled to represent seven different
levels of sampling effort and used to evaluate both the statistical and spatial
probability of occurrence. Underlying the interpretation of the seagrass analysis
was the understanding that there was no knowledge of the "truth" to which
different representations derived from the different treatments could be
compared. As such, the different representations were instead compared to each
other in order to examine relative differences in interpretations of the examined
phenomenon.
Together, the two studies presented in Chapters Ill and IV demonstrate
the difference between an "ideal" situation isolated from unpredictable or
unaccounted variables, and a practical situation influenced by many more
external factors, providing insight into both the theoretical and practical
implications for the role of truth in the development of scientific understanding.

5.2 Theoretical Implications of This Study
The research described in this study utilized two methods commonly
employed in the environmental sciences to evaluate a phenomenon of interest:
the use of a "sensor," constrained by the limitations of its resolution to observe a
phenomenon; and the use of a sampling strategy, constrained by the number
and spatial orientation of the points, to collect observations of a phenomenon
which could not be observed in its entirety. Both methods allowed for reflection
on the perspective inherent in the perceptual apparatus applied to interpret the
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"truth" of the underlying phenomenon. By understanding the perspective inherent
in the perceptual apparatus, conclusions can be made about the role of the
perceptual apparatus in influencing one's conception of truth and the influence of
that conception on the knowledge derived from it.
The first notable result presented was the difference in cartographic
representations of the phenomenon of interest derived from data captured by
decreasing sensor resolutions within both the RESAM PLED and the
INTERPOLATED datasets. While even a basic understanding of spatial data and
cartographic concepts would render unsurprising the result that lower sensor
resolutions produce different cartographic representations than higher sensor
resolutions, that does not mean the result does not have practical or theoretical
implications for understanding the development of knowledge. Maps are visual
representations of information, directly communicated through map elements
such as legends, scale bars, or north arrows, while other information is indirect
and must be inferred by the map observer. Information, such as relative spatial
relationships or geographic variation in map feature attribute values, are
represented, but indirectly so. In the results presented, maps produced with
progressively lower sensor resolutions produced maps with progressively less
spatial detail which relayed less indirect information about the geographic
variation in attribute values and changed the nature of the interpretation of the
underlying phenomenon. As discussed in section 3.4 Discussion, the loss of
information was due to the aggregation of areal units, in which each aggregation
combined multiple smaller units such that progressively larger areas of the map
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were homogenized in terms of attribute values and became less able to precisely
answer the question of what value was occurring in a selected location. Referring
back to the hierarchal system proposed by Fisher (1999) (discussed in section
1.3.2) , spatial aggregations , such as the one examined, are inherently at odds
with hierarchal classifications based on value, such that spatial aggregations lead
to a breakdown in the hierarchal classification by attribute value. That is, if two
entities are spatially proximal, but have different attribute values, then a system
of spatial classification with high precision (i.e. high sensor resolution) would
maintain the two entities as categorically separate. However, when the entities
are aggregated into the same spatial unit due to low sensor resolution, their
attribute value differences are lost to the aggregate function (typically mean or
sum). Such an aggregation leads to two outcomes in terms of the map observer :
1) less information about the variability of the phenomenon of interest in
geographic space is relayed by the map to the map observer; and, 2) the
observer is less certain about the exact value occurring at any given point. In
terms of truth, both of these have the potential to change how the observer's
interpretation of "truth" is justified by the map. This is obvious when looking at the
range of cartographic representations within this study - one inherently perceives
the synthetic dataset 2.0 treatment level map to be more informative and more
representative of the underlying phenomenon than the 10.0 treatment level map,
even without direct comparison to the 1.0 "truth" map, and, therefore, one is more
certain about how well the 2.0 treatment level represents the truth than they are
about the 10.0 level. This leads to the conclusion that the uncertainty about the
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truthfulness of a cartographic representation is tied directly to the size of the
representative unit, such that larger units of more aggregated entities are
perceived to be less certain and less truthful than smaller units of less
aggregated entities. In this way, the map observer is placing constraints on their
interpretation and justification of truth derived from the map. This conclusion is
not novel in terms of understanding that maps can be manipulated to present
different representations of the same phenomenon or that maps with greater
aggregation have greater uncertainty. However, it is useful in understanding the
way environmental scientists arrive at a truth, how that truth affects the
knowledge derived from it, and how that process is different than the
philosophical description of how one develops knowledge. In this case, the maps
were not manipulated; the same cartographic and symbology methods were
applied to data derived from the same phenomenon. The differences were in the
amount of data used and the way the data were aggregated prior to being
mapped. The process of displaying the data in map format, using a standard set
of cartographic rules and symbologies to visualize the phenomenon, was the
perceptual apparatus, but the ultimate perception of truth to which it led was
greatly affected by the data upon which it relied. This conclusion leads to the
realizations that: 1) there exists some connection between information,
uncertainty, truth, and knowledge: and, 2) that by accepting one representation to
be more truthful than another, that the perception of truth, the knowledge derived
from it, becomes not a deterministic concept, as philosophically proposed, but
falls along a continuum of truthfulness. These themes will be returned to
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repeatedly in the course of these conclusions as they highlight the need for
environmental scientists to evaluate not just the interpretation of truth which they
have derived, but also the perception inherent in that interpretation and the value
in evaluating what other interpretations are possible.
The parallel result from the seagrass study was the realization that the
SRS and TBT sampling methods produced different cartographic representations
of the same phenomenon. Once again, the result is rather unsurprising; however,
it must be noted that both SRS and TBT methods are both scientifically justified
methods for assessing seagrass distribution and abundance. Therefore, when
considered in the context of truth, the implication is that if both methods are
considered scientifically acceptable, yet result in different representations of the
same phenomenon, then truth becomes a flexible concept and one's justification
for believing it is different for different methods of realizing it. This is inherently
contrary to the scientific realists' view that the goal of science is to elucidate a
single truth and, once again, speaks to the point that science accepts truth as
existing along a continuum of truthfulness.
The second notable result within the Synthetic Dataset study was the
difference between cartographic impacts of decreased sensor resolution and
statistical impacts of the same change. As described above, there were
perceptible differences in maps derived from differing sensor resolutions,
differences which could potentially lead to significantly different interpretations of
the same phenomenon. Statistically, however, differing sensor resolutions
resulted in no difference in interpretation of the phenomenon of interest, at least
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in terms of the central tendency. In terms of truth and knowledge, this result
demonstrates a key characteristic of the perceptual apparatus - one gets
answers to the questions they ask. The ANOVA answered the question "Is there
reason to believe that the central tendency of raster cell values of one sensor
resolution category is any different than the central tendency of any other sensor
resolution category?" The answer, in this case, was "No," or at least that there
was not enough reason to believe they were different. The cartographic
representations, on the other hand, answered questions about the geographic
distribution and spatial variability of the phenomenon of interest which, in this
case, differed greatly between sensor resolutions. Other questions could have
been asked about the information presented in the data which may have held
other insights about the observed phenomenon. One such question might
concern the number of very high or very low data points which exist within the
observed phenomenon. As evidenced in the discussion about outliers in the
RESAMPLED dataset, the ANOVA failed to capture an answer to that question,
while the boxplot was able to provide at least some insight into the number of
those outlier data points captured at each resolution level. Furthermore, the
boxplot demonstrated that the answer to such a question was sensitive to the
sensor resolution used to capture the data. Two conclusions can be derived from
this result: 1) that the interpretation of truth is dependent on the questions asked
about that truth; and, 2) that the questions asked must be appropriately applied
and answered to reflect the truth of the observed phenomenon. The first
conclusion highlights the subjectivity in how one interprets their observations.
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The choice of question is subjective, and depends upon a number of factors,
including the investigator's own interests and expectations from the observations,
the point of the study being conducted, the theory under which the investigator is
working, and the influences of the reigning paradigm. Furthermore, regardless of
the question asked, the question is asked prior to any interpretation being made,
and, in many cases, prior to making the observations. As such, the question
being asked determines which perceptual apparatus is to be employed in
constructing an interpretation. Thus, how the phenomenon is to be interpreted is
decided prior to the actual interpretation.
The second conclusion echoes the earlier discussion of propositional and
doxastic justification. If one is to be justified in their belief that they have revealed
the truth, they must establish propositional justification by asking questions which
are sufficiently able to elucidate the truth, as well as doxastic justification by
ensuring that those questions have been answered properly. Propositional
justification ensures that one has sufficient information to make a judgement,
while doxastic justification ensures that the type of information is appropriate for
making a judgement. In both cases, the issue of "sufficient" and "appropriate" are
subjective decisions which are determined by the reigning paradigm. Both the
determination of how to evaluate a set of observations and the determination of
whether that evaluation was sufficient and appropriate to be considered justified,
are components of Reiss and Sprenger's (2016) stage (iii) of the scientific
process, which, according to the authors, is a stage which is supposed to be free
of subjectivity. The evidence would suggest that subjectivity, in particular the
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values and ideals of the existing paradigm, determines how an observed
phenomenon is interpreted and whether or not a tested theory is accepted as
truth. Looking back at Chapter 11,each of the case studies presented
demonstrate situations where the scientific community initially found acceptance
in the way a theory was presented. However, after continued examination, and
often after the discovery of anomalies through empirical evaluation, the onceaccepted theory became insufficient. In those cases, the subjective "sufficient"
and "appropriate" changed and ultimately resulted in a changed interpretation of
the truth.
In the case of the seagrass study, the same question was answered by
two different methods, which resulted in two different answers. Statistically, the
evaluation of central tendency resulted in the calculation of two different medians
for the same seagrass population at all levels of effort above 55. In this case, the
existing paradigm accepts both SRS and TBT methods as justification for their
respective interpretations of seagrass distribution and abundance. Therefore,
once again, the situation arises where scientific justification exists for two
different interpretations of the same truth.
The final result of the synthetic dataset study to be discussed here is the
influence of interpolation on the interpretation of the observed phenomenon. In
this case, introducing interpolation to make inferences about attribute values of
the observed phenomenon at locations other than those observed, indicated an
interactive effect with sensor resolution such that interpolations carried out using
lower resolution sensor data were generally less accurate than those carried out
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using higher resolution data. This result was evidenced cartographically by the
calculation of RMSE (Figure 14), and statistically by the calculation of central
tendency, which differed significantly from the census/1.0 median at lower sensor
resolutions within the INTERPOLATED dataset (Table 8, Table 9, Figure 11) but
not the RESAMPLED dataset (Table 7, Figure 9). In terms of one's understanding
of the truth, there are two important conclusions that can be derived from this
result: first, the statistical understanding of the truth of the phenomenon of
interest was robust to sensor resolution when central tendency was calculated
directly, but not when interpolated. Second, is that lower resolution data, when
interpolated, didn't just lead to a less informative cartographic interpretation of
the truth, but one that was actually less truthful.
In the case of the seagrass study, because all data collected by both
sampling methods were subjected to interpolation and neither set had a "truth"
scenario against which it could be compared, the evaluation of objective
accuracy could not be made. However, some insight was gained when
comparing the interpolated results between the two methods. In particular, the
appearance of anisotropy in the TBS cartographic representations (Figure 25,
Figure 26, Figure 27) suggests that the combination of sampling method and
interpolation resulted in cartographic bias. If it is assumed that true distribution of
seagrass PO cannot be represented exactly by two different representations,
then one is left with two outcomes: either they accept both representations as
truth and are left without knowledge (remember, one cannot not have knowledge
of something that is not true), or they accept that one or the other, or both, of the
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representations is not exactly truthful but that they may have some degree of
truthfulness from which a limited knowledge could be derived. Here, again,
knowledge becomes not a deterministic concept, but a fuzzy concept, blurred by
a series of restrictions or caveats that suggest a level of uncertainty in its
existence. This understanding of knowledge is a rather large departure from the
philosophical definition proposed earlier.
The philosophical implication of the above is that one's understanding of
the truth of an observed phenomenon is not only dependent on the perceptual
apparatus, but that different components of that apparatus can have different
influences on one's interpretation depending on how they are combined, such
that one component may provide an accurate interpretation in one situation and
not in another. This somewhat complicates the concept of reliabilism by which a
belief that something represents the truth is justified if it stems from a method
known to reliably produce truths. In the cases studied above, it was evident that a
method may be reliable in one instance but not in another. Therefore, it would
appear that a method may only be considered reliable if it has been proven to be
reliable in the exact situation to which it is being applied. In a practical sense,
achieving the same situation in science is not just difficult, but often undesired, as
science pushes the boundaries of knowledge, seeking to elucidate new
perceptions of the truth by applying "proven" methods to new situations.
Furthermore, this potentially changes the way one perceives the process
of interpreting and justifying truth in the development in scientific knowledge. The
philosophical sense of knowledge is one based on deterministic concepts; for
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knowledge of a proposition to exist, the proposition must be true (as opposed to
false, nothing exists in between), and belief in it must be both complete and
justified. This conceptualization, however, implies that the truth of the proposition
is independent of the belief, such that it is either true or it is not, regardless of the
belief. Application of the results above, however, supports the earlier claim that
scientific justification is inseparable from truth in that one's access to, and belief
in, the truth is only as strong as the justification on which it is based. If, as in the
cases above, that justification results in a belief which is not complete but falls
along a continuum of certainty, then truth, as it is known, is not complete but falls
along a continuum of truthfulness. This is further complicated by the fact that
science is often concerned with complex, non-deterministic events. To get at the
truth of such events, science employs the scientific method, using selected
simple, deterministic hypotheses to evaluate less deterministic phenomenon
(based on Popper's theory of falsification ism). This not only creates degrees of
uncertainty within the resulting interpretation, but, as observed above, allows for
equal justification of different hypotheses and provides for competing
interpretations of the same event. The ultimate result in many cases, as
evidenced above, is not a complete, concrete understanding of the truth, but a
conception of truth that is more dynamic and dependent on what questions are
asked, how the answers are sought, and how the results are interpreted.
What, then, does that mean for the scientific knowledge based on such
truth? If knowledge is access to the truth, but one's understanding of the truth is
not a firm, fixed interpretation, then knowledge cannot be a firm, fixed concept
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either. As such, knowledge may be less than the accumulation of facts, as was
suggested by Popper and Lakatos, and more a fluid and dynamic process,
reminiscent of the truth as proposed by Kuhn. Popper's and Lakatos's view of
knowledge is one of facts accumulated and stacked together like bricks in a wall,
but, if the perception of truth is a more fluid and dynamic one, then a more
appropriate analogy might be that of a kaleidoscope, through which the truth is
examined and knowledge is constructed by many, slightly different
interpretations, patched together from their common parts. In this analogy,
"normal science" is the turning of the kaleidoscope, collecting the many shifting
views and attempting to stitch them together into one congruent conception.
Such an analogy is more sympathetic to situations, such as the above, where
different questions and different methods reveal slightly different interpretations
of the same phenomenon. It also supports examples such as the discovery of
matrix water flow through soils, the reorganization of the scientific community's
understanding of the primary drivers behind life history evolution, or the
ecological understanding of the processes which drive community heterogeneity,
in which small deviations from the expected results of normal science eventually
caused drastic shifts in how the scientific community perceived an examined
phenomenon.
The kaleidoscope analogy also addresses the other points made in regard
to truth and science above; namely, that some relationship exists between
information, truth, knowledge and uncertainty, and that the perception of truth is
dependent on the subjective prescriptions of the reigning paradigm. By this
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analogy, the way one perceives the truth of an observed phenomenon depends
on what picture they are given when they look through the kaleidoscope and how
that picture changes as they tum it. A perception formed with limited information,
derived from a limited number of views or few turns, is different than one formed
by many views and many turns. Given this, however, one is left to question "How
much information is enough to justify truth?" Clearly, if one is able to make every
possible observation, then one's perception is not limited by information, but is
dependent on issues of positionality and interpretation instead. However, in the
many cases where one is not able to make every possible observation, the
answer to that question would appear to be subjective and dependent on both
the nature of the phenomenon being observed and the standards of the
paradigm under which the observation is being made. As discussed previously,
the absence of information is uncertainty and science makes an enormous effort
to categorize, quantify, and account for the uncertainty in any given study.
Regardless of the method used to account for uncertainty, however, the standard
of how uncertain is too uncertain is a standard set by the reigning paradigm and
is not applied equally to all situations. Thus, the standard of what is enough
information is subjective.
Furthermore, the idea that one's subjective justification of truth is built on
an incomplete set of observations, leaves open the possibility that the next
observation may be incompatible with the current truth. As observed in the
examples of paradigm shifts presented in Chapter II new observations have the
potential to shift one's entire view of the truth. In terms of the kaleidoscope
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analogy, this makes sense. If one's truth is a perception stitched together from a
series of incomplete and not perfectly congruous views, then a single view,
incompatible with the others, may lead the viewer to conceptually restructure the
view that had been previously formed.

5.3 Practical Implications of This Study
Post-modern constructions of "truth" in many disciplines outside of the
environmental sciences have generally embraced the idea that one cannot arrive
at a truth without some level of subjectivity imposed by personal perspective and
perceptual bias present at every step of the research process, from observation
to conclusion. The environmental sciences, however, have yet to embrace that
construction and have generally assumed that scientific endeavors result in
objective truths so long as they satisfy the requirements of the reigning paradigm.
The practical implication of this study is the realization that environmental
scientists must be cautious when assuming that a result is truthful simply
because it satisfies the standards of the paradigm for the given field of work.
While some level of subjectivity may be generally recognized by the scientific
community through measures of uncertainty and the reporting of confidence
values alongside results, there also exists a culture in science of holding tightly to
standards and thresholds such that, so long as a presented result is shown to be
satisfactory given those standards, the result is deemed justifiably representative
of the truth. An example from the study presented was the observation that
evaluation of the central tendency of the RESAMPLED synthetic dataset
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remained statistically similar between data collected by higher and lower
resolution sensors, but visual analysis of the multiple maps derived from the
same data revealed obvious differences in the spatial distribution and variability
of the different treatment levels. According to the standard, the ANOVA is an
appropriate test for central tendency and the a of 0.05 is the appropriate
threshold for determining significant differences in that central tendency, but the
result of the analysis fails to reveal the truth of underlying phenomenon. Other
evaluations must also be considered, such as those accounting for outliers or the
spatial distribution of the data.
Similarly, caution should be exercised when assuming that a given
objective function realizes the knowledge goal. Both studies presented here
demonstrated experimental designs that involved the manipulation of sample
numbers which could be thought of as changes to sampling effort to
accommodate some ultimate objective function such as sampling cost or time.
Similarly, the application of statistical methods to determine statistical differences
in central tendency could be considered a surrogate objective function if the
objective was to maintain statistical similarity. In both, the RESAMPLE dataset
example described in the preceding paragraph, and in the calculation of median
PO in the seagrass dataset, the reduction in sample effort had no influence on
the interpretation. However, in other cases, such as in the calculation of PO
when interpolation methods were applied, reducing sample effort had significant
effects on the outcome. In these cases, changing the method changed how the
objective function influenced the outcome, a situation which was reflective, not of
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some aspect of the underlying phenomenon, but of how different conditions can
influence the same objective function and can result in different interpretations.
Thus, scientists should understand how satisfying an objective function, such as
minimizing sampling costs or maintaining a statistically equivalent central
tendency, might change not only how or whether an interpretation of truth is
justifiable, but how that interpretation is changed by the imposition of the
objective function itself.
Additionally, the results presented suggest that caution should be
exercised when assuming that "reliable" methods result in true interpretations of
a phenomenon, even if they are applied according to the requirements of the
standard. As demonstrated in the seagrass study, two different "reliable"
methods for designing sampling networks can produce two different
representations of the truth when applied to the same phenomenon. By the
standards upheld in the field of seagrass research, both TBS and SRS methods
are reliable methods of sampling seagrass abundance and distribution, though,
clearly, they resulted in different representations of the same event. Similarly, the
observation that interpolation methods had effort-dependent effects on the
calculation of central tendency also emphasizes the fact that scientists must be
aware of how one judges a method to be "reliable" and how such judgement
should be questioned relative to the context.
The results above have particularly practical implications when applied to
decision making. Should the ultimate goal of a scientific endeavor be not just
knowledge, but knowledge for the sake of influencing a decision, then an
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understanding of how one's interpretation of truth that underlies that knowledge
is limited, biased, or otherwise influenced, is critical for making the most informed
decision possible. League and Corwin (1996, p. 132) referred to the failure to
understand the limitations in one's interpretation of the truth as a " ... potential
danger to rational decision making." This point was made with reference to
decision support systems (DSS), by which users can access information to
derive knowledge used to aid in decision making; however, by accessing the
information through a predetermined environment, the user is not aware of how
their interpretation of the truth is being limited. DSS are designed systems which
must be built according to some set of theories which determine every aspect of
the system, from what data are available to be examined, to what methods are
available to analyze the data, to how the analysis results are to be presented. As
such, the DSS is built on the standards of the paradigm which a scientific
community deems acceptable. An example of DSS-driven limitations in the
interpretation of truth was illustrated above in the application of interpolation
methods through spatial DSS (SDSS). Within the GIS SDSS used, a series of
menu options exist that allow unspecialized users to apply highly complex
interpolation analyses to data without a conceptual understanding of the
limitations of the method. The result is the imposition of limitations on the
interpretation of truth derived from the interpolation without a necessary
awareness of those limitations by the user. In the study above, the interpolations
of low resolution data into high resolution cartographic representations produced
maps with noticeably less detail than the higher resolution interpolations.
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However, this resulted in a situation where the map observer would be unaware
of the limitations in the information relayed by the map because, regardless of
the resolution of the data used as the input, the output map was always produced
at a high resolution. In a non-interpolation situation like the RESAMPLED
dataset, the output resolution matches the input resolution, and a map observer
is cued to the limitations on input data by the size of the output raster cell. With
the interpolated data, there was no coinciding change in raster cell size, so
unwary or unknowledgeable map users may falsely believe that a map is relaying
the maximum level of detail possible given the cell size at which the data are
presented, when, in reality, the true input data was limited by a much lower
resolution. Ultimately, the user is not just constrained in their interpretation of the
truth, but the situation becomes one where a user is justified in holding a false
belief.
The conclusions described above suggest that more should be accounted
for in the justification of truth than just standards and thresholds. This is not an
argument against the use of standards and thresholds in science. Such tools are
essential for preventing the acceptance of any and all results as truthful and
serve as a means of comparison between good and better results, even if the
standards used are subjective. Science, in its search for objectivity, and through
evaluative processes such as peer review, is very good at subjecting scientific
results to tests of standard. Such tests ensure both propositional and doxastic
justification in that they evaluate whether results are both substantial enough and
arrived at appropriately. The underlying notion here is that there is such a thing
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as "wrong" in science, and, in no way, should this argument be construed to
suggest that all science is purely subjective and therefore anything can pass as
truth. The methods employed by scientists should be designed and carried out in
such a way as to differentiate that which is truthful from that which is not;
however, caution should be exercised in order to avoid indiscriminately rewarding
the title of truth to those results which pass the standards test. Environmental
scientists should move a step further and evaluate how their understanding of
truth, and therefore their knowledge derived from it, is limited by the theories they
embrace, the methods they use and the standards they apply. Consideration
should be given to evaluating other perspectives derived from other theories,
methods, and standards, and deciding whether or not those other perspectives
offer valuable insight into the described truth. In general, a greater effort is
needed among environmental scientists to recognize that all research
conclusions come with some inherent perspective related to the perceptual
apparatus which they have chosen, including the scale of analysis and methods
of data collection, and that by engaging in the uncertainties and limitations of
their chosen perspective, they can derive a more holistic conception of the truth
they seek.

5.4 Future Considerations
The study presented above was the first known effort to apply the
philosophical concepts of truth and knowledge to a practical investigation of
perceptual bias in an attempt to contextualize how knowledge is realized in
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environmental science. This study follows examples set in other disciplines that
have come to embrace the roles that perception and perceptual bias play in the
interpretation of truth. As a first study, the conclusions drawn are broad and
represent general relationships which were observed from the study presented.
Future work should continue to explore the conclusions here and consider more
nuanced aspects of the observed relationships. Opportunities recognized by the
author through this work include a focus on quantitative measures of uncertainty
and how, regardless of statistical thresholds, conceptions of truth shift along a
spectrum of uncertainty. Similarly, the relationship between objective functions
and truth is an area of exploration worthy of consideration. In particular, the ways
in which objective function choice drives the interpretation of truth. Also, in terms
of spatial analysis, opportunities exist to explore how different interpolation
methods applied to the same data drive different interpretations of those data.
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